Community engagement with Muslim communities:\ua0pitfalls and opportunities in a climate of counter-terrorism by Hartley, Jason





Community Engagement with Muslim Communities: 
Pitfalls and Opportunities in a Climate of Counter-Terrorism 
 
Jason Hartley                                                                                                                                  
 
Master of Arts Criminology and Criminal Justice 
Bachelor of Commerce                                                                                                            
Bachelor of Modern Asian Studies                                                                                    
(Vietnamese Language, History and Culture) 
Advanced Diploma Indigenous Studies                                                                                                




A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
at 
The University of Queensland in 2019 
The School of Social Science 
 





In a climate of counter-terrorism, police engagement of Muslim communities can be a difficult 
enterprise. The vast majority of literature in relation to counter-terrorism community 
engagement recognises the importance of trust and Muslim leadership as the foundation of 
relations with Muslim communities. This study attempts to understand the role and 
implications of uncertainty on community engagement in Muslim communities. Secondly, the 
research seeks to better understand and characterise the cultural nuances associated with 
Muslim decisions to bestow trust and engage police. The research investigates the implications 
for Muslim leaders when trying to simultaneously engage police and appease their own 
community. This study adopts a qualitative approach, drawing on interviews with Muslims (N 
= 29) and police officers (N = 14) in South East Queensland. The analysis exposes community 
perceptions of an over-reaction by authorities that has moved suspicion from a handful of 
terrorists to the entire Muslim community, resulting in community perceptions that Muslim 
communities are being targeted by police. The analysis suggests that the intentionality of police 
is a highly significant consideration in trust negotiations between police and Muslims. The 
study exposes a number of cultural preferences considered critical to trust negotiations in a 
manner that further highlights opportunities to enhance the development of trust and avoid 
pitfalls that can be problematic to community engagement. Results show that community 
engagement with police can also negatively impact the efforts of Muslim leaders to win and 
retain legitimacy in their own communities. The lessons learned from the analysis seek to 
further enhance the existing body of literature regarding strategies and resources to improve 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This research seeks to make a valuable contribution to improving the capacity of police to 
engage Muslim communities in a climate of counter-terrorism. The events of September 11, 
2001 (9/11) caused unprecedented social and political upheaval, with widespread recognition 
that “the new war on terror” would be the greatest challenge of the 21st century (Burnett & 
Whyte, 2005; McCulloch & Pickering, 2010; Mythen, Walklate, & Khan, 2013; Pantazis & 
Pemberton, 2009; Spalek, 2010). In Australia, 9/11 resulted in hostility toward Muslim 
minority communities, including a rise in Islamophobic attitudes (Allen, 2012; Meer, Dwyer, 
& Modood, 2010; Poynting & Mason, 2007), media stereotyping (Whitaker, 2002), racially 
motivated violence (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Frost, 2008), and Muslims being labelled with a 
“suspect community” status (Pickering, McCulloch, & Wright-Neville, 2008).  
 
Australia’s counter-terrorism response involved a period of “hyper legislation” unmatched by 
any other country (Spalek & Lambert, 2008), resulting in claims by Muslim communities that 
they had been unfairly singled out through indiscriminate counter-terrorism policing (Murphy, 
Cherney, & Barkworth, 2015; Mythen et al., 2013; Spalek, 2013; Spalek & Lambert, 2008; 
Walklate, Mythen and McGarry, (2011). Studies have exposed clear examples of counter-
terrorism responses alienating the very communities that are a key line of defence against 
terrorist propaganda and recruitment (English, 2010; Klausen, 2009; LaFree & Dugan, 2009; 
Murphy & Cherney, 2015; Parmar, 2011; Peek, 2011; Pickering et al., 2008; Saggar, 2009).  
 
While much effort has been invested in coordinating police powers to tackle terrorism, 
responses have also emphasised community engagement, which is seen as central to a “hearts 
and mind” approach (Birt, 2009; Beutel, 2015; Department for communities and local 
government [DCLG], 2007 ; Innes, 2006; Pickering et al., 2008; Spalek, 2010; Thacher, 2005; 
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How do the dynamics of uncertainty characterise the current climate of counter-









How can the partnering of Muslim leaders with police in a climate of counter-terrorism 
negatively impact the legitimacy of Muslim leaders within their own communities? 
 
1.1 The Problem  
 
The problem is that counter-terrorism community engagement strategies that fail to integrate 
unique community dynamics stand to jeopardize sustainable trust with Muslim communities, 
which is critical to the success of future terrorism prevention. In this vein, my research sought 
to address a shortfall in the literature by examining the factors that facilitate, erode, build, and 
maintain trust between authorities and Muslim communities in the context of counter-terrorism 
community engagement. Uncertainty, trust and leadership are considered key factors that 
influence the outcomes of police–community engagement in a climate of counter-terrorism. 
 
1.2 Background and Context 
 
The literature on counter-terrorism community engagement consistently refers to the critical 
importance of trust as the foundation of progress (Briggs, 2010; Hillyard, 1993, 2005; Laitinen, 
2008). Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair stated: “It is the communities that 
defeat terrorism, not the police” (Husband & Alam, 2011). Spalek (2010) advocated that the 
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success or failure of community-based counterterrorism will depend on the extent to which 
trusting relationships are built between police officers and communities. Jensen (2006)  
observed that in Muslim communities, building trust has to be at the forefront of best-practice.  
 
It is argued that police efforts to engage Muslim communities within the context of counter-
terrorism are built upon a precarious and unstable foundation arising from some inherent 
tensions (Cherney & Hartley, 2015).  Spalek (2013) elaborates that little is known about how 
authorities within a “new terrorism” context go about building trust between themselves and 
community members, or whether the building of the necessary trust in this context is at all 
possible.  Spalek (2010) adds that the existing body of literature constantly highlights the 
critical importance of community trust, further elaborating that an absence of literature on how 
that trust can be achieved only serves to undermine its critical importance.  
 
Goldsmith (2005) states that the response of authorities requires a level of “implicit trust”, 
which he describes as a deeper more entrenched trust found in committed, stable relationships. 
Spalek (2010) adopts this same conclusion by emphasising the urgency to operationalise a 
community approach to counter-terrorism based on implicit trust, but warns the window of 
opportunity is narrowing.  
 
Community engagement is a key focus of counter-terrorism policing in the USA, Canada, the 
UK and Australia, often under the guise of community policing (Edwards, Jeffray, & Pantucci, 
2015; Ramirez, Quinlan, Malloy, & Shutt, 2013). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have 
designated community-outreach coordinators, whose role is to establish key contacts with 
Muslims across Canadian society (Edwards et al., 2015). The Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
have established community liaison teams with a view of developing partnerships with 
community leaders to tackle the threat of violent extremism and enhance community relations 
(Harvey, Hogg,  & Bull, 2010). Following 9/11, a Muslim Contact Unit was also established 
within the UK Metropolitan Police Service to form partnerships with Muslim leaders and 
organisations (Lambert, 2011; Spalek, 2013), with outreach to Muslim communities as part of 
the UK’s Neighbourhood Policing (Innes, 2006; Staniforth, 2014).  
 
Police agencies have faced significant challenges in generating trust and securing the voluntary 
cooperation of ethnic minority groups (Cherney & Chui, 2010), making counter-terrorism 
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highly controversial and trust difficult to sustain (Baker, 2012; Cherney & Hartley, 2015; 
Lambert, 2011; Pickering et al. , 2008, Spalek, 2013, Spalek, El Awa, McDonald, & Lambert 
2008; Thacher, 2005).  In this vein, there is clear evidence that ethnic minority groups living 
in Australia have particularly problematic and poor relationships with police (Chan, 1997; 
Dixon & Maher, 2002; New South Wales Parliament Legislative Council [NSWPLC], 2001; 
Pickering et al., 2008). Furthermore, Silk (2010) reminds us that an absence of trust in 
community partnership leads to flawed problem  analysis and strategisation, limited outcomes, 
wasted resources and the potential to exacerbate already strained community relationships.  
 
Community members have complained that police intentionally initiate meetings with leaders 
who are more willing to comply with the requests of police instead of contacting more 
representative leaders who are prepared to address the real issues (Briggs, 20010; Cherney & 
Murphy, 2016). Innes (2006) suspects the result is a thin form of trust after a long history of 
difficult relations between Muslim minority communities and the police.  
 
Coercive counter-terrorism strategies throughout the world quickly emerged as the primary 
basis for policing terrorism. In response, an array of scholars points out that over-policing has 
eroded trust between the police and Muslim communities, leaving communities feeling 
stigmatised and upset (Bowling & Phillips, 2007;  Bridges & Gilroy, 1982; Cherney & Hartley, 
2015; Cherney & Murphy, 2015; Cherney & Hartley, 2015; Jefferson, Walker, & Seneviratne, 
1992; Jones & Newburn, 2001; Sivanandan, 1981; Smith & Gray, 1985; Waddington, Stenson 
& Don, 2004; Thacher, 2005; Sharp, & Atherton, 2007). Spalek (2013) states that the counter-
terrorism context easily generates resentment and distrust between police and Muslims given 
the high level of emotionality and its negative impact on Muslim communities (Spalek & 
O’Rawe, 2014).  The result is an ongoing concern that ill-conceived counter-terrorism 
engagement strategies continue to undermine the perceived legitimacy of authorities to deal 
with counter-terrorism (Allen, 2012, Briggs, Fieschi, & Lownsbrough, 2006; LaFree et al., 
2009; Meer et al., 2010 Poynting & Mason, 2007; Spalek, 2010).   
 
1.3   Uncertainty and Counter-Terrorism  
 
Murphy (2004) points out that the most important weapon of a terrorist is not a gun or a bomb 
but rather uncertainty that results in fear and alarm. McFadden, Lyon, and Pinsker (2008) 
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suggest that the promotion of uncertainty is a clear terrorist goal because it leads to fear, 
disruption and more critically, the destruction of trust (Gill, 2001; McFadden et al., 2008). As 
the opposite of trust, uncertainty has the capacity to undermine trust, which is the basis of 
societal functionality including community engagement that is critical to western democratic 
policing in a climate of counter-terrorism. The space of counter-terrorism community 
engagement consistently refers to the critical importance of trust as a foundation for progress 
(Demos, 2007; Hillyard, 1993, 2005; den Boer, Hillebrand, Nolke & Virta, 2008). Building 
trust has to be at the forefront of best practice in Muslim communities for police to achieve 
strategic victory as the basis of police counter-terrorism community engagement (Beutel, 2015; 
Birt, 2006; DCLG, 2007; Innes, 2006; Jensen, 2006; Pickering et al., 2008; O’Toole, Meer, De 
Hanas, Jones & Moodood, 2016; Spalek, 2010; Thacher, 2005; Vermeulen, 2014; Vermeulen 
& Bovenkerk, 2012). 
 
Research has documented how uncertainty can interfere with cognitive processes that influence 
decision-making (Gudykunst & Kim, 1995; Janis & Mann, 1977). Gudykunst (2005) proposes 
that uncertainty in culturally diverse interactions can result in avoidance behaviours (Turner, 
1988), with the potential to damage trust and communication (Duronto, Nishida, & Nakayama, 
2005; Hubbert, Gudykunst, & Guerrero, 1999; Samochowiec & Florack, 2010).  In order to 
prevent and/or minimise the destructive capacity of uncertainty on counter-terrorism 
community engagement, it is first imperative to understand the intricate dynamics that give 
uncertainty the destructive capacity to interfere with the key elements of community policing.  
 
1.4  Cultural Considerations and Trust 
 
There is now greater understanding that the dynamics of trust vary across cultures, and that the 
decision to trust is acknowledged to be culturally complex (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
Weick, 1979). Branzei, Vertinsky, and Camp (2007) found that cultural norms and values that 
are conducive to the efficient production of trust in one setting may be impotent, misleading 
and even damaging in another.  
 
Goldsmith and Harris (2012) state that more realism regarding the complexity of building 
trustworthy policing partnerships is required, warning of the need to avoid “glib talk” about 
trust until the different forms, challenges and possibilities for change are better understood in 
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a broader context. This sentiment is echoed by Tyler and Huo (2002), who state that to 
effectively engage communities, police agencies need to understand the intrinsic culture and 
internal motivations shaping people’s desire to voluntarily cooperate and trust police.   
 
Doney et al. (1998) examined how norms, beliefs and values impact the way individuals 
prioritize and process trust. Doney, Cannon,  and Mullen (1998) identified five cognitive 
processes to solicit trust, and demonstrated that specific trust methodologies were clearly 
consistent with particular cultural group profiles. Doney et al. (1998) discovered that in 
Australia, UK and the USA, trust is most likely to be formed by the calculus and capability 
processes; in contrast, Muslim societies placed far greater emphasis upon the prediction, 
intentionality and transference processes. In this respect there appears to be an absence of 
literature examining the compatibility between strategies applied by authorities to secure trust, 
and strategies used by Muslim communities to bestow trust. Doney et al. (1998) suggest that 
an alignment of consistent methods results in trust while a non-alignment reduces trust. In this 
regard, this research will attempt to understand the nature and existence of any non-alignment, 
and propose strategies to improve relationships of trust as the basis of effective community 
engagement. 
 
1.5  Muslim Leadership                                                                                                                     
 
Beekun and Badawi (1999) describe leadership from an Islamic perspective as having two 
primary roles: guardian and servant-leader. Leadership in Islam is considered an amanah (a 
trust), representing a psychological contract between a leader and followers where the leader 
will try his best to guide and protect followers, and treat them justly (Beekun & Badawi, 1999).  
 
Ali (2009) describes this relationship as based on a shared influence process that creates the 
right of subordinates to take a proactive role in confronting and correcting Muslim leaders. 
Beekun and Badawi (1999) explain how Muslim leadership is based on a servant leadership 
paradigm where the approval of the followers is a prerequisite for effective leadership. Wallace 
(2007) demonstrates this point by pointing out that an Islamic organisation is unhealthy unless 
it periodically holds it leaders accountable for their actions. 
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Altalib (1991) highlights a key principle of Islamic leadership with the notion of “shura”, 
meaning consensus, and exposes a leadership style where the community holds the power-base 
for decision-making. According to Rahman (1996), shura is fundamentally based on spirited 
debate to avoid follower resentment and dissatisfaction, which creates an obligation on the part 
of the leader to exemplify openness, a willingness to listen, and readiness to conform to the 
group.  
 
Hogg (2001) created the notion of an “intragroup proto-typicality gradient” where leaders who 
best demonstrate group values gain power, status and influence because they embody the most 
prototypical values of the group. According to Ali (2009), justice is the strongest Islamic value, 
with more than 200 direct references in the Qur’an. According to A’la Mawdudi (1991), justice 
legitimises the symbolic authority of Muslim Leadership and bestows trust and influence.  
 
Leadership cannot be effective in an environment where trust is lacking (Martin, 1999). A 
leader’s capacity to influence the members of his or her mosque is contingent on the level of 
trust he or she has with community members, which is legitimised by the demonstration of 
critical values (Ali, 2009). In this respect, where Muslim leaders engage partnership activities 
with authorities in a climate of counter-terrorism policies perceived as only targeting Muslims, 
the result is a de-legitimisation of symbolic leadership and a reduction in trust (Faris & Parry, 
2011).  
 
Faris & Parry (2011) argue that too many Muslim leaders have lost credibility in the sight of 
community members through attempts to please both authorities and the community resulting 
in a loss of leadership credibility. Kundnani (2014) states that this double strategy of seeking 
suitably compliant community leaders who can act as surrogate voices for their community, 
while systematically violating its cultural and civil rights serves to generate a permanent state 
of fear, anger and resentment, whilst suppressing constructive dialogue. As such, this research 
will seek to better understand the dynamics and implications for Muslim leaders when engaging 
police in a hope of working towards valuable recognitions that stand to improve the 
effectiveness of community engagement with Muslim communities. The overall aim of this 
thesis is to: 
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Critically analyse the factors (trust and uncertainty, leadership) that erode and enhance the 
process of counter-terrorism community engagement.   
 
 
1. 6  Analytical Framework 
 
Trust maybe the foundation of community engagement, but community engagement is more 
than a foundation of trust. Community engagement requires competent leadership and accurate 
knowledge concerning a terrain routinely characterised as complex and emotive. The following 
analytical frameworks were conceived to depict how all three research questions are critical to 
the overall aim of effective community engagement.  
 
In its simple form, this research seeks to expose pitfalls and opportunities of community 
engagement with Muslim communities by largely focusing on the “what”, “how” and “who”. 
These include “obstacles for better engagement” (uncertainty), “how to better engage” (trust) 
and “the implications for key participants (Muslim leaders) who are central to effective 
engagement”.   
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1.7 Thesis Overview 
 
Chapter one provides a background and context that outlines the challenges associated with 
community engagement by police with Muslim communities in a climate of counter-terrorism 
as a means to highlight the salience of the research aims.  
 
Chapter two explains the preferred methodology including the theoretical framework and 
reasons for applying a generic qualitative design and case study approach. It also addresses 
tools of data collection such as semi-structured questionnaires, sampling techniques and 
guidelines to categorize and analyze the captured data. This was done with reference to 
marginalized groups in the midst of cultural and language barriers in a community where 
members have voiced concerns that they have been over-researched and over-consulted with a 
final product that has not always reflected the true thoughts and intents of community members. 
A discussion is also offered to explain salient considerations to ensure credible findings that 
result from the application of a robust measure that ensures validity, reliability, generalizability 
and further efforts to minimize the impact of subjectivity.  
 
Chapter three presents an overview of the literature concerning the state of community relations 
when police seek to engage Muslim communities in a climate of counter-terrorism. The 
literature review is divided into four main sections including background and insights in the 
context of community engagement by police with Muslim communities including explanations 
with respect to perceived successes and failures of police in an environment fraught with 
challenges, high emotionality and complexity. This section also includes a recognition of best 
practice community engagement principles with an overview of lessons and opportunities to 
improve community engagement with Muslim communities. An overview of the literature is 
provided with respect to the three key focus areas of uncertainty, cultural implications for trust, 
and insights into the dynamics that determine Muslim leadership legitimacy. 
 
The literature review examines definitions and considers the application of uncertainty as a tool 
of terrorism to disrupt societal wellbeing including relationships between police and Muslim 
communities. Literature is further reviewed to expose the potential impact of uncertainty on 
factors critical to the success of police community engagement that include the development 
of trust, communication, anxiety, avoidance and withdrawal by community members. 
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Literature is then outlined concerning cultural proclivities associated with uncertainty that have 
the capacity to influence behavior.  
 
Chapter three also exposes the current state of the literature with respect to research on trust 
which compares an array of trust models. Topics include the salience and application of trust 
as the basis of societal wellbeing at a macro level, and trust as the basis of exchange at a micro 
level. The final section of chapter three considers the literature on leadership including a 
Muslim servant leadership paradigm, the relationship between values and leadership 
legitimacy as the basis of positively and/or negatively influencing interactions between Muslim 
community members and their leaders.  
 
Chapter four marks three results chapters that present findings with respect to the key topics of 
uncertainty, trust and Muslim leadership. Using data collected through 30 semi-structured 
interviews with Muslim community members and 14 serving Queensland Police Service (QPS) 
uniformed staff, this chapter focuses on findings associated with the notion of uncertainty and 
its impact on the current environment including the efforts of police to engage Muslim 
communities in a climate of counter-terrorism. Using data collected through semi-structured 
interviews with both police and Muslim community members, an analysis is presented 
concerning the impact of uncertainty and a perceived over-reaction that has resulted in 
consequences non-conducive to police community engagement. Consequences appear to 
include decisions on the part of Muslim community members to not bestow trust, and the 
withdrawal of Muslim leaders. Furthermore, findings are presented on perceived cultural 
proclivities including community efforts to manage and avoid uncertainty that highlight a 
number of pitfalls and opportunities to enhance community engagement practice. 
 
Chapter five presents an array of results associated with the cultural nuances that characterize 
the processes applied by Muslim community members to demonstrate trustworthiness and 
bestow trust in a climate of counter-terrorism. An analysis is presented outlining the impact, 
risks and consequences of misinterpreting cultural cues that create room for misunderstanding 
and the loss of trust. This chapter highlights pitfalls and opportunities for police to build upon 
existing successes, avoid pitfalls and seize opportunities to improve trust relations in an 
environment that as culturally complex where there are examples of alienating Muslim 
communities and the withdrawal of Muslim leaders.  




Chapter six presents’ results associated with the implications for Muslim leaders when 
engaging police in a climate of counter-terrorism. It exposes community reactions to the 
involvement of Muslim leaders with police, and highlights community insights into how 
Muslim leaders win legitimacy, trust and influence. Using data collected through the semi-
structured interviews, the analysis exposes the relevant factors that inhibit or facilitate 
community engagement. As such, this chapter highlights the pitfalls and opportunities that 
require consideration in the pursuit of formulating engagement practices that minimizes 
obstacles and lessens community resistance so that community engagement outcomes stand to 
be improved.   
 
The discussion in chapter seven interprets and describes the significance of the findings on 
uncertainty, trust and leadership in light of existing literature, and offers new understandings 
and insights into the goal of improving strategies that fail to integrate unique community 
dynamics and jeopardize sustainable trust with Muslim communities. As an evaluative case 
study, this chapter presents a summary of the findings with discussion that draws a number of 
evidence-based conclusions regarding the key elements of community engagement by police 
in Muslim communities. This chapter further highlights relationships in the data that seeks to 
crystalize knowledge claims in relation to opportunities and pitfalls that determine the quality 
of community engagement by police in Muslim communities.  
 
The concluding chapter, chapter eight, provides direct answers to specific research questions 
that aims to eliminate identified pitfalls and address shortfalls in the literature. This is achieved 
by addressing the factors that facilitate, erode, build, and maintain trust between authorities 
and Muslim communities in the context of counter-terrorism community engagement. This will 
include unique contributions to the literature and an array of recommendations to improve 
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Chapter Two:  Methodology 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This research seeks to understand and explain the factors that erode, build, and maintain trust 
between police and Muslim communities in a climate of counter-terrorism. The key focus is 
to better understand the implications of an environment characterized by uncertainty; how 
Muslim communities demonstrate trustworthiness and bestow trust; and how these dynamics 
impact on the efforts of Muslim leaders to win legitimacy and influence among their own 
communities.  These are the strategic aims considered critical components of effective 
counter-terrorism community engagement. 
This chapter will explain the methodology used to formulate and answer the research 
questions through a qualitative approach that involved semi-structured interviews with 29 
Muslim participants, and a further 14 semi-structured interviews with members of the 
Queensland Police Service. This methodology focuses on understanding Muslim behaviour in 
the context of a relationship with police. This explains why 29 Muslim community members 
and only 14 police were interviewed. As such, insight will also be provided into adopted 
measures that ensure academic integrity while further overviewing the background of the 
researcher to highlight measures to reduce issues of researcher subjectivity. 
 
2.1 A Qualitative Research Design 
 
This research is firmly entrenched within a qualitative paradigm that was determined to be 
the most effective choice to meet the aims of this study. Although, mainstream criminological 
research most commonly draws upon quantitative methodologies (Merriam, 1998; 
Tewksbury, Dabney, & Copes, 2010), a recognition of an absence of research and literature 
on trust relations (Spalek, 2010), uncertainty (Innes, 2006) and Muslim leadership within the 
context of counter-terrorism community engagement highlights a void of literature and 
understanding. Within a qualitative paradigm there are many different ontological and 
epistemological positions, however, a void in the literature and understanding exposes the 
need for a qualitative, grounded theory approach where reflexive interpretation is used in 
order to respond to the research questions. Grounded theory is considered to be a highly 
appropriate and valuable method in the research of new phenomenon within a new 
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substantive context that lacks clarity of understanding. Grounded Theory has a long history 
that allows insight into leadership social processes and associated dynamics. 
The landscape of counter-terrorism is often characterised as socially and culturally complex 
with high emotionality in a space that is viewed as misunderstood and includes strained 
community relationships with police (Baker, 2012; Chan, 1997; Cherney & Hartley, 2015; 
Dixon & Maher, 2002; Lambert, 2011; McCulloch & Wright-Neville, 2008; NSWPLC, 2001; 
Pickering et al., 2008; Spalek, 2013; Spalek, El-Awa, & McDonald, 2009; Thacher, 2008). 
This suggests that answers are often not readily apparent, which creates the need for research 
to better understand and explain relevant behaviours. Where researchers find themselves with 
research questions or studies that are in need of further investigation in the midst of a void of 
literature on a particular subject then a qualitative approach offers a viable alternative  (Caelli, 
Ray, & Mill, 2003; Merriam & Tisdell, 2009).  
 
Research through a qualitative paradigm stands to capture the essence of people, objects, and 
situations (Berg, 2004) based on sources of well-grounded descriptions and explanations of 
behaviours in local contexts (Miles & Huberman, 1984). In this respect, the candidate achieved 
a deeper descriptive analysis and understanding of the key phenomena and critical relationships 
through a qualitative approach that was chosen to enable concrete depiction of detail, 
unforeseen variables, and attention to the perspectives of those studied (Patton, 1980).   
 
While critics of qualitative approaches level accusations of it being “atheoretical”, “lacking 
rigour” and being prone to “method slurring” (Kahlke, 2014); proponents respond by stating 
that focused effort by the researcher to establish epistemological and theoretical congruence 
throughout the research study can counter such limitations (Caelli et al., 2003; Ryan, Kofman, 
& Aaron, 2011). In adopting this approach, I have endeavoured to abide by the essential 
characteristics of qualitative research specified by Merriam (1998) – “the goal of eliciting 
understanding and meaning, the researcher as primary instrument of data collection and 
analysis, the use of fieldwork, an inductive orientation to analysis findings that are richly 
descriptive” (p. 11). In this vein, a qualitative research design was applied as an exploratory 
methodology to conduct a small-scale, but in-depth, research study utilising semi-structured 
interviews of the Muslim community and police in South East Queensland.  
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2.2 A Case Study Approach 
 
A case study approach was viewed as the most appropriate method to examine police-
community engagement and partnership behaviour within the context of counter terrorism 
focusing upon the South East Queensland experience. Grotelueschen, Kenny, and Harnisch 
(1980, p. 5) suggest, the use of a case study approach is appropriate when the objective is to 
“develop a better understanding of the dynamics of a program…when it is important to be 
responsive, to convey a holistic and dynamically rich account”. According to Yin (2009) the 
case study method enables the researcher to explore, explain, describe, evaluate, through 
application that “is used in many situations, to contribute to our knowledge of individual, 
group, organizational, social, political and related phenomena” (Yin, 2009, p. 4). 
    
Yin (2009,  p. 2) states that a case study approach is the preferred method in qualitative research 
when “(a) ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed; (b) the investigator has little control over 
events; and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context”. My 
selection of counter-terrorism community engagement with Muslim communities in South East 
Queensland constitutes such a real-life context where the research seeks to address the “how 
and why” of contemporary phenomena associated with uncertainty, trust and leadership.   
 
Merriam states that case studies “involve description, explanation and judgement” (1998, p. 
39). As Stake (1995) explains, in case studies “we are trying to understand behaviour, issues 
and contexts with regard to our particular case….We try to find the pattern or the significance 
through direct interpretation, just asking ourselves ‘What did that mean?’” (p. 78). 
Furthermore, a case study approach defined by Queensland experience acknowledges that the 
approach of the Queensland Police is different to the approaches of the New South Wales and 
Victorian police jurisdictions. For example the number of Community Police Liaison Officers 
in Queensland is 1701 while southern counterparts maintain 402 in larger jurisdictions. In this 
regard, the Queensland Muslim Community is further smaller and less cultural diverse than 
Sydney and Melbourne. As such, Yin’s criteria suggests a case study approach seeking to better 
understand  nuances unique to Queensland experience through a qualitative research paradigm 
is completely suitable to fulfil the desired aims of this research.  
                                                          
1 Personal communication with Queensland Police Inspector Lesley Bullus,- Community Engagement Command – Queensland Police  
2 Personal communication with Queensland Police Inspector Lesley Bullus,- Community Engagement Command – Queensland Police 
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2.3 Multi-Disciplinary Approach      
 
According to Merriam (1998), “the disciplinary orientation is the lens through which you view 
the world. It determines what you are curious about, what puzzles you, and hence, what 
questions you ask that in turn begin to give form to your investigation”(p. 45). The research 
recognizes that the notions of community engagement in the context of counter-terrorism fall 
soundly within the boundaries of criminology, but recognizes that an absence of literature on 
the details of trust and leadership in the context of culturally diverse environments between 
groups requires an appeal to social psychology, sociology and cross-cultural psychology.  
A balanced contribution of disciplines required “a tolerance for ambiguity” (Merriam, 1998 p. 
20) and an ability to “adapt to unforeseen events and change direction in pursuit of meaning” 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 21). In this regard, Conger (1998) and Alvesson (1996) have identified the 
advantages of researching leadership qualitatively which include flexibility to follow 
unexpected ideas during research, and an ability to study symbolic dimensions and social 
meaning which will be particularly relevant to interpreting responses in a culturally diverse 
environment.   
 
In this light, the value of cross-cultural psychology became increasingly evident particularly in 
view that collectivism and responses to uncertainty are widely recognised as two of the most 
critical cross-cultural constructs to accurately interpret behaviours (Bond, 2002; Jones, 2007). 
As such, a multi-disciplinary approach was considered a valuable contribution towards 
achieving the research aims. 
 
2.4  Ethical Considerations 
 
A grounding philosophy of my research was to adopt a “do no harm” ethical stance which 
required continuity and transparency in the formulation of the research design and achievement 
of research objectives. At every opportunity, I identified myself as a University of Queensland 
PhD candidate and sought to re-assure participants that my research was to inform 
improvements toward the future relationships between police and Muslim communities 
specifically with respect to the development of counter-terrorism community engagement.  
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In qualitative research, concerns associated with research ethics most often revolve around 
various issues of harm, consent, privacy, and the confidentiality of data (Punch, 1994). As such, 
the researcher has a constant obligation to protect the rights, privacy and welfare of the people, 
communities and organizations that their wellbeing is of paramount concern (Merriam, 1998; 
Patton, 1980). In this respect, it is believed that the active involvement of communities is not 
only good for the research but also a matter of good research ethics (Maiter, Simich, Jacobson, 
& Wise, 2008). 
 
However, the active involvement of communities also creates ethical considerations. This was 
the case where the Islamic Council of Queensland (ICQ) who is a key community research 
partner instrumental in achieving ethical approval, also expressed a desire to nominate and 
approve the final list of community respondents. This was considered inappropriate for two 
main reasons. Firstly, one of the key research aims is to investigate the dynamics of Muslim 
leadership suggesting that a snowball approach through ICQ carries the potential to recruit 
participants most favourably associated with ICQ resulting in a loss of objectivity and 
community representation with the potential to skew results.   
 
Secondly, initial discussions with Shiite Muslims revealed concerns that ICQ only represents 
the interests of Sunni Muslims which created a sense of discomfort that a Sunni council not 
only knows the identity of Shiite participants but would assume the right to approve their 
participation. The management of this issue required three presentations to separate bodies 
representing the majority of Muslim communities in Queensland. The first was to the ICQ, the 
second was to the Imam’s Council of Queensland which enjoys a broader representation of 
grass roots Muslim leadership including imams and sheiks. A third presentation was given to 
community leaders at the Islamic Shiite Council of Queensland situated in Underwood; all 
bodies expressed enthusiasm to support the aims of this research.  These community bodies 
assisted but not solely utilized to recruit participants but did provide letters of introduction and 
verbal support that proved valuable in demonstrating the merit of the research and ethical 
approval. Letters from the ICQ, and the Queensland Imam’s Council, and Islamic Shiite 
Council are attached as appendix 2.0.   
 
These community dynamics and tensions highlighted the need for the confidentiality of 
participants, (Apentiik & Parpart, 2006), appropriate sampling methods (Gould & Cross, 
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1972), the identification and liaison of gatekeepers that included the negotiation of local 
cultural and linguistic barriers that importantly influenced how the research is perceived and 
understood by participants (Renert, Russell-Mayhew, & Arthur, 2013). Due to the sensitivities 
in an environment routinely characterised by emotion and distrust, a deliberate decision was 
made to not collect data on the religious, ethnic, or the migrant background of interviewees.  
However, although some information could be inferred through responses to interview 
questions, only the most general demographic description of the interviewees is included. 
 
Participants were subsequently assured that their identities would be anonymized and research 
data collected would be protected; and that the data would be secured on password protected 
computers or in lockable containers, at home and on University grounds. In view of it being 
very difficult to maintain the anonymity of participants in face-to-face interviews (Fink & 
Kosecoff, 1985), the researcher safeguarded and collected information by using numbers to 
protect identities. Participant confidentiality and anonymity was upheld with pseudonyms and 
coded transcripts were securely stored. 
 
The right and opportunity of all participants to withdraw consent from the research study at 
any time was also explained with an assurance that confidentiality and anonymity will be 
maintained. Informed consent procedure was clearly articulated both written and verbal to 
ensure that participants clearly understood the need to protect anonymity and confidentiality 
while the right to withdraw appeared to make the respondents more comfortable with being 
honest about sensitive questions. In every case, verbal and written consent of Muslim 
community participants was documented and recorded.  
 
Applications for ethical approval were prepared and submitted to both the University of 
Queensland Research Council and the Queensland Police Research Approval Committee, 
outlining the procedures for principles of informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality and 
protection from harm. In view of the cultural sensitivities and at often times, controversial 
nature of the relationship between police and Muslim communities, the Queensland Police 
Research Approval Committee was delayed three times before final approval was granted. This 
was primarily the result of a need to clarify the exact nature of the research in terms of the 
interface with the operational requirements of counter-terrorism policing.  Upon being granted 
ethical approval, I was granted authority by the senior executive of the Queensland Police to 
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arrange interviews through the appointed academic liaison officer who was an inspector of 
police.  QPS personnel were then assigned the task of being interviewed where I further 
acquired and documented the verbal and written consent of QPS personnel themselves.  
 
2.5 Marginalized Groups and Community Access 
 
The flow of information in marginalized communities contains its own set of unique barriers 
to secure trust (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Conducting research on sensitive topics with stigmatized, 
disadvantaged and/or oppressed populations can create a number of obstacles with the potential 
to impede efficient data collection (Russell, Touchard, & Porter, 2002). Lee (1993) states that 
the past experiences of vulnerable groups often makes them cynical as they tend to assume the 
worst about an outsider until their fears have been dispelled.  
 
In the years since 9/11 and the emergence of Islamophobia, Bolognani (2007, p. 290) argues 
that “any piece of research involving Muslims becomes political” resulting in a general sense 
of mistrust towards people investigating issues that concern Muslim communities. This is 
further compounded by media misrepresentation at times involving the public ridicule of 
Islamic theology resulting in high community emotionality (Allen, 2012; Aly & Green, 2008; 
Rizvi, 2005). In this vein, the researcher often met community participants who wanted to 
contribute towards positive change yet were sceptical of the true motivations of the research 
asking; “is this more of the same?”  When asked what was meant by such a question, one 
participant responded; “Islamophobia extends beyond the media and the masses even to 
researchers”. 
 
This dynamic demonstrated what appeared to be research fatigue where a number of Muslim 
participants felt that Muslim communities had been over-consulted and over-researched. Such 
phenomena was evident in the literature where research fatigue and a perceived failure to 
capture the reality and intent of Muslim communities had on occasions resulted in a perception 
that ensuing policy decisions were further compounding dilemmas (Afshar, Aitken et al., 2006; 
Clark, 2007; Dwyer et al., 2008). In this respect, the consequences appear to be research fatigue 
and reluctance to assist researchers.  In these circumstances, Ryan et al. (2011) argues that there 
is an ensuing challenge for the academic researcher to gain access, trust, negotiate with 
community gate keepers, establish rapport, and overcome suspicion. In terms of this research, 
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there were clearly community participants who expressed fear and concern that bias attitudes 
not only existed in the wider community but also among researchers. 
 
Gate Keepers, Community Access and Building Trust 
 
Negotiating access to any community depends on the interpersonal relationships between 
researchers and participants (Lee, 1993). Most outsiders tend to heavily rely on gatekeepers to 
gain access to hard-to-reach groups (Etzold, 2013; Jocano, 1975). In order to establish trust and 
rapport, researchers are often advised to find a key informant, preferably one who has a valued 
reputation in the community (Whyte, 1955), who could then introduce the researchers with 
other members of the community. If the key informant is known to the researcher, this would 
assist in opening doors to collect quality data (Narag & Maxwell, 2014; Singleton, Jr, Straits, 
& Straits, 1993). This required significant and “extra” investment in relationships to be 
undertaken prior to the recruitment of participants. This was manageable but not without risks 
considering I was formerly appointed the State Islamic Liaison Coordinator for the Queensland 
Police; this meant that I had some networks through my work with the police but also required 
recognition that my association with police carried the risk of being perceived by Muslim 
community members with fear and distrust.  One gatekeeper responded that when promoting 
the merits of this research at the mosque and mentioning my background in the police could be 
counterintuitive; one attendee responded that there was a good chance that the researcher was 
a spy and could not be trusted. 
 
In a climate of counter-terrorism, dispelling fear is best achieved through building trust, as 
such, successful qualitative research requires the securement of trust with community and 
participants to allow “the free flow of information” (Spradley, 1979, p.78). To establish trust 
relationships with marginal communities, researchers need to break or minimize the power 
relations between the researcher and the participants (Emmel, Hughes, Greenhalgh, & Sales, 
2007). Most rapport building literature suggests that this occurs through social interaction 
(Sztompka, 1999), and reciprocal interaction (Rashid, 2007; Umaña-Taylor & Bámaca, 2004) 
while demonstrating respect and empathy (Elliott, Watson, & Harries, 2002; Liamputtong, 
2006). On my part, this required proactive involvement through a concerted decision to attend 
community activities to informally chat/connect with community members as the basis of 
empathy where the intended result is trust and rapport.  




There is an Arabic saying that states “a friend is someone who gives you total freedom to be 
yourself” (قیدصلا وھ صخشلا يذلا كحنمی هیرحلا هلماكلا نا نوكت كسفن)3. In this vein, a concerted effort 
was made to enjoy meals together which no doubt created a comfortable and open environment 
for safe and honest discussion where participants could be themselves. This highlights the aim 
of qualitative research to achieve in-depth understandings of a social setting, situation or 
problem from the perspectives of the people involved (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008). In this 
regard, if time and commitments permitted, I never turned down an invitation to events that 
included iftar dinners or social gatherings at the mosque that would routinely add to my 
knowledge and help mature my perspective. 
 
I attended dozens of community meetings and engaged two community service projects that 
required “getting my hands dirty” through building fences, constructing a garage and planting 
trees at two Islamic Schools which created opportunity to work side by side with community 
members. This enabled many hours simply socialising and discussing the political and social 
landscape with community members many of whom I now consider to be friends.  These 
experiences enabled me to experience more personal empathy from being “sensitive to the 
needs and lives of the participants” (Liamputtong, 2006, p. 66) rather than only focusing on 
research aims.  
 
Additional to years of community exposure, I further attended Police and Muslim Community 
liaison forums, and other community activities and meetings that created critical opportunity 
and networks as the basis of informal discussions to clarify the research aims and identify the 
most informed respondents. This approach allowed close immersion into the settings in order 
to obtain valuable insights through opportunities to observe, listen and interact before and after 
the interviewing of participants to ensure the best mechanism to interpret interview responses. 
This contributed to what Tewksbury and Gagné (1997) describe as demonstrating the necessary 
empathy that helps participants feel safe and accepted with a readiness to be forthcoming in 
their responses.  
 
                                                          
3 Arabicpod 101, 2017 – Innovative Language Learning. 
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Sixsmith, Boneham & Goldring (2003) emphasize that a failure to understand local dynamics 
including cultural nuances may generate noncooperation and suspicion between researchers 
and participants.  Sixsmith et al. (2003) add that an array of researchers concede that the 
credibility of the researcher is a critical consideration in accessing vulnerable groups. In this 
respect, I found that without credibility and trust with various community members, I would 
have not been able to access a number of other community members who had the greatest 
capacity to contribute to the research. In this respect, my background of working in culturally 
diverse environments including ongoing interaction with refugee communities, having been a 
senior cultural advisor with the Queensland Police, and having made an effort to attend 
community functions with a further two years of Arabic language provided a sound foundation 
and sense of credibility with community members. 
 
This process allowed me to observe “for myself” the gatekeepers with the greatest influence 
also representing the greatest capacity to open doors with community members. This type of 
interaction beyond the superficial also resulted in a better understanding to better understand 
cultural nuances and potential barriers to effective data gathering such as research fatigue and 
community etiquette.  
 
Furthermore, Muslims are enormously diverse. They come from over 60 countries, following 
different theological schools, and having various ethnic, political, national and ideological 
backgrounds. Consequently, the Muslim leadership structure has become as diverse as the 
fabric of its constituency (Sohrabi, 2016). In terms of the Queensland experience, Shiite 
Muslims did not recognise the authority of Sunni Muslim leaders and vice versa, and  a number 
of other Sunni Muslims highlighted concerns that ICQ was largely dominated by Hanafi Sunni 
Muslims with ancestry stemming from the sub-continent including India and Pakistan. In this 
light, as Maiter et al. (2008)  highlights qualitative studies of ethnic communities often reveal 
enormous levels of diversity and heterogeneity arising from “immigration history and length 
of time after arrival, language skills … and socio-economic status” (p. 312). These dynamics 
raised questions about how notions of a “community” are constructed, where Ryan et al. (2011) 
challenge the need to identify true gate keepers that actually represent and speak for the 
community.  In this regard, a strategy was required to identify gatekeepers in each community 
which required simultaneous liaison with multiple groups. Progress varied according to the 
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dynamic of each relationship in each community, and although often time consuming and 
occasionally frustrating, this was a necessary exercise to achieve representative results.  
 
Examples include observations that Sunni Muslims were more guarded than Shiite Muslims; 
while Turkish Sunnis were more proactive and some Sunni Arab Muslims appeared to be more 
suspicious. Overall, although some participants expressed hesitation, after some time they 
became more comfortable and confident.  
 
2.6 Data Collection 
 
Purposive Sample - Muslim Communities  
 
The choice of participants for this research was part of a purposive strategy described by 
Esterberg (2002), “in which you intentionally sample research participants for the specific 
perspectives they may have” (p. 93). Bolognani (2007) warns against “snowballing from a 
single community organisation highlighting the risk of reproducing a hegemonic point of view 
that claims to be widely representative” (p. 291). 
 
In view that one of the key research aims sought to explore the traits and challenges of Muslim 
leadership in Queensland, it was concluded that a snowball approach using Muslim 
representative leadership forums to solely recruit participants created the risk of skewing 
results with a further loss of objectivity. In this respect, Ergun and Erdemir (2010) state that 
gaining access through local powerful gatekeepers may result in participants failing to disclose 
real objective information to researchers. Although widespread community support for the ICQ 
was evident throughout the research, it was by no means overwhelmingly dominant where as 
many as half of all Muslim respondents acknowledged support for ICQ. while the other half 
did not.  
 
It needs to be recognised that Muslims living in Australia originate from many different 
cultures including a diversity of Islamic faiths. This dynamic will challenge the capacity to 
generalise research findings with most Muslims. In view of the diaspora reflecting the diversity 
of Queensland Muslim communities, it quickly became apparent that in order to achieve any 
sense of representative community views, there was a present effort to identify and build 
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relationships with gatekeepers from a number of communities. Respondents routinely 
recognised that the wider “Muslim community” in Queensland consisted of “smaller Muslim 
communities” usually defined by a particular ethnicity that often frequented a particular 
mosque.  In Queensland, there were widespread perceptions that the Darra Mosque was Fijian 
Indian; the Rochdale Mosque was Bosnian; the Kuraby Mosque was South African, and native 
Arab speakers most commonly frequented the Logan, West End and Bald Hills Mosques. Other 
Muslim community clusters included Turkish, Indonesian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi who also 
gathered in Muslim communities defined by ethnicity.  
 
This meant that a purposive sampling strategy with some chance of representation would need 
to extend beyond any one ethnic community, mosque, and socio-economic. This meant that 
representative views required the researcher to not only access participants from a range of 
ethnic backgrounds but also from different demographics and experience.   
 
Layder (1998) explains that credibility is not derived from the size of the sample but more from 
the right tools targeting the right sample further adding that this is the key to richness of 
information. Respondents considered suitable based on activity in the community including 
leadership and problem-solving roles, were identified through attending the Queensland Police 
and Muslim Communities Liaison Forum, directly visiting mosques, Islamic Schools and 
community groups such as the Islamic Women’s Association of Queensland. The below 
diagram reflects the characteristics of the Muslim sample that ensures representation and a 






Sunni/Shiite 2 Shiite and 27 Sunni 
Role 8 Imams; 5 Academics; 2 Teachers at Islamic Schools; 5 
community members considered problem solvers; 4 
community leaders in non-religious roles; 3 youth workers and 
2 youth (older than 18 years) 
34 | P a g e  
 
 
Ethnic Background Palestine, Bosnia, Turkey, India, South Africa, Somalia, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Anglo 
Australian, Yemen and South-East Asian. 




Purposive Sampling – The Queensland Police 
 
Through the Queensland Police Research Approval Committee, a specific request was made to 
interview personnel including frontline constables, to community engagement specialists, 
cultural diversity specialists, station managers, district officers and assistant commissioners. 
This was deliberate and strategic choice to ensure complete and representative views from 
every level of police connected to Muslim communities. Furthermore, all personnel 
acknowledged that their responsibilities in one manner or another, past and/or present were 
directly connected to Muslim communities in a capacity that was operational, liaison, 
educational or the management of such responsibilities. The vast majority of police officers 
worked in the south-eastern corridor of Queensland between South Brisbane and Logan where 
the majority of Queensland Muslims currently reside. 
 
Approval was subsequently granted by the Queensland Police to interview all staff excepting 
counter-terrorism personnel on grounds of security and confidentiality related issues. In this 
regard, the Queensland Police appointed a research liaison officer of the rank of inspector who 
kindly assigned staff who matched the desired parameters excluding those connected to 
counter-terrorism.  
 
Semi Structured Interviews 
 
This research conducted face-to-face interviews that are a more personalized and engaging 
interview technique considered conducive to the establishing of rapport, and enables the 
researcher to better contextualize responses (Sapsford & Jupp, 2006; Wilson & Sapsford, 
2006). Semi-structured interviews are generally conversation based in a format that Cleary, 
Horsfall, and Hayter (2014) describe as a structure that enables a set of pre-determined 
questions to direct a fluid discussion around the topic from the perspective of the participant.  
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While some questions incorporated prompts to elicit further information or to expand on 
opinions expressed, they remained flexible in their application. Interviews were scheduled at a 
time and place considered convenient by the participant. A choice was given to police 
personnel to be interviewed at police stations or at the University of Queensland, in most cases 
police stations were preferred where the interview was conducted in a room designated for 
interviewing. In four cases, the officers elected to be interviewed at the University of 
Queensland.  
 
Community participants were afforded opportunity to choose times and locations considered 
culturally safe and comfortable with minimal demands on travel time and/or expense.  Most 
community leaders chose to be interviewed at the local mosque or community organisation; 
while on four occasions the researcher was invited to attend the home of the participant. 
Furthermore, it was not unusual to be invited to enjoy a meal together before or after the 
interview. In relation to gender issues and cultural safety, it was clearly evident that female 
participants preferred being interviewed in full public view which may explain consistent 
preferences to meet at a cafe or community organisation. Other considerations included an 
awareness that Fridays were least convenient to arrange interviews because of expectations to 
attend the mosque up to five times throughout the day to offer prayers.  
 
As E. R. House (1977) identified, it is necessary to convey a desirable interviewing that is 
“perceived as caring about and interested in the people being studied, but neutral about the 
content of what they reveal….he must be impartial rather than simply objective” (pp. 45–46). 
During the interviews, I strived to portray myself with empathy and neutrality by never 
expressing personal opinion or asking leading questions. Furthermore, I always expressed 
respect for each opinion by thanking respondents at the end of each question.  
 
Fontana and Frey (1994) state that face-to-face semi-structured interviews are preferred over 
quantitative instruments creating an appropriate instrument to get detailed rich information 
(Frey & Oishi, 1995). As such, semi-structured interviews created opportunities to document 
the experiences and perceptions of both police officers and Muslim community members 
critical to an inquiry seeking to understand perceptions and behaviour. Interviews typically 
lasted for 30-40 minutes with police personnel and 50-60 minutes with Muslim participants. 
Questions were open-ended as to not solicit specific answers.  
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Interview Schedules - Muslim Community Questionnaire 
 
The interview schedule for community members was comprised of four sections that 
specifically answer the main research questions subject to the overall aims of the research. The 
first section is based upon uncertainty; the second is on Muslim leadership and legitimacy; the 
third is on trust and cultural diversity while the final section presented questions to ascertain 
perceptions of police best practice. There were ten questions in total further containing a series 
of seventeen prompts creating flexibility to build upon lines of inquiry considered most relevant 
to the course of discussion. 
 
The selected questions were derived from a review of literature and consultation with the 
candidate’s academic advisors, and community members to safely frame the content.  
Furthermore, research questions in a climate of counter-terrorism are of a relatively sensitive 
and often contentious nature, both socially and politically; in response Renert et al. (2013) 
emphasise careful regard for appropriateness and worthiness. As such, the content and framing 
of the questions were further discussed with gatekeepers and community members to make 
them non-threatening without compromising data integrity or accuracy in a manner considered 
culturally appropriate. 
 
The questionnaire for the Muslim community was as follows: 
 
 THE PRESENCE AND IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY  
 
1. Does the environment surrounding counter-terrorism, impact on Australian Muslim’s sense 
of belonging in Australian society?  
a. If yes - how?  If no, why? 
 
2. Do you think the counter-terrorism efforts of police make Muslims feel uncertain about 
their status in Australian society? 
a. If so how, any examples? If no, why not? 
 
3. Do police act in ways that increase or reduce uncertainty in Muslim communities?  
a. Do any examples come to mind? 
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b. Does the police approach to counter-terrorism create problems for Muslim 
communities? If yes, what problems arise? Does this impact levels of trust? 
c. Does the existing approach increase or reduce levels of uncertainty that Muslims 
feels? 
 
LEGITIMACY, MUSLIM LEADERSHIP AND WORKING WITH POLICE 
 
4. What challenges do Muslim leaders face when working with police? 
 
a. Police engaging leaders who are not representative? 
b. Police failing to engage legitimate leaders? If so, what determines a legitimate 
leader? 
c. Doubt concerning the transparency of engagement between police and leaders 
d. Dealing with community divisions and politics 
e. Trying to engage in ways that reflect Islamic values – If so, what values are you 
thinking of? 
f. Dealing with the expression of foreign policy grievances? How does this impact 
engagement? 
 
5. What determines the legitimacy of a Muslim leader? 
a. What causes a Muslim leader to lose legitimacy? 
b. What enhances the legitimacy of a Muslim leader? 
 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND TRUST 
 
6. As a leader, how do you determine if a person is trustworthy or not? 
a. What are the key attributes or behaviour that you look for? 
 
7. With respect to engaging police on counter-terrorism, what is most important when 
assessing the trustworthiness? 
a. The qualifications of a particular police officer. 
b. The potential to impact your own individual needs. 
c. The potential to impact community needs. 
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d. Confidence to predict whether that police officer will act according to Islamic 
values. 
e. An endorsement by a trusted friend or colleague that a particular police officer can 
be trusted. 
f. Capacity to first ascertain the true intentions of a police officer. 
g. The integrity of a particular police officer. 
 
BEST PRACTICE – MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 
 
8. What have the Queensland Police done well to develop trust with Muslim communities?  
a. If yes, why do you consider this as an example of good practice?   
 
9. How can the Queensland Police enhance their engagement? 
 
10.  What is the biggest threat with the potential to undermine trust between police and Muslim 
communities? 
 
The Police Questionnaire 
 
The police questionnaire is divided into five sections with five main questions and fourteen 
prompts to strategically guide discussion. The sections address topics that are aligned to the 
Muslim community questionnaire where the key focus is on Muslim behaviour relevant to the 
research aims. The first section sought to ascertain the officer’s training and understanding of 
the challenges associated with counter-terrorism community engagement.  The second section 
addresses “uncertainty”, the third section address “relationships of trust and awareness of 
Islamic values”; the fourth section examines “community and leadership” while the final 
section seeks to better define “Best Practice”. The questions were as follows. 
 
BACKGROUND AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
 
1. Does the counter-terrorism approach of police create uncertainty and undermine the 
sense of belonging felt by Australian Muslims? If yes, how, in what ways. If no, why 
not? 
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a. How does your role relate to the engagement of Muslim communities?   
b.  Are there particular community dynamics that make engagement with the 
Muslim particularly challenging?   
c.  What types of skills are critical to effective engagement of the Muslim 
community? 
d. Have you ever undertaken any specific training to better understand and engage   




2. Does the counter-terrorism approach of police create uncertainty and undermine the 
sense of belonging felt by Australian Muslims? If yes, how, in what ways. If no, why 
not?  
    
a. Do you think that Australian Government Foreign policies impact the local 
decisions of Australian Muslims to trust local police? If yes how? 
 
RELATIONSHIPS OF TRUST AND AWARENESS OF ISLAMIC VALUES 
 
3. How would you describe the existing relationship between the Queensland Police and 
Muslim Communities?   
 
a.  What strategies have helped to develop trust between the QPS and Muslim 
Communities?  
b.  What are the activities of police that carry the greatest potential to undermine 
or destroy trust with Muslim Leaders? 
c.  Do the efforts of police to win trust with Muslim Leaders translate to trust with 
broader community members? 
d.  Do police engage Muslim leaders who are representative of all Muslims? 
f.  Do the actions of police have the capacity to impact on the trust and influence 
of Muslim leaders in their own communities? 
h.  Do police need to have a better understanding of Muslim community divisions 
and politics? 




COMMUNITY AND LEADERSHIP 
 
4. What is a Muslim leader looking for when deciding to trust Police? 
a. Is reputation of a Police Officer important? 
b. Is demonstrated intentions important? If so then why? 
  
BEST PRACTICE AND FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS 
  
5. How can the Queensland Police enhance their engagement with Muslim communities? 
a. What is the biggest threat with the potential to undermine trust between police 
and Muslim communities? 
b. Do Police have sufficient trust to effectively endure a multiple fatality terrorist 
event?  
 
All interviews finished with an open question for the interviewee to add to, or change any 
response to any of the questions which allowed respondents to voice ideas and opinions that 
may be considered relevant and not addressed in the course of the interviews. Following the 
interview, the voice record was transferred to computer for later review and analysis while 




Community participants routinely responded that the research aims appeared to be “real and 
relevant”, as such, community members were most often enthusiastic to assist. In this regard, 
the number of potential participants exhibiting enthusiasm to be interviewed exceeded the 
number required to complete the research. This appeared to support the observation throughout 
the research that when participants were convinced that the aims and intentions of the 
researcher were honourable then trust appeared to follow with an apparent desire and readiness 
to participate. 
 
Some participants provided very limited responses to questions while others were expansive 
and keen to discuss issues beyond the design scope of the question set. I utilized both verbal 
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and non-verbal prompts during the interviews to maintain rapport and elicit further information. 
Where participants indicated time was short, or demonstrated non-verbal cues such as looking 
at their watches during the interview, efforts were made to reduce the extended discussion or 
ask fewer questions. In every case, all questions were applied according to the interview 
schedule. 
 
No problems were reported with participants refusing to answer for social or political reasons, 
and there was no suggestion of hesitation in being honest about issues although one participant 
withdrew prior to interview without stating why. Regardless of responses, all interview subjects 
were cooperative and the atmosphere was informal and appeared comfortable. 
 
2.7 Data Analysis 
 
In adopting a qualitative approach to data collection, I was faced with the challenges associated 
with analysis of unstructured data. As Boulton and Hammersley (2006) highlight, the principal 
challenge in dealing with unstructured qualitative data “is that there is no set of rules, no simple 
recipe, that one can follow with unstructured data which will always be appropriate and 
guarantee good results” (pp. 250–251). 
 
Ongoing consultation with both police and Muslim community members by discussing aspects 
of the transcripts proved to be a valuable process to ensure that analysis and conclusions from 
the data were realistic, relevant, applicable and feasible. In order to elicit meaning, I re-visited 
and reviewed the data relating to each thematic group with a view to identify patterns and 
trends. Furthermore, a selective coding strategy was employed to identify core unifying themes 
in the data. As such, data was collected throughout all phases and hand coded, thematically 
categorized and analysed to allow for the best possible interpretation of meanings.  
 
All semi-structured interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed, and imported into Nvivo 
that was a critical tool to analyse themes and manage groupings.  Initially, analysis of data 
followed an open coding strategy which aims to identify patterns and themes (Willis, Jost, & 
Nilakanta, 2007). Esterberg (2002) suggests “the goal is to begin to focus on the potential 
meanings of your data” (p. 158). The recordings and transcripts were systematically scrutinized 
for emerging themes. In this vein, as themes began to broadly develop, I more thoroughly 
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reviewed and considered the data to reinforce or refute relevant topics while always recording 
relevant insight. Fortunately, well established relationships with both community members and 
police provided a comfortable mechanism for ongoing discussions considered critical in 
identifying the significance and relationship between emerging themes.  
 
The interview data was initially coded on the basis of the following core concepts/themes 
which framed the interview schedule namely the impact of uncertainty, Muslim leadership 
legitimacy, Muslim notions of justice, Muslim community notions of trust, improving police 
responsiveness, and addressing community problems.  Once the content of interview data had 
been allocated to these broad themes, each category was then broken down further into 
subcategories to represent their various dimensions (Bazeley, 2009). For example, the theme 
“improving police responsiveness” was divided into five separate dimensions on the basis of 
the various issues identified within the data. This included: (a) incidents that built community 
trust; (b) incidents that destroyed community trust; (c) an understanding of the impact on 
Muslim leadership by the actions of Police; (d) Perceived challenges confronting Muslim 
leaders; and (e) knowledge and skills to undertake effective engagement. An identical approach 
to mapping various dimensions was adopted for all the themes outlined above. Nvivo was used 
to further confirm data analysis and identify relationships between interviewee transcripts as 
the basis of thematic analysis. Nvivo further developed concepts by examining the re-
occurrence and groupings of words to identify relationships between concepts within different 
data sources. Concepts should be understood as the key issues arising within the interview data.  
 
2.8 Three Observed Behavioral Phenomena 
 
Merriam (1998) explains the plight of qualitative researchers as “they simply seek to discover 
and understand a phenomenon, a process, or the perspectives and world views of the people 
involved” (p. 11). In community discussions as part of relationship building and 
communicating the true intentions of the research before interviewing, three relevant 
observations were made concerning behaviour/phenomena associated with uncertainty, 
leadership and trust. Throughout the research, these observations would become discussion 
points to assist in the development and focus of research inquiry.  
 
 





The first was that community members routinely described the current environment as 
“uncertain” while exhibiting a further sense of anxiety concerning an uncertain future. In view 
that uncertainty is a synonym to doubt and the anti-thesis of trust which is recognised as the 
foundation of successful community engagement, uncertainty was systematically unpacked 
into themes including causes, consequences and drivers to better understand the impact on trust 




The second observation was that there are at least two types of Muslim community leaders 
perceived by Muslim community members that are not only considered central to trust relations 
with police but more importantly central to trust relations with Muslim communities. The first 
are those leaders perceived to have legitimacy with the police but not with the community while 
the second are those leaders perceived to have legitimacy with community and not police. 
Interviews with police demonstrated an awareness of the challenges that exist for Muslim 
leaders to simultaneously manage positive relationships with both police and community, but 
not to the two clear leadership classifications as articulated by community members. As 
legitimacy is the basis of trust and influence, this became a salient consideration as successful 
engagement on the part of police not only requires liaison with Muslim leaders who are 
perceived as legitimate by police but also perceived as legitimate by community members. In 
this regard, the emerging lines of inquiry were to better understand the basis of Muslim 
leadership legitimacy as perceived by community members, and how this is impacted by 




The third observation was the apparent cultural differences between police and Muslim 
community members who largely stem from various migrant backgrounds when it comes to 
the processes that demonstrate trustworthiness and the bestowal of trust. In view that trust is 
the basis of successful community engagement, and culture is perceived as a key determinant 
in the way trustworthiness is demonstrated and trust is bestowed, a need quickly emerged to 
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itemise and characterise the steps that determine, enhance or erode trust relations. Fortunately, 
well established relationships with both community members and police provided a 
comfortable mechanism for ongoing discussions that critical in identifying the significance and 
relationship between emerging themes.  
 
2.9 Emerging Themes and Categories  
 
Hays (2004) and Esterberg (2002) suggest constant review and comparison of the  data while 
highlighting developments to inform inductive enquiry as the research evolved. Hays notes, 
“the sorting, resorting, and labelling and relabelling of data  [which] should lead to a set of 
categories that answer the research questions in a meaningful, thick description that provides a 
summarization” (p. 232). As patterns were clarified in the research, it became much easier to 
ascertain relevance and value of the data for inclusion into final analysis.   
 
Yin (2009) stresses the importance of the case study researcher having a defined analytic 
strategy to cope with unstructured qualitative data. In this vein, the absence of fixed formulas, 
“much depends on an investigator’s own style of rigorous empirical thinking, along with the 
sufficient presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations” 
(Yin 2009, p. 127). This involved systematic analysis requiring consistent search for meaning 
in the data through the listening and re-listening of interview recordings, and constant review 
of transcripts and notes in an effort to identify commonly held views among respondents to 
draw out unique and/or different perspectives on the topic.  
 
Themes and Sub-Themes 
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Tracing the chain of cause and effect was a valuable source of analysis that assisted in 
organising the data into groups and themes. This usually occurred by unpacking the perceived 
issues that impact efforts to succeed in counter-terrorism community engagement.  
 
For example, the dynamics concerning uncertainty were grouped into macro and micro 
perspectives each constituting themes with the potential to impact the community engagement 
efforts of police. The macro perspective examines uncertainty effecting all communities caused 
by a terrorist incident but further highlights a second more significant theme that recognises a 
second wave of uncertainty unique to Muslim experience caused by the ensuing domestic 
response to a terrorist incident. This includes the media and counter-terrorism approach of 
police and government where respondents cited over-legislation and over-policing as a further 
source of uncertainty causing anxiety with the potential to impact the community engagement 
efforts of police.  This highlighted the tension between the reactive and proactive approaches 
of police.  
 
Themes were identified through thematic analysis based on frequency in which they were 
raised, and perceived salience. For example, justice emerged in all three themes while media 
was constantly cited as a source of uncertainty and frustration. At a micro level of analysis, one 
example includes the role of uncertainty as a dynamic to frustrate a risk assessment that is 
instrumental in a decision to trust police. This highlights sub-themes that includes anxiety as a 
barrier to trust police, and assists in explaining community responses to avoid police. 
 
In terms of Muslim leadership, themes quickly emerged concerning the significance of a 
congruence of values, particularly the value of “justice” to influence behaviours in processes 
that determine Muslim leadership legitimacy. This also assisted in interpreting how the 
responses of Muslim leaders stood to enhance and erode trust with their own communities.    
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In relation to efforts to better understand how trustworthiness is demonstrated, and trust is 
bestowed in Muslim Communities, it soon became apparent that relationship served as a 
functional mechanism to predict behaviours. This also highlighted the critical importance of a 
third party referral to initiate trust relations in circumstances where there is no relationship 
preventing opportunity to predict behaviours. 
 
Police responses were analysed and categorised according to where they were most relevant in 
the key groupings associated with uncertainty, leadership and trust. Trust sub-themes were 
further divided into action of police determined to be drivers of trust, and police actions that 
eroded trust. 
 
2.10 Data Integrity 
 
As Merriam and Tisdell (2009) argue, “to have any effect on either the practice or the theory 
of a field, research studies must be rigorously conducted; they need to present insights and 
conclusions that ring true to readers, practitioners and other researchers" (p.210). An array of 
academics argue that the achievement of this goal by the qualitative single case study 
researcher is directly impacted by the need to develop generalized findings, establish validity, 
maintain data reliability, and avoid subjectivity (Berg, 2004; Creswell, 2003; Merriam, 1998, 




Validity seeks to demonstrate the truth of the findings. Hammersley (1987) states that "an 
account is valid or true if it represents accurately those features of the phenomena that it is 
intended to describe, explain or theorise" (p. 69). This refers to causal inference, and from a 
social constructivist perspective requires evaluation concerning “the ‘trustworthiness’ of 
reported observations, interpretations, and generalizations” (Mishler, 1990, p. 419). In this 
regard, Merriam (2002) suggests validity is enhanced through a process of discussing research, 
and posing ideas to involved parties who are considered informed and capable.  
 
To ensure discussion with informed and capable parties, data collection involved five simple 
phases as a foundation and groundwork to secure the best possible opportunities to extract the 
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best information from the most informed respondents. This process required continual 
community exposure where respondents were not only afforded multiple opportunities, they 
were invited to freely express opinions before and after the actual interviews to best ascertain 
the true meaning concerning interview responses.  As such, the five phases were formulated to 
develop networks and relationships of trust to maximise opportunities to engage individuals 
perceived with the greatest capacity to most accurately interpret the results. The five phases 
were as follows.  
 
Phase 1: Community interaction, relationships of trust and informal discussions. 
Phase 2: Interviews with QPS Personnel.  
Phase 3: Interviewing Muslim Community Members.     
Phase 4: Participant Opportunity subsequent to the interview to change or   enhance 
responses. 
Phase 5: Consulting academics with direct expertise external to criminology. 
  
A systematic approach involving five phases was to ensure that the candidate adopted an 
approach heavily invested in relationships, trust and communication not only with Muslim 
communities but also with police and academics. Having been a sworn member of police 
further resulted in a network of active relationships with currently serving police officers who 
continually made themselves available to discuss the scope and meanings of data.   
 
All participants both community and police were informed that the researcher was open to 
additional insights and feedback in the weeks that followed the interviews, and if they were of 
the opinion that there was value to clarify or change responses, then such opportunity was 
available (phase 4).  No police participants utilised this opportunity; however eight of the thirty 
community participants did provide additional feedback on discussion points which were 
considered useful to the research.  None of the feedback challenged any of the views expressed, 
only adding to the reliability of the research findings. This occurred in the midst of wider and 
ongoing community discussions that further proved to be a valuable mechanism to interpret 
the data in a manner considered consistent with community thoughts and aspirations. 
 
The research addresses topics that include leadership, trust, culture, Islamic jurisprudence and 
group behaviour that are not considered core notions central to the academic discipline of 
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criminology.  In an effort to enhance validity, the candidate established a network of recognised 
academics including a sociologist, cultural anthropologist, social psychologist and two 
leadership experts (one in Islamic leadership jurisprudence) with whom I met regularly to 
discuss research considerations, direction and balance to retain academic integrity.  
 
The five phase approach resulted in a number of robust functional relationships that provided 
a foundation to review issues and return to discussion points over time resulting in a deeper 
understanding and more thorough interpretation of themes that more accurately reflect the 




Generalisability or external validity describes the extent to which research findings can be 
applied to settings other than that in which they were originally tested. A study is externally 
valid if it describes the true state of affairs outside its own setting.  
 
Merriam  (2009) states that “the most common understanding of generalizability in qualitative 
research is to think in terms of the reader or user of the study…leaving the extent to which a 
study’s findings apply to other situations up to the people in those situations” (p. 226). As such, 
a systematic effort to recruit participants from a variety of community roles and responsibilities 
including an array of demographics and ethnicities (as outlined in the sampling section) enabled 
a richness and diversity of responses that allows the reader to relate to numerous situations. In 
this regard, the result is as Merriam states to provide “enough detailed description of the study’s 




Reliability concerns the replication of the study under similar circumstances and carries the 
responsibility of convincing oneself and one’s audience that the findings are based on relevant 
and sound investigation (Merriam, 2009). Where qualitative research relies on a few well-
chosen participant examples, it has been criticised as anecdotalism (Silverman, 2000. In this 
regard, the demonstration of reliability requires sound methodological rigor through a design 
that becomes the standard of quality and judgement. 
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The candidate believes that the integrity, credibility and value of findings has been 
demonstrated through the extended time spend with community and participants to check for 
distortions and variations, exploring the participant’s experience in sufficient detail, recording 
interviews by hand and electronic device for comparison, clarifying initial findings with the 
participants, revising assumptions as more data became available, and checking multiple 
sources of data such as written records, diaries, and field notes.  
 
The candidate further advocates that a degree of reliability can be inferred through an 
observation that despite community respondents coming from an array of smaller Muslim 
communities that experience unique nuances and exist in isolation to each other (i.e. Shiites 
and smaller Sunni communities), there remains a clear consistency in participant responses to 
the shared challenges associated with counter-terrorism in a climate of Islamophobia.    
 
In a similar vein, an approach that interviewed police respondents from different ranks, roles 
and responsibilities has produced data that represents a holistic view of police experience and 
interaction. For instance, despite different views associated with reactive and proactive roles 
such as operational work and liaison activities there were clearly shared perceptions around the 
obstacles to improve trust relations. 
 
As Lincoln and Guba (1985) first recognized, reliability in qualitative research is more 
concerned with whether the results make sense in so far as they are consistent and dependable. 
According to Yin (2009), the most effective tactic in case study research to increase reliability 
is to maintain a chain of evidence. The chain of evidence can be used by the reader “to follow 
the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions 
and equally trace the steps in reverse (from conclusions back to initial research questions)” 
(p.122).  
 
Through the linkage of my research framework, research questions, data collection  techniques 
and data analysis techniques with an established body of literature in this field, I have attempted 
to establish a logical chain of evidence for the reader to follow.  
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Personal Bias  
 
Denzin (1989) noted: “All researchers take sides, or are partisans for one point of view or 
another. Value-free interpretive research is impossible. This is the case because every 
researcher brings preconceptions and interpretations to the problem being studied” (p. 23).  
 
Much has been written in qualitative research literature regarding the need for the researcher 
to adopt a reflexive attitude and measures to prevent pre-conceived bias influencing the 
research process (Berg, 2004; Cresswell, 2003; Merriam, 2009). Krieger’s (1991) argument 
that the outer world, or our "external reality" is inseparable from what we already know based 
on our lives and experiences – our inner reality. Thus, the reality we all see is based on our 
understanding of the world, which in turn is based on our knowledge of the self.  
 
This creates a limitation associated with dealing with qualitative data relates to subjectivity and 
bias on the part of the researcher. Research integrity requires a rigorous impersonal procedure 
governed by logic and objectivity free of personal bias and prejudice (Kothari, 2004). Much 
has been written in qualitative research literature regarding the need for the researcher to adopt 
a reflexive attitude and measures to prevent pre-conceived bias influencing the research process 
(Berg, 2004; Cresswell, 2003; Merriam, 2009). Simmons (1988, as cited in Brown 1996, p. 20) 
regards awareness of one's "biases, blind spots, and cognitive limitations … as high a priority 
as theoretical knowledge". Berg (1988) raises an important question – where do we (social 
scientists) position ourselves in connection to our research?  
 
Experienced researchers and experts in the field of qualitative research see self-discovery as 
essential to learning about qualitative research (Brown, 1996). As such, I understand the need 
to confront “the baggage of my past” in that I was a police officer appointed to liaise with 
Muslim communities in response to the highly emotional and intense events of 9/11. As such, 
although there is an ethic and necessity in policing to trust people, I must concede that by nature 
policing advocates the need to notice anything different and not accept things at face value. In 
this respect, transitioning into a culturally and religiously diverse environment meant that 
everything was different which equated to accepting very little at face value. Sadly, there was 
a time in the early stages of engagement where I recollect an opinion that every mosque had a 
small group of non-conformists plotting the downfall of democracy. In this light, as I reflect 
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upon past perceptions and experience, I can track changes in my perception and attitude that 
has resulted from years of community interaction.  These changes include a greater awareness 
of the fears and anxiety experienced by Muslim Australians, a greater consciousness to the 
destructive interference of irresponsible media reporting, and a recognition that upon removing 
linguistic and cultural barriers, our basic needs are the same. 
 
In an effort to guard against subjectivity and personal bias, I undertook three reflexive activities 
during my research. The first is a simple SWOT analysis that highlights my weaknesses and 
the threats that carry the potential to negatively impact my objectivity. A SWOT analysis 
simplistically highlights my perceived weakness and threats that stand to influence my 
objectivity while acknowledging strengths and opportunities to enhance community discussion 
that aids in the interpretation of data.  The second is a reflective entry and subjectivity statement 
to be actively conscious of my background and experience in law enforcement (highlighted 
through a SWOT analysis) as a means to manage the potential for problematic perceptions as 
and be as objective as possible.  
 
The third item is a reflexive journal piece based on a trip to Palestine in the third year of 
research. Some may respond that such an exercise is not relevant to a case study in South East 
Queensland, but Palestine was routinely cited by community members, both in and outside of 
the interviews as a benchmark of injustice propagated by a coalition of western governments 
including Australia that carries the potential to negatively impact local community engagement 
efforts. In this regard, both the literature and respondents suggest that the war on terror is 
commonly perceived in Muslim communities as a war against Islam (Malik, 2003; Palmer & 
Palmer, 2004). This sentiment is partially exposed in the saying that one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter. Furthermore, the results of this research suggest that notions of 
justice, particularly as a core value of Islam plays a key role in trust relations and Muslim 
leadership legitimacy which is critical to successful community engagement. As such, a 
decision was made to stay six weeks in Hebron on the West Bank.  
 
In view of my background in law enforcement on one end of the specter, I believe that a stay 
in Hebron allowed me to balance my views and mature my thoughts by staying on the other 
end of the specter. I believe this is critical to a better interpretation of the data results especially 
with respect to the impact on local communities. The candidate noted that throughout 
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discussions with Palestinians, Islam was never used as a means to justify violence of resistance 
to Israeli occupation while injustice was constantly raised as a motivating factor.  
 
In this respect, and in a hope of adding credibility to my efforts as a competent research 
instrument, it is further relevant to highlight my background as a senior cultural advisor for the 
Queensland Police who in response to the events of September 11, was appointed as State 
Islamic Liaison Coordinator for the Queensland Police. Furthermore, for eight years I operated 
a specialist cultural diversity consultancy, and was contracted by dozens of government and 
non-government agencies that involved tasks such as training staff for deployment in the 
Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Bougainville, Iraq and Afghanistan. I have also attended the 
Australian Defence Force School of Military Intelligence course on Community Psychology, 
and the Queensland Police Counter-Terrorism Course. I have studied Islam and further 
undertaken Arabic language training, and have been accredited with level one at the University 
of Queensland, and further accredited with level two in Palestine.  
 
I acknowledge that reflexivity provides no guarantee against bias or subjectivity. However, I 
am confident that I have demonstrated the hallmarks of sound qualitative research by eliciting 
understanding and meaning from my observations and interviews, to analyze data and produce 





There are a number of limitations that the candidate concedes has an impact on the extent and 
depth of analysis including a capacity to interpret results. The first is a lack of literature in the 
area of trust and counter-terrorism community engagement. As Spalek (2010) points out there 
is a universal recognition concerning the importance of trust but notes an almost complete 
absence of research addressing the deeper dynamics of trust in a climate of counter-terrorism. 
This is also the case with respect to notions of Muslim leadership legitimacy and the 
implications of uncertainty in relation to community engagement in a climate of counter-
terrorism. This creates a limitation that diminishes the capacity of the researcher through an 
inability to draw upon a substantial body of literature (that is absent) to best interpret results.  
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This explains a deliberate and systematic approach to win community trust and relationships 
to enhance interpretation of the data through ongoing community discussions.  
 
Another limitation is that the literature review refers to a substantial amount of literature that 
are derived from other disciplines. In terms of trust, the literature often cites examples within 
the context of business environments. Although still relevant, it must be recognised that 
behaviours may change from a business environment to a climate of counter-terrorism due to 
an increase in emotionality and stress associated with greater perceived risk. 
 
Cultural bias is another limitation that can be minimised through community exposure and 
educating one’s self with respect to the issues and nuances, however, despite efforts to better 
understand these dynamics, I recognise that I have never walked in the shoes of community 
members. Furthermore, two community participants raised concerns with respect to an inability 
to clearly express their thoughts during the interview process. The candidate was of the opinion 
that the views of these participants were easily understood, however, this raises the possibility 
that the choice of English words does not accurately reflect the intended thoughts. To minimise 
this limitation, a written copy of the transcript was provided to community participants to read 
over and endorse the comments as accurate. 
 
The limited number of female participants could be perceived as a limitation. It was clearly 
evident that the purposive sampling technique applied to identify suitable participants based 
on community roles and leadership positions resulted in more male participants than female 
participants. Faris and Abdalla (2018) recognise a deficit of females undertaking community 
roles and holding leadership positions but add that the status quo is improving. This was 
evident through a comment by one female participant who remarked that meetings with 
government officials are often preceded with a call to build the number of female participants 
to give the impression of equal participation. In any case, there were no identifiable 
differences in the responses of female and males with regard to the research aims of this 
project. As such, this issue was considered a minimal limitation. 
The decision was made to only interview two Shiite Muslim community members in view 
that of the 18 mosques situated in Queensland, only one is Shiite while the remaining 17 are 
Sunni (excluding one Ahmadiyya). There were no identifiable differences between the 
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responses of Sunni and Shiite participants. However it is necessary to recognise that the 
Muslim responses in this research more accurately reflect the views of the Sunni population 
that constitute the overwhelming majority of Queensland’s Muslims. 
 
In view of a counter-terrorism climate most often characterised by suspicion and distrust of 
authorities, there were clear moments that my background in law enforcement was at least an 
initial obstacle. In this matter I must concede, that there were community members who 
expressed hesitation, but this became less and less as trust relations developed. 
 
Another limitation is that trust, uncertainty and leadership legitimacy in the context of culture 
and group behaviour represents just some of the complexities that characterises counter-
terrorism community engagement. In this regard, despite an effort to draw upon literature from 
other disciplines that specialise in these areas, I must recognise that the findings are presented 
through the eyes of a criminologist. I did try to minimise any subjectivity by consulting 
literature and leading experts in these fields but this remains a limitation that this research relies 
on expertise outside the scope of criminology.  
 
Research approval by the Queensland Police Service was granted on condition that no specialist 
counter-terrorism police were to be approached or interviewed throughout any of the research 
phases. This was also viewed as a significant limitation as the research identified that the 
greatest single threat perceived by community members to sustainable community trust with 
the Queensland Police is their existing counter-terrorism approach. This was considered a lost 





In view of an almost complete absence of literature on the unique nuances of Muslim leadership 
and the impact of culture on the bestowal of trust in a climate of counter-terrorism characterised 
by uncertainty, this research always required an approach to understand and explain.  As such, 
in this Chapter, I have detailed a research methodology that comprises a generic qualitative 
design with a single case study focus. I have articulated observed behaviour constituting 
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phenomena that became the focus of research in relation to the key topics of uncertainty, trust 
and Muslim leadership.  
 
Research questions, data collection and data analysis techniques have been discussed in 
recognition of the need to draw upon a multi-disciplinary approach. Furthermore, developing 
networks and securing ethical approval for a research design in marginalized communities also 
impacted by the complexities of counter-terrorism and Islamophobia required significant 
investments in community relationships, and a decision on the part of the Queensland Police 
to not allow the researcher to interview counter-terrorism staff. I have addressed some common 
issues confronting a qualitative case study approach in terms of validity, reliability, 
generalization and subjectivity, and further detailed the measures that I adopted to best manage 
any associated concerns. In the following Chapters I detail my research findings with respect 
to the key focus areas of uncertainty, trust relations in a cultural context, and Muslim leadership 
legitimacy. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter will review an array of literature that addresses key aspects of police community 
engagement with Muslim communities in a climate of counter-terrorism. As such, this chapter 
is divided into four sections where the first section broadly considers the literature associated 
with community engagement in a climate of counter-terrorism while the remaining three 
sections review literature more specific to uncertainty, trust and leadership in Muslim 
communities. Since 9/11, the significance and implications of counter-terrorism has exposed 
the need for law enforcement to navigate new boundaries and challenges in a space considered 
complex and emotional (Innes, 2006). New terrain and multifaceted challenges represent the 
need to draw upon a number of disciplines external to criminology that include sociology, 
social psychology and cross-cultural psychology. In all, this review will address contributions, 
progress, and shortfalls highlighting the state of literature on this topic. 
  
3.1 Counter-Terrorism and Community Engagement – A Contentious Dichotomy 
 
Research has consistently shown that successful counter-terrorism policing depends on a 
positive relationship between the police and the community it is trying to work with (Bartlett 
& Miller, 2010). However, it is also evident that in the field counter-terrorism, police and 
community partnerships are difficult to sustain and are often fraught with tension as police seek 
to engender Muslim community trust (Baker, 2012; Lambert, 2011; Pickering et al., 2008; 
Spalek, 2013; Spalek et al., 2009; Thacher, 2005).  
 
One example includes a recognition that intelligence gathering relies on community trust as a 
critical mechanism to prevent a terrorist incident (Jones, 2010). However, the police risk a loss 
of credibility to all their community engagement approaches if Muslim communities perceive 
community policing as little more than an apparatus to gather intelligence (Birt, 2009; Currier, 
2015; Kundnani, 2014; Lambert, 2011; O’Toole et al., 2016; Richards, 2012; Spalek & 
O’Rawe, 2014).  In this respect, Shami Chakrabarti, the author of Liberty (in Mythen, 2012, p. 
11) described Prevent as “the biggest spying programme in Britain in modern times and an 
affront to civil liberties”. 
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Spalek (2010) warns that a failure on the part of police to gather intelligence can result in 
invasive “hard” policing approaches that cause community anger, frustration, and paranoia. In 
circumstances where community members choose to not support the efforts of police, and there 
is limited or no policing by community consent, the risk of more arbitrary and violent forms of 
policing becomes very real, serving to further damage public trust (Cole, 1999; Goldsmith, 
2005; Lea & Young, 1984). As Wilson (1968) notes, this legalistic style often results in 
minorities and other disenfranchised groups bearing the brunt of law enforcement, and a further 
loss of community trust (also in Black, 1980; Slovak, 1988).  
 
In America, Britain and Australia, community based policing approaches are building valuable 
community relationships that are being jeopardised and undone by the simultaneous 
application of investigative/intelligence gathering approaches that are part of a wider reactive 
counter terrorist mechanism (Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013). In Australia, the counter-
terrorism response has involved a period of “hyper legislation” unmatched by any other country 
(Spalek & Lambert, 2008). In this regard, Alderson & Goodey (1998) suggests that when police 
are required to enforce unpopular laws that are deemed unacceptable by communities they will 
lose public trust and support. Wilson suggests that the greater use of law in marginalised 
neighbourhoods will often “be experienced as harassment” (1968, p. 172) further serving to 
damage trust relations (quoted in Warren, 1999, p. 9).  
 
The application of stop and search powers by police (Spalek, 2013) and blanket surveillance 
of Muslim communities (Walklate et al., 2011) has raised concerns that Muslim communities 
are unfairly singled out by indiscriminate counter-terrorism policing. Police raids of Muslim 
homes (Mythen et al., 2013), informal questioning of Muslims and the cancelling of passports 
preventing Muslims from travelling overseas (Murphy et al., 2015) has further bolstered claims 
by Muslim communities that they are under siege (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2013b; 
Cherney & Murphy, 2015; Kundnani, 2014). In short, over policing has left Muslim 
communities feeling stigmatised and upset (Bowling & Phillips, 2007; Cherney & Murphy, 
2015; Cherney & Hartley, 2015; Jones & Newburn, 2001; Sharp & Atherton, 2007; 
Waddington, Stenson, & Don, 2004).   
 
Govier (1998) suggests that efforts by authorities to control communities are an expression of 
distrust while Darley (2004) and Tyler (2006) state that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
61 | P a g e  
 
 
effectively control citizens based on legislation and/or use of power. Alderson and Goodey 
(1998) bolster this point by suggesting that a police department with solid public support will 
be more effective than a more powerful police department lacking public support through an 
absence of community trust.  
 
 In this climate, the result has been the disengagement of Muslim leaders and the alienation of 
the very communities who are considered the key line of defence against terrorist propaganda 
and recruitment (English, 2010; Klausen, 2009; LaFree et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2015; 
Parmar, 2011; Peek, 2011; Pickering et al., 2008). As such, in the current climate, there remains 
a concern that ill-conceived counter-terrorism engagement strategies that fail to address the 
complexities of this environment will continue to undermine community trust and perceived 
legitimacy of authorities to deal with counter-terrorism (Allen, 2010; Briggs et al., 2006; 




This section will review literature exposing the potential of uncertainty to negatively impact 
societal relations including the community engagement efforts of police to liaise with Muslim 
communities in a climate of counter-terrorism. Literature addressing the implications, 
consequences and associated definitions of uncertainty is reviewed. At a macro level, literature 
will also be reviewed exposing uncertainty as a recognized strategy of terrorism to disrupt 
societal functionality including relationships that are critical to successful community 
engagement. Literature will also be reviewed examining implications for cultures that possess 
“high uncertainty avoidance” proclivities including a propensity to terminate trust relations 
where excessive uncertainty represents excessive risk. At a micro level, further literature will 
expose uncertainty as an antithesis of trust that is synonymous to doubt with the capacity to 
frustrate a risk assessment when making a decision to bestow trust. This will be followed by 
an array of literature highlighting the relationship between uncertainty, anxiety and avoidance 
behaviours that can compromise community engagement outcomes. In this light, uncertainty 
becomes a salient consideration possessing the destructive potential to impair relationships, 
destroy trust and cause avoidance behaviours that are destructive to community engagement.  
 
 




Research in Uncertainty and Definitions  
 
The conception of uncertainty as a motivation and determinant of behaviour is not a new 
concept (Festinger, 1954; Fromm, 1947; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Kahneman et 
al. (1982) state that there are many social psychological analyses concerning the consequences 
of uncertainty. Weary, Jacobsen, Edwards & Tobin (2001) argue that people experience a 
fundamental need to feel certain about their world and surroundings. Hofstede (1999) adds that 
the management of, and reaction to uncertainty changes between cultures and groups. Fiske 
and Taylor (1991) add that uncertainty can be threatening resulting in a propensity for people 
to eliminate uncertainty and find some way to make life tolerable and cognitively manageable 
(also in Edwards & Tobin, 2001; Festinger, 1954; Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Lopes, 1987; 
Sorrentino & Roney, 1986; Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001).  
 
Driskill and Goldstein (1986, p. 41) define uncertainty as "a lack of sure knowledge about the 
course of past, present and future hypothetical events" (also in Weitz, 1989). Heimberg, Turk 
and Mennin (2004) explain that people generally demonstrate an intolerance of uncertainty that 
can be described as the “tendency to react negatively on an emotional, cognitive, and 
behavioural level to uncertain situations and events” (p. 143). The literature highlights 
consequences of uncertainty that include impeding capacity to communicate resulting in 
behaviour that alters relationships between groups (Gudykunst, 1995); frustration of risk 
assessments at the heart of decisions to bestow trust; and anxiety resulting from an inability to 
assess a threat that is perceived as dangerous resulting in avoidance behaviours. In this respect, 
capacity to communicate, group behaviour, the bestowal of trust, and the management of 
avoidance behaviours are not only relevant to community engagement efforts by police; they 
are the literal determinants of success. 
 
Terrorism and the Strategic Application of Uncertainty 
 
Kasperson (1986) maintains that uncertainty affects the cognitive processes used to receive and 
process information. This suggests that the cognitive processes associated with uncertainty can 
be manipulated to influence the reception and processing of information to alter behaviours. In 
this respect, uncertainty as a strategy of terrorism can be found in an array of literature.  




Murphy (2004) points out that the most important weapon of a terrorist is not a gun or a bomb, 
but rather uncertainty that results in fear and alarm, and further undermines peace and security. 
Gill (2001) adds that the terrorist aim is to impact the entire nation well beyond those who are 
killed, injured or directly affected revealing a more sinister strategic agenda to shatter 
functional relationships between community and government (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, 
Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Hall, Norwood, Ursano, Fullerton, & Levinson, 2002). 
McFadden et al. (2008) state that the deliberate creation of uncertainty is a clear terrorist goal 
because it leads to the disruption of societal functionality (Gill, 2001). Bongar et al. (2007) 
state that the strategic application of uncertainty by terrorists can be viewed as a form of 
“instrumental aggression” where the use of violence is a means to an ends of interfering with 
societal process. This leads to what Moghaddam (2011) describes as “collective uncertainty” 
perpetrated to change behaviours and influence decision-making resulting in feelings of 
helplessness and vulnerability, a loss of trust in institutions while increasing cultural and ethnic 
divisions within society. As such, Innes (2006) suggests that the presence and role of 
uncertainty, and subsequent impact on the relationship of trust between police and community 
has been neglected in the current debate concerning counter-terrorism community engagement. 
Innes (2006) highlights this point by arguing the result is a thin form of trust after a long history 
of difficult relations in an environment easily characterised by its unprecedented complexity 
and uncertainty.  
 
High Uncertainty Avoidance Cultures 
 
The ground breaking work of Dutch cultural psychologist Geert Hofstede (1984) involved an 
unprecedented 117 000 surveys across 70 countries making it the largest survey in the world 
at that time. Sponsored by IBM, the result was Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions Theory that is 
renowned as one of four universal constructs including the collectivism and individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity/feminism. According to Hofstede 
(1986), uncertainty avoidance was second only to the collectivism/individualism construct in 
value to understand cultural difference, and explain behaviour.  
 
Hofstede (1986) argues that uncertainty avoidance is where people within specific cultures 
experience anxiety, or feel nervous about a situation which they perceive as unstructured, or 
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unpredictable. Hofstede observed that different cultures experience diverse reactions to 
uncertainty including anxiety and fear while other cultures remain unaffected with little or no 
reaction.  Hofstede (1986) maintains that high uncertainty avoidance cultures often experience 
worry, anxiety, and attempts to reduce or avoid the course of uncertainty (Hofstede 1986). This 
allowed Hofstede (1986) to conclude that “uncertainty avoidance” is a valuable construct to 
understand behaviour.   
 
Doney et al. (1998) add that high uncertainty avoidance cultures are the least tolerant of 
uncertainty and risk and have the least propensity to bestow trust. In this vein, Doney et al. 
(1998) identify Muslim societies as having little tolerance to uncertainty (high uncertainty 
avoidance) and risk resulting in a much lower propensity to trust (also in Zak & Knack, 
2001). In this respect, the Islamic stance concerning the Quranic instruction to avoid 
uncertainty and unnecessary risk “gharar” (Arabic: ررغ) is widespread throughout the 
literature (Al-Suwailem, 2000; Berg & Kim, 2014; Elgari, 2003; Nordin, Aziz, Ahmad, & 
Daud, 2014). Kühlmann (2005) concludes that increased levels of uncertainty in high 
uncertainty avoidance collectivist societies not only results in a reduced propensity to trust, 
but can also in a propensity to distrust. In this respect, it should be highlighted that ‘gharar’ is 
most often applied in more specialist contexts that include economic situations and in general 
Islamic jurisprudence, and not commonly as a direction to guide the everyday behaviour of 
Muslims (Al-Suwailem, 2000; Berg & Kim, 2014; Elgari, 2003; Faris & Abdalla, 2018; 
Nordin, Aziz, Ahmad, & Daud, 2014).  
 
Hofstede (1983) notes that “high uncertainty” avoidance cultures often believe in an absolute 
truth, have more formal rules, are less tolerant of deviant ideas, seek to conform to group 
consensus, and actively seek to minimise risk in the face of increasing uncertainty. Freeston, 
Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur (1994) highlight other reactions to reduce uncertainty 
include bias information processing, exaggerated appraisals of a threat, and a reduced ability 
to cope. In this vein, Hinton and Kleinman (1993) explain that culture powerfully influences 
the way in which anxiety is generated, experienced, and treated. Welzel, Inglehart, and 
Klingemann (2003) suggest that as one of a number of religious cultures that believe in an 
absolute truth, Muslim societies were identified as possessing high uncertainty avoidance 
characteristics.  




Hofstede (1986) and Gudykunst (1995) warned that ignorance on the part of low uncertainty 
avoidance cultures to the proclivities of high uncertainty cultures, and vice versa can result in 
an impaired capacity to communicate and equate to a further loss of trust. Hofstede and 
Hofstede (2001) suggest that uncertainty increases anxiety in high uncertainty avoidance 
communities in a manner that may not be understood by low uncertainty avoidance 
communities. In contrast, Hofstede (2001) identifies that western democratic societies such as 
Australia, Canada, UK and the USA are typically characterised as individualistic, with low 
uncertainty avoidance suggesting that uncertainty, risk and change are far more easily tolerated.  
 
Uncertainty Risk and Trust 
 
Risk and uncertainty have long been linked to the development of trust in the theoretical 
literature (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1990; Kelley, 2013; Kollock, 1994; Luhmann, 2000). Stickel 
(1999, p. 10) notes that trust is the result of a “the willingness to accept risk that arises from 
uncertainty and the vulnerability of another party’s actions” while Rosa (1998) defines risk as 
a situation or event in which something of human value has been put at stake where the outcome 
is uncertain. Fischhoff (1985) states that risk is entwined with uncertainty (also in Slovic, 1987; 
Weterings & Eijndhoven, 1989) where unknown or uncertain risks are perceived as more risky 
(Covello & Mumpower, 1985; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, 1978) and 
dangerous (Heath, Seshadri, & Lee, 1998). In this vein, Lewicki and Bunker (1995) suggest 
that uncertainty influences risk, and tolerance of risk determines propensity to trust.  
 
Cook et al. (2005) concluded that risk taking is a key element of trust building which can be 
explained by uncertainty avoidance across cultures. Cooke et al. (2005) states that in order to 
mitigate these risks, collectivist trustors avoid uncertainty seek predictable trustees and avoid 
unpredictable ones, while favouring benevolent partners who show loyalty, empathy, and 
support (Cross & Madson, 1997; Morris & Gelfand, 2004). 
 
Of the five cultural processes presented by Doney et al. (1998), the prediction process is largely 
preferred by Muslim communities, and is further the most vulnerable to uncertainty as a means 
to impair predictability resulting in the perception of excessive risk and a proclivity to terminate 
trust negotiations. Predictability as a means of risk assessment is dependent upon a capacity to 
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interpret the wider situational context or environment (Doney et al., 1998). In this respect, the 
reduction of decisional uncertainty emphasises that trust, its opposite, makes the subjects 
decisional process more certain by allowing the behaviour of a counter-part to be more easily 
predicted (Mayer et al., 1995).  
 
Berger (1987) suggests that negotiation of trust relations requires uncertainty reduction through 
explanation, predictability and control. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975) the primary 
uncertainty reduction mechanism is asking demographic, situational and background questions 
to ensure predictability through a congruence of values that minimises risk. Bacharach et al. 
(2001) describe these critical skills as “sign reading” or decoding as a fundamental part of 
deciding whether to trust. In this respect, the reduction of decisional uncertainty emphasises 
that trust, its opposite, makes the subjects decisional process more certain by allowing the 
behaviour of a counter-part to be more easily predicted (Mayer et al., 1995). Failure to 
demonstrate certainty concerning situational awareness results in inconsistencies or doubts 
about the stability of the connection and stands to jeopardize the bestowal of prediction-based 
trust (Bacharach et al., 2001). The literature recognises that uncertainty has the capacity to 
frustrate a decision to bestow trust where trust is the foundation of community engagement 
which highlights the need to better understand and manage the destructive potential of 
uncertainty.  
 
Uncertainty, Anxiety and Avoidance 
 
Aly and Green (2010) conducted ten focus groups and 60 individual interviews with Australian 
Muslims and members of the broader Australian community to explore levels of fear and 
anxiety concerning terrorism in Australian society. Two types of fear were identified; the first 
was “the fear of terrorism” on the part of Muslims and Non-Muslims alike with respect to 
perceived vulnerability. The second characterised the fear and anxiety of Australian Muslims 
who were perceived as “the object of fear” by the wider community. The results clearly 
indicated that anxiety and fear on the part of Australian Muslims was by far the most prevalent 
and intense emotion revealed throughout the entire research. This resulted in a strong 
recommendation by Aly & Green (2010) that Muslim community fear and anxiety needs to be 
carefully considered in the development of counter-terrorism strategies that emphasise 
community engagement.   




Uncertainty has become a popular construct in explaining anxiety (Holaway, Heimberg, & 
Coles, 2006). Demerath’s (1993) knowledge based affect theory, for example, suggests that 
increases in uncertainty lead to negative affects including fear and anxiety. Gudykunst (2005) 
suggests that anxiety is the emotional response to the cognitive response of uncertainty (also 
in Turner, 1988). Anxiety has been defined as a “generalized or unspecified sense of 
disequilibrium” (Turner, 1988, p. 61) that is induced through the anticipation of outcomes that 
carry the perception of negative consequences (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). In this vein, 
negative consequences for Muslims can be fear and anxiety associated with retribution by the 
wider community in response to a terrorist incident, fear and anxiety of being targeted by 
police, and fear and anxiety of discrimination in its many forms. 
 
Turner (1988) contends that if anxiety is too high, individuals are not motivated to 
communicate with others; instead, they try to avoid them. Furthermore, Salkovskis (1997) 
explains that excessive anxiety not only results in withdrawal, it results in the overestimation 
of danger, underestimation of one’s ability to cope, underestimation of help available; and the 
presence of catastrophic thoughts. Hubbert et al. (1999) further point out a reciprocal self-
perpetuating relationship between uncertainty and anxiety where increases in anxiety 
exacerbates levels of uncertainty.  
 
Carleton, Norton and Asmundson, (2007) differentiate between fear and anxiety stating that 
the degree of uncertainty is the primary difference. In this respect, Borkovec, Alcaine, and 
Behar (2004) point out that when the degree of certainty allows for a successful risk assessment 
(capacity to predict), then anxiety can be converted into fear and managed. In contrast, 
excessive uncertainty prevents risk assessment and serves to prevent the formulation of a 
response leading to perceptions of increased vulnerability and increased levels of anxiety 
(Barlow, 2002). In this vein, an inability to assess and manage an uncertain threat results in 
anxiety and disengagement through withdrawal (Asmundson, Taylor, Bovell, & Collimore, 
2006; Barlow, 2002). Furthermore, Witte’s (1992) fear appeal theory states that in cross-
cultural encounters, individuals will engage in either uncertainty control processes resulting in 
adaptive outcomes such as engagement; or anxiety control processes that result in maladaptive 
outcomes such as disengagement or withdrawal. 
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Community engagement cannot develop where there is disengagement and withdrawal. The 
current environment does document a degree of withdrawal and disengagement by Muslim 
community members and leaders (Blackwood, Hopkins & Reicher, 2013; Cherney & Murphy, 
2015; Currier, 2015; Hilal, 2014). However, beside the research of Aly and Green (2010), there 
is no literature investigating the deeper dynamic and impact of uncertainty resulting in anxiety, 
withdrawal and disengagement, and its destructive capacity to community engagement in the 
space of counter-terrorism.  
 
3.3 The Field of Trust Research  
 
Trust has a long history as a subject matter in academic research (Lindskold, 1978; Luhmann, 
1979; Mayer et al., 1995; Rotter, 1967; Strickland, 1958). Trust literature is divided into 
identifiable sub-categories including interpersonal trust (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010; McAllister, 
1995; Rotter, 1967, 1971, 1980; Zand, 1972), institutional trust (Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 
1979; Maguire & Philips, 2008) and trust as a process (Khodyakov, 2007; Kim, Ferrin & Rao, 
2008). Dietz and Gillespie et al. (2010) further divide trust research into trustworthiness beliefs, 
propensity to trust, and trusting behavior.  
 
Despite renewed contributions to the trust literature in recent years (Nooteboom & Six, 2003; 
O’Hara, 2004; O’Neill, 2002; Warren, 1999), there is an array of literature suggesting that from 
a theoretical perspective, the problem of trust in police has received little attention in 
criminological literature (Stoutland, 2001; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). In the 
context of counter-terrorism community engagement, Spalek (2011, 2013) points out that an 
almost complete absence of literature on how to achieve a more implicit trust in space of 
counter-terrorism only serves to undermine its critical importance. Significantly, Spalek (2013) 
elaborates that little is known about how authorities within a “new terrorism” context go about 
building trust between themselves and community members; or whether the building of the 
necessary trust in this context is at all possible.  
  
The decision to trust is acknowledged to be contextually based (Mayer et al., 1995) and 
profoundly complex (Weick, 1979). In this respect, an already complex issue becomes even 
more complicated by a diversity of trust definitions that change between academic disciplines 
(Creed, Miles, Kramer, & Tyler, 1996; Fukuyama, 1995; Taylor, 1989; Nelken, 1994; 
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Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Despite each discipline offering unique insights into the 
nature of trust, its definition, and the processes through which it develops; it is also clear that 
there are many similar features.  
 
Public trust in the police can be understood as the degree to which the general public as a 
stakeholder group holds a collective trust orientation toward an organization (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003). This definition is consistent with trust as fundamentally a psychological state 
(Kramer, 1999) in which one willingly relies on another based on a positive expectation of the 
other’s intentions or behaviour (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).  
 
Scholars have found a significant relationship between trust beliefs and trust intentions 
(McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). Lewicki, Tomlinson and Gillespie (2006) propose 
that a review of the literature indicates that trust is based upon a body of evidence about the 
other party’s motives and character from which a belief leads to a prediction or faith judgement 
about the other parties’ likely future conduct. Mellinger (1956) states that trust requires an 
individual's confidence in another person's intentions and motives to demonstrate sincerity of 
that person's word. According to Govier (1997, 1998), trust cannot be won in a relationship 
until both parties are satisfied with the other’s motivation for engagement. Hardin (2006) states 
that “to say we trust you means we believe you have the right intentions towards us and that 
you are competent to do what we trust you to do” (p. 17). Jackson et al. (2011) elaborate that 
public perceptions of police trustworthiness imply that the police would display right intentions 
towards citizens, and are capable of carrying out various tasks expected by the public, and that 
such belief subsequently shapes our expectations of future encounters with the police.  
 
In the context of counter-terrorism community engagement, this becomes a salient issue as 
efforts on the part of Muslim community members to ascertain the true intentions of police can 
be problematic.  This is the case because the 9/11 aftermath has resulted in more than a decade 
of hostility toward Muslim minority communities including Islamophobic attitudes (Allen, 
2010; Meer et al., 2010; Poynting & Mason, 2007), media stereotyping (Whitaker, 2002), 
racially motivated violence (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Frost, 2008); and Muslims being labelled 
with a “suspect community” status (Pickering et al., 2008). According to Green and Aly (2011), 
Muslim community members feel they are “under siege”, and almost entirely perceived 
through a prism of security concerns (Cherney & Murphy, 2015; Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 
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2010). This is compounded by claims that specific security policies have unjustly targeted 
Muslims and fuelled a wider public climate of suspicion and hostility where Islam has been 
long portrayed as a problematic faith, and that Muslims present a tangible threat to national 
security (Mythen et al., 2013).  
 
This description echoes Mastrofski, Reisig, and McCluskey’s (2002) notion of a vicious cycle 
of reciprocal disrespect between police and “the policed” in marginalized communities. Where 
circumstances deteriorate, Offe and Patterson state that those “whose lives are more insecure 
can less afford to trust” (quoted in Warren, 1999, p. 9) highlighting the reality that redressing 
such cycles is deeply complex. According to Kull (2011) these issues perpetuate a problematic 
worldwide perception among Muslim communities that the war on terror is an effort to masque 
the true intentions of a war against Islam waged by western governments. In this vein, trust in 
police struggles where Muslim communities wrestle to ascertain if the true intentions of police 
concern Muslim wellbeing or intelligence gathering. Bayley and Weisburd (2009) point out a 
preoccupation with intelligence gathering can undermine trust through local community 
engagement efforts (Currier, 2015; Harris, 2010; Lambert, 2011; O’Toole et al., 2015). In 
response, former FBI Director Robert Mueller stated; "Oftentimes, the communities from 
which we need the most help are those who trust us the least … it is in these communities that 
we must redouble our efforts” (Bjelopera, 2012, p. 313). 
 
Trust is also defined as the willingness to be vulnerable in a situation of risk (Mayer et al., 
1995; Zand, 1972). In their frequently cited paper, Mayer et al. (1995) describe trust as a 
propensity or attitude reflecting a willingness to take a risk. Hosmer (1995) and Mayer et al. 
(1995) define trust as "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party" (Mayer et al., 1995: 
712). In this regard, at one level, trust introduces a degree of risk concerning the potential for 
harm when called upon to assist police. In a traditional sense, there can be risk associated with 
the fear of injury, revenge or retribution resulting from a decision to report suspicious activities 
of an offender or group. However, in a conflict where the efforts of police are characterised as 
a war against Islam and Muslims perceive they are treated as a security concern; fears have 
been raised concerning the risk of being targeted by police who are further equipped with 
unprecedented resources and new legislative powers.  




Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) noted a convergence of intentionality and the risks associated 
with vulnerability through the following definition of trust: “A psychological state comprising 
the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behaviour of another”. In this regard, Rotter (1971) and Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande  
(1992) conceptualise trust as an expectancy held by an individual or group that the word, 
promise, verbal or written statement of another party can be relied on (Rotter, 1971; Moorman 
et al., 1992). This becomes a salient consideration in the event that authorities respond to a 
deficit of community trust through over-policing and over-legislating with new counter-
terrorism powers perceived as targeting Muslim communities (Bowling & Phillips, 2007; 
Cherney & Murphy, 2015; Cherney & Hartley, 2015; Sharp & Atherton, 2007; Sivanandan, 
1981; Thacher, 2005; Waddington, et al., 2004). 
 
The Importance of Trust 
 
A culture of trust liberates and mobilizes human agency, releasing creative, uninhibited, 
innovative, entrepreneurial activism (Luhman, 1979, p. 8). Trust, as noted by Elster (1989a), 
“can be characterized as a social “lubricant”, without which the wheels of society would soon 
come to a standstill” (p. 252). Trust promotes cooperation between group members, sustains 
social order, and permits beneficial long-term exchanges that otherwise might never occur 
(Cook & Cooper, 2003; Ostrom, Walker & Messner, 2003). Trust, it has been noted, “reduces 
complexity for individuals while providing them with a sense of security by allowing them to 
take for granted most of the relationships upon which they depend” (Warren, 1999, pp. 3–4). 
Trust or lack of it is simply a make or break ingredient to relationships, where a shortage 
prevents cooperation and coordination (Blomqvist, 2005; Gambetta, 1998). Trust alleviates 
suspicion and fear (Govier, 1998) and further liberates anxiety, watchfulness; and allows 
spontaneity and openness (Luhman, 1979, p. 8). Trust bridles expressions of inter-group 
hostility and xenophobia, and civilises disputes (Parry, 1976; Sztompka, 1998).   
 
Zand (1972) describes, if one party expects the other to be trustworthy, then they disclose 
information, relax controls, accept influence and interdependence resulting in a relationship 
that grows through continued reinforcing cycles of reciprocated trust. If reciprocation is not 
forth coming trust erodes and distrust may result (Zand, 1972). Thus trust development is an 
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ongoing, dynamic process influenced by reciprocation (Blau, 1964) and the outcome of trusting 
behavior (Zand, 1972).   
 
The space of counter-terrorism community engagement consistently refers to the critical 
importance of trust as a foundation for progress (Demos, 2007; den Boer etal.,, 2008; Hillyard, 
1993). Since the events of 9/11, a wide variety of influential voices have specifically advocated 
the need for more community centred strategies to fight violent extremism through a greater 
dependence on trust (Al-Marayati, 2007; Benjamin, 2010; Downing, 2007). Building trust has 
to be at the forefront of best practice in Muslim communities for police to achieve strategic 
victory as the basis of police counter-terrorism community engagement (Beutel, 2015; Birt, 
2009; DCLG, 2007; Innes, 2006; Jensen, 2006; O’Toole et al., 2015; Pickering et al., 2008; 
Spalek, 2011; Thacher, 2005; Vermeulen, 2014; Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 2012). 
 
Community engagement provides a platform to develop trust, and is a key focus of counter-
terrorism policing in the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia often under the guise of 
community policing (Edwards et al., 2015; Ramirez et al., 2013). While more in-depth than 
Lambert (2008) or Innes (2006), it is worth noting that Spalek et al. (2008) findings support 
the consensus from Innes and Lambert that community-based partnerships based on trust are 
key to countering the threat of violent extremism.  
 
While the securement of trust through community engagement is central to a “hearts and mind” 
approach to counter-terrorism (Innes, 2006; Lambert, 2011; Pickering et al., 2008; Thacher, 
2005) it is not without its inherent problems and challenges. Historically police agencies in 
Australia have faced significant challenges in generating trust and securing the voluntary 
cooperation of ethnic minority groups (Cherney & Chui, 2010) further highlighting evidence 
of problematic perceptions of police (Chan, 1997; Dixon & Maher, 2002; NSWPLC, 2001; 
Pickering et al., 2008; Reisig & Parks, 2000). In this vein, counter-terrorism is recognised for 
its complexities (de londras, 2014; Georgsen, 2007; van de linde, 2002) while Lane and 
Bachmann (1998) state that in the face of greater complexity, trust simultaneously becomes 
more critical and more problematic in its acquisition and maintenance.  
 
Mythen, Walklate and Khan (2013) argue that mutual cooperation between minority 
communities and the police can only be founded on relationships of trust. Goldsmith (2005) 
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states that the response of authorities requires a level of “implicit trust” which he describes as 
a deeper more entrenched trust found in committed, stable relationships; and that implicit trust 
starts with partners demonstrating their trustworthiness. Spalek (2010) adopts this same 
conclusion by emphasising the urgency to operationalise a community approach to counter-
terrorism based on implicit trust, but warns the window of opportunity is narrowing. As such, 
Goldsmith and Harris (2012) state that more realism regarding the complexity of building 
trustworthy policing partnerships is required warning of the need to understand deeper 
dynamics and expose different forms, challenges and possibilities for change in a broader 
context.  
 
Trust and Cultural Implications  
 
A decision to trust is acknowledged to be culturally complex (Mayer et al., 1995; Mishler & 
Rose, 2001; Weick, 1979) where cultural norms conducive to the efficient production of trust 
in one setting may be impotent and damaging in another (Branzei et. al., 2007). In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that there is a complete absence of literature on the cultural implications of 
engendering trust with Muslim communities in a climate of counter-terrorism community 
engagement.  
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1995) state that the presence of trustworthy-making properties is not 
sufficient to induce trust. Gibson & Manuel (2003) and Fenny (2012) believe that culture 
influences the content of schemas (cognitive filters used by people to understand their 
experiences), the structure of those experiences (the priority given to different information) and 
the propensity to use those schema as a mechanism interpret information.  As such, House, 
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) highlight the underlying assumptions of western 
bias as follows: emphasising rationality rather than religion or superstition, and stated in terms 
of the individual rather than the group while focusing on the centrality of work and democratic 
value orientation.  
 
Ariño, De la Torre, & Ring (2001) observed that people from different cultures often bring to 
relationship-building efforts “alien” values and beliefs, peculiar behaviours and even 
incomplete assumptions which can prevent trust and successful interactions (also in Branzei et 
al., 2007; Thompson  & Thompson, 2001). Molinsky (2007) adds that it is little wonder that 
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cross-cultural interaction often involves misunderstandings, feelings of low efficacy, even 
psychological distress. In this vein, Noorderhaven (1999) argues the critical necessity to 
explore and compare the meaning of trust, its antecedents and consequences as perceived in 
various cultures.  
 
Zaheer and Zaheer (2006) note that much of the research on trust has adopted an etic approach 
assuming trust concepts, models and measures developed in western countries are adequate for 
the study of trust in other cultural contexts. Fukuyama (1995) states that people and cultures 
differ in terms of their willingness to trust. Smircich (1983) argues that the key question when 
working between cultures is to expose the cognitive processes for uncovering, interpreting and 
accommodating different culture’s rules for trusting others, and how does one demonstrate 
one’s own trustworthiness in another culture. Doney et al. (1998) states that trust grows quickly 
when the trustor perceives that the direction taken by the intended trustee takes the same route 
that the trustor follows to establish whether the trustee is trustworthy. 
 
Doney et al. (1998) examined how norms, beliefs and values impact the way individuals 
prioritize and process trust to demonstrate trustworthiness and bestow trust, and how this 
changes between cultures. Doney and colleagues identified five processes that include calculus, 
capability, prediction, intentionality and transference (third party referral). Doney et al. (1998) 
demonstrated that specific trust methodologies were clearly consistent with particular cultural 
group profiles, observing that in Australia, UK and the USA, trust is most likely to be formed 
by the calculus and capability processes. In contrast, Doney et al. (1998) noted that Muslim 
societies placed far greater emphasis upon the prediction, intentionality and transference 
processes.  Doney et al. (1998) proposed that prediction is the most preferred paradigm in 
Muslim communities when initiating trust relations. In terms of Muslim communities and 
community engagement, this has the potential to be problematic because Mayer et al. (1995) 
highlight that most models of trust in a western context do not include the element of prediction. 
 
Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, and Nisbett (1998) argue that collectivist trustors tend to view 
relationships as deeply interdependent while Putnam (1993) adds that collectivist cultures may 
be less inclined to trust outsiders. Collectivist cultures are more dependent upon a wider 
situational context that stands to impact the collective (Butler, 1991; Fiske et al., 1998; Kramer, 
1999; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). In this regard, Branzei et al (2007) highlight 
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a critical difference between dispositional and contextual approaches to the bestowal of trust. 
In this respect, dispositional based trust is based on the disposition of the individual which is 
consistent with individualistic cultures such as Australia; while contextual approaches are 
consistent with collectivists who emphasise context relative to the group or collective.  
 
McKnight et al. (1998) suggest that collectivists rely on prediction based trust making them  
particularly sensitive to signs of situational abnormality that may trigger an alert of excessive 
risk (Gibson, Maznevski & Kirkman, 2009). According to Berger and Calabrese (1975) 
collectivists will ask demographic, situational and background questions to ensure 
predictability through a congruence of values as the basis of eliminating uncertainty and 
bestowing trust. Masuda and Kitayama (2004) explain that this makes collectivists more 
responsive to situational cues and consistently unresponsive to dispositional cues in their initial 
assessments of trustworthiness where the converse holds true for individualistic societies.  
 
Trust emerges via a prediction process when the trustor can confidently and accurately forecast 
that the trustee’s future behaviours that are culturally defined will fall within a desirable range 
(Deutsch, 1960). As such, compliance with social norms and situational interpretation affecting 
collectivist communities is very important to enable predictability and establish if the trustee’s 
behaviour will fall within a desirable range (Doney et al., 1998). Yamagishi et al. (1994) add 
that ignorance to a wider situational context makes little difference in individualist cultures but 
results in a greater propensity to distrust in collectivist cultures (Huff & Kelley, 2003).  
 
Bacharach et al. (2001) describes these critical skills as “sign reading” or decoding as a 
fundamental part of deciding whether to trust. In this vein, Gibson et al. (2009) advocate that 
when a person interacts with a person from another culture, they are required to comprehend 
the “rules or scripts” that guide action and trust. Cultural implications highlight the potential 
for misunderstanding in the context of community engagement between Muslim cultures that 
are predominantly collective, and the wider Australian societal culture that is individualistic. 
Models and Characteristics of Trust 
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1995), and Elangovan and Shapiro (1998) argue that there are three 
variations of trust namely calculus, knowledge-based and identification-based trust. Calculus-
based trust (also referred to as deterrence-based trust) is brought about through negative and 
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positive reinforces, and is perceived as the weakest form of trust. Calculus also known as 
“calculative trust” relies on a simple cost benefit analysis that can exist without a relationship 
(Kramer, 1996). Kramer (1996) explains that calculus is the weakest form of trust and can exist 
in the presence of the narrowest relationships. In contrast, knowledge-based trust is achieved 
through frequent interaction and communication while identification-based trust grows through 
a more intimate knowledge of the other, and develops as both parties begin to share similar 
beliefs and understanding (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Elangovan et al, 1998). 
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1995) respond that regular communication allows the exchange of 
information about each party’s preferences, values and approaches to problems, thereby 
leading to the development of knowledge-based trust. In this vein Johnson and Johnson (1989) 
advocate that partnerships require frequent, accurate, and open communication to understand 
another’s perspective and build trust. This highlights the functional role of relationships. 
 
Sitkin and Roth (1993), and Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) suggest that opportunities to 
develop trust are lost when expectations are not met, while distrust occurs from a perceived 
incongruence of values. Parry (1976) characterises “the syndrome of distrust” into three 
segments. Firstly, it paralyses human agency and erodes social capital; secondly, distrust leads 
to the breakdown of associations and the decay of interpersonal networks. And thirdly, results 
in defensive attitudes, hostile stereotypes, rumours, prejudices, as well as “downright 
xenophobia”. Govier (1997, 1998) warns that when we choose to distrust a person that we 
perceive to be dishonest, we simply reinforce a culture of distrust. Govier (1998) highlights the 
destructive nature of human psychology where the “Self-fulfilling Prophecy Theory” warns 
that a choice to distrust may very well lead partners to progressively perceive each other as less 
trustworthy serving to further damage future relationships.  
 
Peel (1998) points out that distrust is learned, and is not simply a matter of bad personal 
experience but the result of personal and collective histories that are all too often proved. Peel 
(1998) explains that people share stories including indignities at the front counter of the police 
station, the police raid on the wrong house, and especially police brutality. Walklate et al. 
(20011) note that similar histories are circulated in Muslim communities through claims that 
specific security policies have unjustly targeted Muslims and fuelled a wider public climate of 
suspicion and hostility.  




Govier (1998) also warns that one episode of distrust can sabotage ten efforts to win trust, 
adding that betrayal can be worse than deception, violence and unreliability. Horsburgh (1960) 
explains that grounds for distrust will never be dispelled through words alone, and only when 
trust replaces distrust, partners are released from the necessity to monitor and control every 
move to reduce risk with positive consequences for both the givers and recipients of trust 
(Gambetta, 1988, p. 221).  
 
Baier (1995, p.1 76) has observed that in conditions where there is little or no mutual trust in 
relationships or distrust, circumstances may not improve without the assistance of a third party 
who is trusted by both parties. Strub and Priest (1976) describe the "extension pattern" of 
gaining trust as using a third party as a basis for building another’s perceived trustworthiness. 
This suggests that trust can be transferred from one trusted "proof source" to another (Milliman 
& Fugate, 1988; Strub & Priest, 1976). Goldsmith (1991) suggests that third parties can act as 
a “circuit-breaker” that enables the provision of information, influence and control where 
previously these resources have been absent or deficient. 
 
Jones and George (1998) argue that the relationship enables the exchange and interchange of 
thoughts and feelings that allows the meshing of people’s values attitudes, moods and emotions 
critical for trust building. Zucker (1986) notes that building trust with organizations can be 
difficult for those who are more relational and dependent upon relationships to make trust 
judgements. This presents a challenge for many migrant communities including most Muslim 
communities where literature suggests that trust struggles to grow in the absence of 
relationships (Ryan et al. , 2011; Spalek, 2010).  
 
Murphy and Cherney (2011) argue that trust in Muslim communities is diminished when 
groups believe that police fail to have their best interests at heart. Herzfeld (1992) suggests that 
a deterioration in trust is the result of a failure to take the concerns of community members 
seriously amounting to a lack of attention regarding legitimate grievances. Superficial 
engagement without any real opportunity for people to have a say or influence an outcome can 
be judged as manifestly unfair and can actually be more damaging to trust than no consultation 
at all (Govier, 1997, 1998; Kramer, 2001.  Levi (1998) highlights that lip service on the part of 
police damages public trust and can be perceived by community as a form of breaking 
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promises. Muslim community members have complained that police intentionally initiate 
meetings with leaders who are more willing to comply with their own requests instead of 
contacting more representative leaders who are prepared to address the real issues (Briggs, 
2008; Cherney & Murphy, 2016). Govier (1998) states that control means that no opportunity 
is given to progress along the pathway of moral development leading to greater trustworthiness.  
Govier (1998) states that the effort to control is an expression of distrust and not a solution to 
problems of distrust. 
  
Showing concern for others and putting their needs and interests as priorities demonstrates 
empathy and elicits trust (Block, 1993; Greenleaf, 1973; Kouzes & Posner, 1993). Martin 
(2015) notes that without a commitment to truth and openness, solid relationships of trust can't 
be formed resulting in an inability to communicate and a negative impact on partnership.  
 
This section has overviewed literature that exposes a number of cultural nuances and unique 
dynamics associated with trust. Ignorance and misunderstanding of these dynamics not only 
represents the potential for lost opportunities to engender trust and progress relationships but 
can actually result in distrust that is actively destructive to community engagement. 
 
3.4 Muslim Leadership and Muslim Communities 
 
The two previous sections have highlighted a contentious dichotomy between trust and 
uncertainty highlighting opportunities and pitfalls with the potential to impact community 
engagement. This section will overview literature addressing implications for Muslim 
leadership and their efforts to win trust within their own communities.  
 
Post 9/11, Muslim leaders quickly became critical change agents in the battle to win the hearts 
and minds of Muslim community members (Birt, 2006; Choudhury, 2007; Lambert, 2008). 
Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt (2007) point out that in times of uncertainty 
group authority and leadership becomes vitally important (also in Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, 
& De Grada, 2006). Salam Al-Marayati, the Executive Director of the American Muslim 
Public Affairs Council (AMPAC) in testimony to the House Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment noted that “understanding and partnering 
with the Muslim American community and its legitimate, authentic and credible leadership is 
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the key to countering extremism and radicalization.” In this light, Lambert (2008) and Al-
Marayati (2007) state that Muslims will not trust leaders who they do not perceive as legitimate 
highlighting a critical recognition that successful community engagement cannot take place in 
the absence of Muslim leaders who are perceived as legitimate in their own communities. In 
this respect, a perusal of the literature reveals little insight concerning the relationship between 
trust and the perceived legitimacy of Muslim leaders where clearly absent is any sense or 
deeper comprehension of Islamic leadership within the context of counter-terrorism 
community engagement.  
 
Sohrabi (2016) notes that authorities need to recognise the diversity of Muslim communities 
and its emerging infant leadership (also in Tibi, 1997). Faris and Abdalla (2018) authored the 
only book that examines Muslim leadership in Australia, and state that many Australian 
Muslims are disillusioned with leaders who are perceived as underqualified and often failing 
to meet the expectations of Islamic leadership. According to Faris and Abdalla (2018), the 
Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) is the foremost Islamic organisation 
purporting itself to represent Australian Muslims, and has been publicly scrutinised due to 
allegations of corruption and misconduct, a lack of transparency, lack of accountability, 
ineffective representation of Muslims, financial mismanagement,  struggling governance, 
infighting, scandals, chaos, and election irregularities (Branley, 2016; Morton, 2015; 
Mann, 2016; O’Brien, 2008; Ray, 2015). 
Skogan (2003) and de Guzman (2002) advocate that the success of community policing often 
revolves around the selection of the most appropriate community segments that need to be 
contacted and consulted. However, Dunn et al. (2016) suggest that Muslim communities have 
at times expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the spokespeople that government agencies 
and media select for their consultation and partnering. According to Maher and Frampton 
(2009), these decisions can profoundly alter the balance of power within communities, which 
in turn has the capacity to define community relationships with police, and further exacerbate 
existing divisions within Muslim communities (Esposito, 2010; Tibi, 1997).  
 
Lambert (2008) concurs with this stance by arguing that the “ideal yes-saying” Muslim leaders 
often targeted by authorities tend to lack trust and legitimacy in their communities with little 
or no capacity to influence change. In a counter-terrorism context, Blackwood et al. (2013) and 
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Hilal (2014) among other academics state that the result has been an increase in the 
disengagement of Muslim leaders suggesting a further loss of community trust (Cherney & 
Murphy, 2015; Currier, 2015). In this light, Faris and Parry (2011) suggest that one of the most 
critical challenges confronting Muslim leadership in Australia stems from efforts to appease 
both government and community. Highlighting these complexities, Chowdhury and Krebs 
(2009), and Vermeulen et al. (2012) assert that the label of “sell out” derived from Muslim 
leaders being too close to police and government equates to a loss of leadership legitimacy.  
 
Brodbeck, Frese, Akerblom, Audia, Bakacsi, Bendova,& Brenk  (2000) explain that different 
cultures have different expectations about what determines effective leadership (Hofstede, 
1999; Markus & Kitayama, (1991). This suggests that efforts on the part of police to 
competently identify leaders with the greatest legitimacy with the greatest influence for change 
will require insight into the cultural nuances that determine legitimacy within Muslim 
communities.  
 
According to Raban (2003) the subject of leadership in Islam is given considerable attention 
because leadership is perceived as the most significant instrument for the realization of an ideal 
or just society. Ahmad and Fontaine (2011) add that a righteous leader will be able to positively 
influence a society whereas an evil ruler can destroy a society. Ali (2011) differentiates between 
dominating and inspiring styles of leadership in Islam that can be characterised as the 
“prophetic” or “caliphal” models of governance. The "great or prophetic leader" is perceived 
by followers through the persona of Mohamad as the worker of miracles while the "ordinary or 
caliphal" leader may choose to resort to coercion and fear (Dorfman, 1996).  In this vein, Ali 
(2009) recognises periods of authoritarian leadership in Islamic history where people were 
ordered to fear and obey the caliph but suggests that the time of Mohammad and the first four 
caliphs are considered to be the most informative years of true Islamic leadership (Al-Buraey, 
1985; Blanchard, 2007). 
 
Sweedan (2000) notes a western review of leadership containing 54 identifiable traits. After 
intense review of Quranic Sura and Islamic literature, Sweedan (2000) concludes that the 
Prophet Mohammad possesses all 54 leadership traits. According to Esposito (2005), the 
example of Muhammad highlights a complete programme of life that was conceived to govern 
the political, economic, social and legal aims of society through Sharia Law (also in 2005). In 
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this respect, Islamic leadership asserts the example of the Prophet Mohamad as spiritual lens 
to define the political, economic and social; and not vice versa (Bangash, 2000; Safi, 1995). In 
this vein, Ramadan (2009) and Kuhn (2007) highlight the significance of the Prophet 
Mohammad by suggesting that both action and reform in Muslim societies starts by using 
Mohammad (pbuh) as the ultimate exemplar.  In these terms, Al-Banna (2009, p. 58) cites the 
words of  Bernard Shaw; “how much the world in the modern age needs a man like Muhammad 
to solve its stubborn, complicated problems over a cup of coffee”. 
  
Servant Leadership and Consensus 
 
Beekun and Badawi (1999) describe leadership from an Islamic perspective as having two 
primary roles based on guardian and servant leader. According to Altalib (1991), the Prophet 
Mohammad (pbuh) emphasised the idea of a guardian-leader to protect the community against 
tyranny and oppression as a means to promote justice while servant leadership requires that a 
Muslim leader serves the community in which he or she lives. Servant leadership is not new 
(Sendjaya & Sarros, 2002; Spears, 1996) and has been practiced for many centuries in all 
cultures and religions (Nyabadza, 2003). Servant Leadership is a model of leadership 
characterized by its emphasis on strong follower-centric, altruistic, moral/ethical, and spiritual 
values (Sendjaya & Sarros, 2002; Smith, Montagno, & Kuzmenko, 2004).  Stone, Russel, and 
Patterson (2004) suggest that servant leadership asserts the “sharing of power” for “the good 
of those led over the self-interest of the leader.” 
 
Laub (1999, p. 81) defines servant leadership as: 
 
. . . an understanding and practice of leadership that places the good of those led over 
the self-interest of the leader. Servant leadership promotes the valuing and development 
of people, the building of community, the practice of authenticity, the providing of 
leadership for the good of those led and the sharing of power and status for the common 
good of each individual, the total organization and those served by the organization. 
 
Servant leadership is concerned with influence and persuasion at the mature end of a power 
continuum where group members are not motivated through coercive power or monetary 
incentive (San Juan & Residence, 2005). As such, according to Muslim scholars, Mohammad 
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never imposed his own opinion upon his companions (Bangash, 2000; Ghazali, 1999; Sweedan, 
2000).  Abo-Kazleh (2006) acknowledges this point by stating a forefront Islamic instruction 
of the Prophet Mohammad that there is no compulsion in religion.  
 
A’la Mawdudi (1991) highlights a salient difference from Islam to other faiths in that Muslim 
communities possess the right to determine the extent of power shared with the leader; and that 
the leader does not have the capacity to determine the extent of power shared with the 
community. A’la Mawdudi (1991) explains that in Islamic societies, the centre of power sits 
best with the people who ensure a decisive mechanism that serves the people. Australian 
Muslim activist Monique Toohey states that the traditional western views of leadership 
succession don’t apply in Muslim communities where someone dies or moves on, and then the 
next person simply comes in. Toohey maintains that the community has the capacity to dismiss 
leaders who are perceived as not performing (cited in Sohrabi, 2015).  
 
Ahmad (2009) explains that this process of situating the power base with the community is 
known as “shura” which translates from Arabic as “consensus” (Arabic: ىروش shūrā). Faris and 
Abdalla (2018) maintain that ‘shura’ can be translated as ‘consultation’ in their work that deals 
specifically with Islamic leadership challenges in Australia (also in El Fadl, 2007).  Altalib 
(1991) describes “shura” as the basis of Islamic leadership while Ali (2009) states that “shura” 
exposes the philosophical assumption that there will neither be leaders or leadership without 
followers, as such, “shura” empowers the community to become the ultimate source of 
legitimacy. Nixon (2008) explains that in Islam, “shura” empowers local communities with the 
authority to determine local solutions to local problems that may include the dismissal of 
leaders. “shura” was demonstrated in the Qur’an by the Prophet Mohammad who was “ordered 
by God” to take counsel from, and consult with his companions to find out their opinions in all 
affairs (Jabnoun, 1994; Syed, 2002).   
 
Ali (2009) explains that shura creates the right of subordinates to take a proactive role in 
confronting and correcting the leader. Saeed, Thaim and Rahman (2014) point out that shura 
exposes a leadership style which is fundamentally based on spirited debate to avoid follower 
resentment and dissatisfaction which creates an obligation on the part of the leader to exemplify 
openness, a willingness to listen, and readiness to conform to the group. Siddiqi (1997) supports 
this notion by stating it is the responsibility of leaders to empower the people even to criticism. 
83 | P a g e  
 
 
In a similar vein, Wallace (2007) points out that an Islamic organisation is considered unhealthy 
unless it periodically holds leaders accountable for their actions by providing a designated time 
and space to invite constructive criticism on how to confront challenges and improve their 
performance (also Altalib, 1991; Safi, 1995). Shakir (2003) in turn points out that “shura” can 
result in community debate to the point of excessive arguing that tries the patience of many 
individuals and places Muslim leaders at the mercy of community scrutiny. Ende and Steinbach 
(2010) highlight this point by quoting the words of Ali ibn Abi Talib the fourth Caliph of Islam 
(AD 656-661) regarding a leader who refuses the will of the community: 
 
If the elected person (leader) rejects or contests their people’s decision, they will bring 
to his attention the issues that need to be addressed. If he persists in his deviation, they 
will fight him for not following the consensus of the Muslims.  
 
Legitimacy and Values   
 
Fry (2003) argues that leadership legitimacy is the only enduring source of power and influence 
in servant leadership organisations. Greenleaf (1977) further advanced that legitimacy is the 
source of trust, adding that legitimacy also begins with trust. Suchman (1995) argues that 
legitimacy is a generalized perception on the part of followers that desirable and appropriate 
actions will occur within some socially constructed system of shared norms, values and beliefs. 
Shaw (1990) supports this stance by arguing that cultural perception of whether or not a person 
is perceived as a legitimate leader involves simple categorization of values. Martin (1999) 
states that values are the first area that servant leaders need to evaluate in order to win trust and 
legitimacy. Russell (2001) argues that a leader’s values may be the strongest underlying factor 
that separates a servant leadership paradigm from every other style leadership. In this light, 
there are numerous academic voices stating that values are the core elements of servant 
leadership, and actuate or determine servant leader behaviour (Batten, 1998; Covey, 1992; 
Farling, Stone & Winston, 1999; Ford, 1991; Kouzes & Posner, 1993; Malphurs, 1996; 
Melrose, 1997; Nair, 2010; Rinehart, 1998).  
 
Greenleaf (1977) advanced that legitimacy is the source of trust for a servant leader. Sarkus 
(1996) and Tatum (1995) highlight that relationships built on trust and service create the 
capacity of servant leaders to influence community members. Russell (2001) argues that a 
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leader’s values may be the strongest underlying factor that separates a servant leadership 
paradigm from every other style of leadership. De Pree (1992) maintains that “sacred 
relationships” between leaders and followers critically depend on the “clearly expressed and 
consistently demonstrated values” of leaders. In short, Russell (2001) concludes that the 
success or failure of servant leadership lies in the application of values by leaders to win trust 
and legitimacy.  
 
The iceberg analogy developed by Hall (1976) suggests that upon entering other cultures, only 
10% or the tip of the iceberg can be observed representing external features of culture such as 
song, dance, food, language and notions of modesty. According to Hofstede, House, Hanges, 
Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (1991), values are the invisible basis of mental programming that 
explain behaviours. Hall argues that it is only the internal aspects of culture or the remaining 
90% of the iceberg constituting value dynamics, that are often hidden from view that possess 
the capacity to explain behaviour. In this regard, there is clear opinion that values are the lens 
that bring into focus the fundamental influences that shape people’s choices, thinking, 
emotions, behaviours and actions (Rokeach, 1973; Russell, 2001; Schwartz, 1994; Woodward 
& Shaffakat, 2016). As such, Russell (2001) argues that values constitute core beliefs that 
underlie the thoughts that stimulate human behaviour. 
   
Hughes (1993) states that a set of rank-ordered values is called a value system, and that a value 
system has the capacity to reveal notions of right and wrong that affects moral reasoning and 
influences judgments to determine ethical and unethical behaviour. In this light, Feather 
explains that values are ranked in hierarchies according to their relative importance providing 
a profile that exposes differences that are often unique to each cultural group (Feather, 1995). 
In this vein, House, Javidan, and Dorfman (2001) argue that values not only differentiate 
cultures but serve as predictors of attributes and behaviour. In a related vein, Berlin (1998) 
explains that differences in value hierarchies between individuals and groups can be a source 
of conflict, unless people are able to perceive some validity in the different value priorities of 
others. 
 
Muslim Leadership and the Value of Justice 
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According to Alhabshi and Ghazali (1994), a value laden conceptualization of leadership was 
well understood and applied by early Islamic scholars. Hassan, Muhamad, Abdullah, & Adham 
(2011) postulate that an Islamic leader is deemed to be legitimate to the extent that he or she 
abides by core Islamic values. Within an Islamic value system, the literature refers to justice as 
an exalted value (Albaba, 2015) and/or a supreme value (Mohamed, 2008) that underpins other 
values (El Faramawy, 2009). Rahman (1984) states that the entire doctrine of Islam is based 
on an ethical foundation where the Qur’anic teachings of justice are at its core. Altalib (1991) 
suggests that the first mission of Muhammad was to bring justice and equality to the people. In 
this light, the Qur’an contains over two hundred admonitions against injustice and no less than 
one hundred expressions embodying the notion of justice (Khadduri, 2001).  
 
Sonn (1991) explains that according to Islamic belief, God set a challenge for humanity to 
assert justice, and further warned that injustice will result in self-destructive societies that are 
plagued by rebellion. Hascall (2011) suggests that justice is the goal of Islamic law which 
makes it the goal of Islamic society that includes the notion of khilafah where justice is the 
basis of the Islamic social order. The Harvard Law School has posted verse 135 chapter 4 of 
the Holy Quran at the entrance of its faculty library:  
 
 O ye who believe! 
Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses 
To Allah, even as against, yourselves, or your parents, or your kin,  
and whether it be (against) rich or poor: 
For Allah can best protect both. (The Muslim Times, 2013) 
 
Lane (1863) suggests that justice within an Islamic paradigm denotes equitability; fairness; 
impartiality; unbiasedness; reasonableness; honesty; integrity; rectitude; straightforwardness; 
straightness and uprightness. Kamali and Society (2002) highlights that Justice as an overriding 
Islamic value applies irrespective of time and place and should be applied at all levels and in 
every situation. In this regard, Smirnov (1996) highlights that justice manifest in shariah law is 
fixed and unchangeable where western concepts of justice change and evolve with societal 
needs. 
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Al-Buraey (1985) elaborates that a Muslim leader is required to meet his obligations to God, 
the Supreme Power as well as to discharge his duties towards the people (Makhluq) or his 
followers to the best of his abilities. According to Geaves (2008), imams in the west have found 
themselves in a unique space, geographically, culturally and temporally, with the need to create 
a synergy between religious knowledge and contemporary secular knowledge. Macfarlane 
(2012, p.82) states that:  
 
The imam in the west is expected to be a one-stop shop, a marriage counsellor, prayer 
leader, meeting with parents trying to deal with conflicts with teenagers, arguments with 
families and neighbours, disputes with landlords over rent, problems with obtaining 
welfare benefits, and marital issues.  
 
Highlighting the difference between a secular leadership paradigm based on the “here and 
now”, and a spiritual paradigm based on decisions that determine one’s place in hereafter; 
Chowdhury (2002) explains that Muslim leaders need to demonstrate divine legitimacy 
through the application of key Islamic values which is the first condition to win popular 
legitimacy or acceptance among followers.  In this manner, A’la Mawdudi (1991) argues that 
justice is a key Islamic value that legitimizes the symbolic authority of Muslim Leadership and 
bestows trust and influence. Alade, Hussain, Nasri and Aziz (2016) surmise that justice could 
be said to be one of the most important principles of Islamic leadership, no matter whether it 
is leadership of a country, community, business organization or non-profit organization.  
 
In Islam, this notion of leadership legitimacy has been formalised with the notion of “amanah” 
which can be literally translated from Arabic as “trust”. According to Beekun and Badawi 
(1999) leadership in Islam is considered to be an amanah (a trust) representing a psychological 
contract between a leader and followers that the leader will try his or her best to guide them, to 
protect them, and to treat them justly. Hassan, Muhammad, Abdullah and Adham (2011) 
explain that when amanah is based on justice it becomes the process of achieving leadership 
legitimacy resulting in trust and influence.  
Tyler, Degoey & Smith 1996 
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Lind and Earley (1992) suggest that the specific value of justice has the greatest capacity to 
affect the cognitions and behavior of group members as it is the key predictor in the acceptance 
of group authority and trust in leadership. Konovsky and Folger (1991) advocate that justice 
judgements on the part of the leader are the key predictor not only in the acceptance of group 
authority or leadership but also in determining the level of individual interest to achieve group 
goals (also in Lind, Tyler & Huo, 1997; Tyler, Degoey & Smith, 1996). According to Lind 
(2001), when a leader makes positive justice judgements, the result promotes group 
commitment, and further enhances loyalty, trust and perceived legitimacy of leadership.  
 
De Pree (1992) said the “sacred relationships” between leaders and followers critically depend 
on the “clearly expressed and consistently demonstrated values” of leaders (p. 126). Kouzes 
and Posner (1993) advocate that a conflict of values causes group members to challenge the 
extent of which they can trust that leader which immediately begins to diminish the influence 
that leader has over the group (Burns, 1978; Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Malik and Naeem (2011) 
supports this assertion by stating that deviation by a Muslim leader from core Islamic values 
stands to weaken leadership legitimacy and acceptance by their followers (also in Hassan et 
al., 2011). Malik et al. (2011) add that leaders who deviate from justice will lose psychological 
and social legitimacy. In this respect, Lewicki et al. (1998) state that a conflict of values 
engenders distrust while Pillai, Schriesheim, and Williams (1999) state that it is very unlikely 
for a leader who is not trusted by his or her followers to successfully achieve commitment to a 
vision because a lack of confidence will reduce the appeal of the vision.  This is a key 
consideration for authorities when seeking to identify leaders with the great capacity to lead 
change. 
 
According to Schwartz and Bilsky (1987), whenever two values are core in influencing an 
action, the one that is present at the higher level in the hierarchy will be more influential in 
determining behaviour that exposes unique cultural nuances. Rahman (1970) highlights the 
critical relationship between justice and Muslim leadership highlighting that a failure for a 
Muslim leader to speak out against injustice can be considered tantamount to sheer hypocrisy 
through a conflict of values (Fry, 2003; Kriger & Seng, 2005). As highlighted by Tangngareng, 
Zulkifli, & Syukri (2017), Islam invites Muslims to endure hatred where necessary for the sake 
of standing for justice as exemplified in the following Quranic Sura:  
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O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm for Allah , witnesses in justice, 
and do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer 
to righteousness. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is acquainted with what you do. (Quran, 
5:8). 
 
Rigoni (2005) states that the pursuit of justice in Islam carries a consistent message to resist 
and correct conditions of injustice even to the point of proactivity and third-party mediation. 
In this respect, a tension exists where Cherney and Murphy (2015) explain a reluctance 
experienced by Muslims to speak out about injustices including views associated with Iraq, 
Palestine and Afghanistan due to a fear of being labelled, or implicated as a terrorist if they 
express opinions in opposition to public, media and political discourse (also in Kundnani, 2014; 
Mythen, 2012). Green and Aly (2011) postulate that the result is a “spiral of silence” where 
Muslims choose to not speak out which adds to community anxieties with respect to global 
concerns about injustice. This is further the case where Tangngareng et al. (2017) articulates 
that Muslims have a sacred responsibility to strive for a world with justice. 
 
Muslim researchers emphasize the importance and application of Islamic work ethics and 
Islamic values (Abu-Saad 1998; Ali 1988, 1992; Ali and Al-Kazemi 2007; Ali and Al-
Owaihan 2008; Beekun 1997; Moayedi 2009; Yousef 2000, 2001).  Shariati (1979, p. 123) 
describes the Muslim notion of exalted values that are the fundamental components of a 
Muslim’s essence inherent to “his being, his living, his thinking, his loving”. Jassin, Sheikh, 
Obeid, Argo, & Ginges (2013) highlight the existence of “sacred values” that appear to be 
immune to social influence trading, discounting or negotiating, and that offering to buy your 
way around someone’s sacred values can result in anger or violence. This may also explain 
community resistance to, and the perceived negativity of the term “moderate Muslim” as it 
implies a readiness to compromise certain sacred or core values (Esposito, 2005; Latif & 
Khan, 2011; Murphy et al., 2015). Chowdhury and Krebs (2009) argue that efforts on the part 
of police to mobilise religious “moderates” can have counterproductive outcomes by actually 
playing into the hands of violent extremists because of a perceived readiness to compromise 
key Islamic ideals (Esposito, 2005; Murphy et al., 2015).  
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Kundnani (2014) states that a double strategy by authorities to decide and utilise Muslim 
leaders who they perceive to have the greatest legitimacy based on their needs and not those of 
the community tends to generate “a permanent state of fear, anger and resentment among the 
“suspect community”, whilst suppressing any kind of constructive public dialogue” (p. 182). 
In this regard, engagement with Muslim leaders lacking legitimacy exacerbates the risk of 
damaging existing relations between Muslim groups, while efforts to deter leaders with 
legitimacy reinforces a problematic perception that the war on terror is actually a war against 
Islam (Kull, 2011). 
 
The literature in this section suggests that any genuine hope of the winning hearts and minds 
of Muslim communities requires police to engage Muslim leaders with legitimacy and trust in 
their own communities. Leadership and legitimacy are culturally defined notions raising the 
importance for police to understand the unique nuances that characterise the plight of Muslim 
leaders to win legitimacy and trust in their own communities. Muslim leaders exist within a 
servant leadership paradigm where the power base for problem solving sits with the community 
and not the leader. Legitimacy is based on the need for Muslim leaders to demonstrate 
behaviour exemplifying a congruence of Islamic values, particularly with respect to the exalted 
value of justice that creates an obligation for Muslim leaders to speak out against perceived 
injustices. In this regard, when community members perceive that engagement by their leaders 
with police involves a conflict with key Islamic values, the leader loses legitimacy, trust and 
influence that further compromises the strategic vision of police to win community hearts and 
minds. This section exposes literature further suggesting that a preference on the part of police 
to engage leaders without legitimacy not only frustrates community engagement but further 




This chapter has over viewed literature in relation to some key challenges that impede the 
capacity of police to win trust and influence in Muslim communities as the basis of successful 
community engagement. Literature surrounding uncertainty was reviewed suggesting that as 
an antithesis of trust, uncertainty is a recognised strategy of terrorism to impair relationships 
and interfere with societal functionality including the community engagement efforts of police. 
In this respect, the literature highlights factors including high uncertainty avoidance proclivities 
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in Muslim communities that hasten a decision to not bestow trust in the presence of excessive 
uncertainty. Furthermore, literature suggests that anxiety is the emotional response to the 
cognitive response of uncertainty with the potential to disrupt communication and provoke 
avoidance/withdrawal behaviours. In this regard, the impairment of trust relations and capacity 
to communicate with the potential for anxiety, avoidance and withdrawal represent factors 
detrimental to successful community engagement, making uncertainty a salient consideration. 
In order to protect trust relations between police and Muslim communities from the negative 
effects of uncertainty, it is necessary to first expose the specific dynamics that make the cultural 
processes unique to Muslim communities most vulnerable. Out of the five processes proposed 
by Doney et al. (1998) it is salient that intentionality and prediction are not only the most 
preferred by Muslim communities but also the most vulnerable to uncertainty. Furthermore, 
Branzei et al. (2007) suggest that an action that promotes trust in one culture may destroy trust 
in another. As such, understanding the deeper dynamics of trust unique to Muslim communities 
empowers engagement practitioners to avoid pitfalls and develop opportunities to secure a 
more implicit trust making this research a critical line of inquiry. 
 
Finally, an overview of literature with respect to Muslim leadership highlights the strategic 
necessity for police to engage Muslim leaders with legitimacy and trust in their own 
communities. A critical point is that police will not only risk falling short of achieving this goal 
if they are not aware of the unique cultural and religious processes that determine legitimacy 
and trust, but they may add to community frustrations. The literature highlights the salience 
and application of justice as a core Islamic value to win leadership legitimacy. In this vein, the 
literature suggests the potential not only for a conflict of values in the context of counter-
terrorism and community engagement, but further suggests that such conflict has the capacity 
to diminish the trust and legitimacy of Muslim leaders in their own communities. This creates 
further reason for Muslim leaders to avoid certain interactions with police that can be 
detrimental to any genuine attempt on the part of police to achieve more success with hearts 
and minds. 
 
The literature suggests that uncertainty, trust and leadership are critical areas of focus with both 
hidden pitfalls detrimental to engagement, and innovative opportunities to develop new 
strengths. As such the next three chapters will present results on uncertainty, trust and 
leadership which will be followed by the discussion chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Results on Uncertainty 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis examines three environments considered relevant to 
successful counter-terrorism community engagement namely uncertainty, trust and Muslim 
community leadership. The aim of this chapter is not only to analyse the broader impact of 
uncertainty on society, but to further examine its role in undermining the community 
engagement efforts of police in a climate of counter-terrorism.  An array of literature highlights 
the capacity of terrorism to generate uncertainty through acts of terrorism resulting in a social 
and political atmosphere including over-reaction and the stigmatisation of Muslim 
communities. The primary focus of this chapter is Muslim perceptions of a counter-terrorism 
over-reaction and associated community responses that can impair the community engagement 
efforts of police.  In this vein, data has been analysed in relation to community perceptions 
concerning the influence of uncertainty in an attempt to identify basic patterns that expose its 
impact on the success of counter-terrorism community engagement.  
 
Driskill and Goldstein (1986 p. 11) define uncertainty as "a lack of sure knowledge about the 
course of past, present and future hypothetical events" (also in Weitz, 1989).  Responses from 
community interviewees highlight related meanings encompassing elements of uncertainty 
such as referring to “a lack of information”, “doubt”, “a lack of surety” and/or inability to be 
certain when counter-terrorism policing. In this regard, the suggestion was made that the 
ensuing over-reaction of the media, government and police creates uncertainty in the general 
public that shifts suspicion (a synonym of uncertainty) from a few terrorists to the entire 
Muslim community. Muslim respondents suggested this suspicion has resulted in an over-
reaction including the deliberate targeting of Muslim communities. This over-reaction appears 
to provoke uncertainty in the minds of community members attempting to ascertain the true 
intentions of police when making a decision to trust and work with them.  
 
The literature also exposes a well-established link between uncertainty and anxiety (Carleton, 
Mulvuogue, McCabe, Antony & Asmundson, 2012; Holaway, Heimberg & Coles, 2006; 
McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). The data indicates the presence of anxiety on the part of 
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community members who appear to be uncertain about the intentions of police in an 
environment where police are simultaneously viewed as a threat through the targeting of 
Muslim communities. In these circumstances, the data raises the possibility of withdrawal 
from, and avoidance of police where they are perceived as a threat. This chapter presents a 
number of community insights into the cultural nuances that appear to expose unique responses 
on the part of Muslim communities to interpret and manage uncertainty.  
 
The main focus of this thesis are the perceptions and behaviour of Muslim community 
members. In an effort to accurately characterise the impact of uncertainty on the current 
environment as perceived by Muslim community members, opinions were sought by Muslims 
on issues that extended beyond their own personal experiences. The sample of participants 
represents an array of community members including religious/community leaders, academics, 
teachers, youth workers and other active community problem solvers whose experience placed 
them in an ideal position to describe the implications of uncertainty on efforts by police to 
engage Muslim communities in a climate of counter-terrorism.    
 
The following sections will discuss uncertainty as a tool of terrorism that results in the 
suspicion of Muslim communities. This will address community perceptions that Muslim 
communities are targeted by police, and the ensuing impact of uncertainty on the community 
engagement efforts of police. This will be followed by exploring the perceived links between 
uncertainty and anxiety; the possibility of high uncertainty avoidance proclivities in Muslim 
communities; and community perceptions concerning uncertainty in faith and the abilities to 
cope in a climate of counter-terrorism. The link between these elements and its impact on 
community engagement will also be highlighted. 
 
4.1 Uncertainty as a Tool of Terrorism 
 
McFadden, et al. (2008) states that the deliberate creation of uncertainty is a clear terrorist goal 
because it leads to the disruption of societal functionality including key community 
relationships (also in Gill, 2001). The interview schedule contained open-ended questions to 
ascertain the impact of uncertainty. A number of interviewees, both police and Muslim 
respondents, expressed awareness that the intent of terrorism was to achieve societal fear and 
division, with a further aim to provoke an ill-conceived response on the part of the government. 
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A number of community respondents perceived that the intended result was a series of 
“missteps” and/or miscalculations in government responses where the consequences was a 
climate where Muslims do not feel at home in the west. This agenda of creating an “us and 
them” situation through fear and division was evident in the following response: 
 
“Real terrorists have an agenda of fear and division. They thrive on seeing missteps 
from government and community suspicion as this feeds into their worldview 
that Muslims should not feel at home in the West. They actually want Muslims to be 
victimised and feel angry here. They don’t want Muslims to feel that they can fit in. 
They want Muslims to feel uncertain about their future and to rail against policy 
missteps as it feeds into, and justifies their narrative that the West is in fact anti-Muslim 
and perpetuates an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality”. (Muslim 019)  
 
The interview data exposed community opinions that uncertainty creates divisions resulting in 
conditions that potentially lead to Australian Muslims sympathising with terrorist grievances 
and implicitly supporting their acts. For example one respondent stated:  
 
“There is a theory that the whole reason of terrorism is based on uncertainty to create 
divisions between Muslims here and the wider community with a view that Muslims 
here will find sympathy for Muslims abroad. The terrorists want Muslims here in 
Australia to cheer for them”. (Muslim 012) 
 
Uncertainty was constantly raised by respondents as a recognised strategy to escalate tensions 
between groups, resulting in hatred and division. This was observed in the following response:  
 
“This climate of fear resulting from uncertainty has always worked as a tactic to pitch 
two groups against each other.  Concerns grow into fear and anxiety which can grow 
into hate, and once you grow hate, you can expect any consequence”. (Muslim 017) 
   
While terrorism provokes fear and anxiety within the broader community, respondents 
perceived an overreaction by government that had positioned Muslims as an “object of fear”. 
In this regard, it was acknowledged among interviewees that there was a community perception 
that the Muslim community had overall been tarnished by “a handful of terrorists”.  




Another respondent highlighted the perception that a ratcheting up of government responses to 
the risks of terrorist violence had only further led to more severe policy miscalculations, which 
only further intensified “the other” mentality, resulting in a culture of uncertainty and 
confusion:  
 
“Sadly, the greater the violence, the greater the impact in respect to policy missteps. 
Also, the resulting hardening and negative community attitudes about ‘the other’ be it 
from a non-Muslim to Muslim perspective and vice versa becomes more 
intense.  Consequently this uncertainty and confusion in the community results in the 
terrorists winning the argument”.  (Muslim 019) 
 
4.2 Muslim Communities are Framed as Suspicious 
 
The perception was routinely expressed that Muslims have been framed by the government, 
media and community members as suspicious. In this respect, Muslim interviewees felt that 
the counter-terrorism and its associated narratives were problematic, and had moved suspicion 
from a handful of terrorists to the entire Muslim community. 
 
According to the following interviewee, the Australian government has framed its response to 
terrorism in a manner that casts Muslim communities as dangerous and opposed to western 
values and traditions. For example this interviewee stated:  
 
“The Australian government way of framing its response and the attached narrative is 
very problematic for Muslims. In many instances Muslims feel that the government 
frames them as evil, barbaric who hate our way of life and in continuous search for 
revenge. This response immediately feeds into media which usually flare things up and 
may cause hysterical responses from the wider public”. (Muslim 028)  
  
There was a common perception that Muslims exist in a state of uncertainty where they are 
viewed as suspect until proven innocent. For example one interviewee stated:   
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“The majority of Australian Muslims view counter-terrorism strategy and laws as 
highly suspicious and directed against them per se. They have many unanswered 
questions; ……. in the eyes of the law all people are innocent until proven otherwise, 
but Australian Muslims are suspects until proven innocent? Too many questions and 
concerns without answers. With such a climate of uncertainty and immense concerns, 
Australian Muslims do not see the future as bright as they would like it to be”. (Muslim 
012)   
 
The following participant suggested that the current environment not only ignores Muslim 
objections to terrorism, but promotes a climate of suspicion by placing Muslim communities 
on public trial. This was evident in the following comment:   
 
“The ensuing response to terrorism (counter-terrorism) creates more uncertainty and 
fear than the act of terrorism as most Muslims abhor the terrorists and believe the 
resultant responses mean they [Muslim] are on trial again, and the perennially feeling 
of here we go again!” (Muslim 012) 
 
Another respondent indicated that the media not only frames Muslim communities as 
“suspect”, but can also be deceptive and report without integrity in their determination to do 
so. This was expressed in the following way by one interviewee:  
 
“I was contacted by an ABC reporter from an extremely well known programme who 
promised a positive piece on Islam, at first I had hesitations but she convinced myself 
and others, so we allowed her to film our mosque and youth doing positive activities. 
Then came the night of viewing where excitement turned to horror and frustration as 
the piece tied our youth to radicalisation. Now, the youth don’t believe anything the 
media says anymore, in fact, they are more inclined to believe Middle Eastern Media. 
I also remember watching in horror and hearing my wife say; ‘I feel so frightened to 
go outside after watching this programme’”.  (Muslim 017) 
   
The following response also indicates a loss of hope that no matter how sincere Muslims are, 
or how hard they try, they will always be treated with suspicion.  This sentiment was expressed 
in the following response: 




“People feeling this uncertainty start believing that no matter how sincere we will be 
towards Australia and Australian people, we will never be trusted and that we will 
always be seen as “suspicious animals”. (Muslim 016)    
 
Another community respondent acknowledged that the ensuing climate of uncertainty results 
in non-Muslims adopting negative responses to Muslims. In this regard, the following response 
highlighted the need for education and an open mind. This was observed in the following 
comment: 
 
“How on earth, would the Australian public trust Muslims within this level of 
uncertainty and Islamophobia. If I am a non-Muslim I would think so unless I am highly 
informed, educated and with tremendous open mind”. (Muslim 028)   
 
4.3 Muslim Perceptions of Being Targeted in a Climate of Counter-terrorism 
 
Muslim responses widely expressed a perception that Muslim communities were being targeted 
in a climate of counter-terrorism: 
 
“The climate of counter-terrorism approach in Australia clearly creates uncertainty 
for Muslim Australians because rightly or wrongly it is perceived by Australian 
Muslims as primarily targeting Muslims”. (Muslim 017)  
 
The following community response exposes a general sense of vulnerability from a perception 
that any Muslim home could be raided by police at any time. For example one respondent 
stated:  
 
“If it’s in the mosque as a discussion point then it is clearly important, and it comes up 
many times. And the impression from the discussion is that things are getting worse. 
Imams have said that your house can be raided at any time – these discussions are very 
common in the mosques”. (Muslim 016) 
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Another community respondent highlighted the perception that racist attacks against Muslims 
tend to spike in response to police counter-terrorism raids. As such, the following interviewee 
indicated that this can be problematic in an environment where police are perceived as targeting 
Muslims, going into state:  
 
“The latest Islamophobia reports show the number of attacks and level of racism; and 
how they spike particularly after anti-terrorism raids. This spike causes uncertainty in 
the lives of Australian Muslims. And given the raids are seen as targeting Muslims, this 
also increases uncertainty”. (Muslim 017)   
 
According to Spalek and Lambert (2008), no other country equals Australia’s response to the 
threat of terrorism with respect to the quantity of new legislation that has been introduced. In 
this regard, community participants raised concerns in relation to the impact of such legislation 
on the future wellbeing of Muslim communities, with one stating: 
  
“Without a doubt there are new laws that raise questions about how the laws could be 
used or abused which uncertainty raise questions in Muslim communities about our 
future wellbeing”. (Muslim 012)   
 
Another participant raised concerns in relation to the future safety and wellbeing of Australian 
Muslims in response to a contentious dichotomy between civil liberties and national security. 
This was emphasised in the ensuing remark: 
 
“There is also a concern of not only what other civil liberties will be taken away (in the 
name of national security) but the future safety and permanent presence of Muslims in 
Australia”. (Muslim 002) 
  
In this vein, the following view also suggests that counter-terrorism laws are also part of a 
wider strategy to make it more difficult for Muslims to enter Australia, with one interviewee 
believing:  
 
“The new laws were giving an impression that those were designed to inhibit Muslims 
getting Australian citizenship. Everyone in Muslim circles I met had the same 
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impression, “they don’t want us to be in Australia, they don’t like us” etc. etc. Every 
Muslim still believe that they will make it harder for Muslims to enter and live in 




4.4 A Perception of Targeting Muslims, Uncertainty and Implications for 
Engagement 
 
The literature suggests that trust is the critical foundation of successful community engagement 
(Baker, 2012; Pickering, McCulloch & Wright-Neville, 2008) with intention a key 
consideration in the decision to bestow trust (McKnight et al., 1998). In this light, a lack of 
certainty (or uncertainty) surrounding the true intentions of police appears to be a clear obstacle 
to trust relations with Muslim communities. 
 
According to the following respondent, it is not possible to trust a government whose actual 
intentions are to target Muslim communities:  
 
“If you are made to feel uncertain as to whether you are or are not a target, then you 
can’t trust the government, and then you are uncertain about your future”. (Muslim 
016) 
 
Interviewees also suggested that there were wide spread perceptions that Muslims will be 
treated unfairly by authorities and that interacting with police carried the risk of negative 
consequences, which consequently makes the development of trust difficult. The following 
respondent highlighted this point, stating:  
 
“If you are uncertain about a person (police officer), then you have doubts which makes 
it difficult to bestow trust. This is especially the case where people think that they might 
be crushed, then of course you won’t trust them”. (Muslim 012)  
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Despite the proactive efforts of community-based policing, the data suggests that Muslim 
community members remain uncertain regarding the true intentions and actual agenda of 
police. Such a notion was evident in the following comment: 
 
“Moreover, uncertainty causes the engagement efforts of government (including 
police) to be viewed with suspicion as to the real agenda for the engagement”. (Muslim 
002)  
 
The interview data also exposed a response that engagement efforts by Muslims with external 
community partners including police can be undermined by uncertainty throughout the entire 
process. This could be observed in the following response:  
 
“Yes, it is definitely frustrating when many Muslims are engaged in building bridges 
with the wider community (including police) where every step forward in creating 
dialogue can be undermined where uncertainty permeates the relationship from the 
start to the end”. (Muslim 002) 
  
Other respondents suggested that a consequence of uncertainty is difficulty to trust police that 
further results in a reluctance among community members to pass on information to police. 
For example one interviewee reflected that:  
 
“This uncertainty makes you to not want to trust, and that you need to be careful of the 
environment. In this situation, it is absolutely possible that somebody with information 
will not come forward, and it is because of uncertainty causes an inability to trust”. 
(Muslim 012)   
 
Responses also highlighted that uncertainty not only shatters Muslim trust in police, but can 
result in a further loss of trust in Muslim leaders who attempt to access Countering Violence 
Extremism (CVE) funding to address particular issues.  The following response by a Muslim 
leader highlights a determination that staying away from CVE funding results in fewer negative 
implications for community leaders, remarking:   
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“Uncertainty shatter that trust (in police), people at my centre will not engage any 
funding that has any tag associated with CVE as part of government, simply there are 
too many questions because of too many uncertainties, and then we lose trust because 
the community doesn’t trust government.  Simply, there is less uncertainty if we stay 
away from this type of funding”. (Muslim 022)  
 
While comments made by community participants highlighted a perception that Muslim 
communities are being targeted by police, there also existed resentment towards Muslim 
leaders who would attempt to engage in partnerships with police. In this respect, the term “sell 
out” was commonly used to describe Muslim leaders who partnership with the “oppressor” 
(i.e., police). This was evident in the following observation: 
  
“Imams are often seen as sell outs – why would they partnership with somebody 
(police) who is oppressing us”. (Muslim 002) 
 
The above suggests that Muslims struggle to trust police in the midst of community perceptions 
that police are targeting Muslim communities. It appears that the consequences include a 
perception that uncertainty permeates every stage of engagement. This includes barriers to 
provide information, community resistance towards Muslim leaders who engage police, and a 
hesitation on the part of Muslim leaders to access CVE funding.  This has the capacity to impair 
key processes critical to the success of community engagement. 
 
4.5 Uncertainty and Anxiety in a Climate of Counter-terrorism 
 
The results highlighted the existence of Muslim community anxiety that appears to be the result 
of the climate surrounding counter-terrorism. In this regard, a number of community 
respondents expressed fear and anxiety beyond the notion of simply being targeted by police, 
and also referred to the fear of the potential for community retribution in response to a terrorist 
attack. While the data is not able to separate out where this anxiety mainly originated from i.e., 
from police responses or community encounters individuals had experienced, the data draws 
attention to some clear issues related to the manifestation of anxiety as a consequence of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism.  
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For instance one respondent identified the presence of anxiety by highlighting a link with 
uncertainty, suggesting that anxiety is a response to an inability to prepare one’s self against a 
threat such as being targeted by authorities including police. This threat that is difficult to 
assess, and potentially related to being targeted by police or subject to anti-Islamic sentiment 
from community members. Another compared such anxiety associated with the threat of being 
targeted by the police or the community to the fear of impending possible negative medical 
results. Another respondent asserted that anxiety is the result of an inability to prepare yourself 
for a threat (i.e., being singled out by police or community members) that you know exists, but 
that uncertainty prevents an assessment that gives any guarantee of safety.  
 
These results highlight a tendency to prepare for the worst possible scenario given the social 
and political environment surrounding terrorism and counter-terrorism. The result can be 
emotional and behavioural responses that are debilitating for community members.  For 
example one respondent made the following observation:  
 
“In the face of uncertainty, so you assume the worse which is a protective mechanism, 
but this happens to the point that it becomes debilitating and makes you dysfunctional. 
This especially happens to those who do not have the full picture because of uncertainty, 
and they are not grounded or have the tools or mechanism to deal with these fears – 
they actually become dysfunctional. It actually becomes debilitating which is what I see 
happening to some Australian Muslims”. (Muslim 017)   
 
In reference to the current climate, one participant believed that most Australians are not racist, 
but recognised that when Muslims are in public, this exposes them to risks of being singled 
out, which exacerbates a sense of perceived vulnerability: 
 
“A lot of sisters including my wife are afraid to travel on the train. I understand that 
most Australians are not Islamaphobes but it only takes one clown to spoil your day on 
a packed train of 200 to do something stupid – so life becomes uncertain for Muslims”. 
(Muslim 023)   
 
Another community participant suggested that a climate of counter-terrorism marked by police 
raids leads to female Muslims changing or reducing their movements in public. This was 
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regarded as exacerbated by the notion that the hijab makes Muslim more obvious in public 
space. For example, this was observed in the following response: 
 
“Anxiety and stress is associated with this, an example is among the raids, I know of a 
sister that would not go out shopping for months on end. And again whether this feeling 
is valid or not, this is how they feel. And this has certainly been the case with my wife”. 
(Muslim 017) 
 
The notion of anxiety was significant in community responses that was further evidenced by 
the following comment from a well-respected community leader: 
 
“I think many Muslims, particularly Muslim women, are experiencing some kind of 
PTSD.  I feel that this issue need to be researched”. (Muslim 005)   
 
This finding is supported by Aly and Green (2011) who state that fear and anxiety in Muslim 
communities is clearly a salient issue with implications that are yet to be more fully understood. 
Salkovskis (1997) explains that excessive anxiety results in responses of withdrawal and 
avoidance in the face of a perceived threat. Turner (1988) adds that if anxiety is too high, 
individuals are not motivated to communicate with others; instead, they try to avoid them. This 
highlights the potential for behavioural responses that can include efforts to avoid police where 
police are perceived as a threat, and/or source of anxiety. 
 
4.6 High Uncertainty Avoidance Proclivities  
 
Hofstede (1998) states that a propensity to avoid uncertainty is one of the four most significant 
constructs to effectively understand cultural differences. In this regard Hofstede (1998) asserts 
that cultures differ in their tolerance and reaction to uncertainty where high uncertainty 
avoidance cultures are the least tolerant of uncertainty. Doney et al. (1998) and Zak et al. (2001) 
identify Muslim societies as possessing high uncertainty proclivities. In this respect, 
Gudyknust (1995) argues that if levels of uncertainty exceed levels deemed culturally 
acceptable in high uncertainty avoidance cultures, then members will withdraw and desist from 
communicating with others who are seen as the source of this uncertainty.   
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In this respect, respondents were asked if Islam had any particular orientation to manage 
uncertainty. The results indicate that “the best Muslim” will avoid situations that are uncertain. 
For example this could be observed in the following remark: 
  
“That which is Halal in Islam is very clear, and that which is haram is also very clear 
but anything that which is between and uncertain creates doubt and suspicion; and 
there is a Hadith that says the best Muslim will simply avoid it”. (Muslim 016)   
 
A number of Muslim interviewees indicated that an understanding in Islam is that uncertainty 
creates risk, and that such risks are to be avoided. In this regard, the respondents suggested that 
Islam treats uncertainty as Haram or forbidden, with one interviewee observing:  
 
“When there is Halal and haram - uncertainty is in the middle, the instruction is treat 
the uncertainty as haram, as not permissible to endure risk. If there are things in the 
middle that are uncertain or not clear, then it is haram. Things that have fallen into 
uncertainty have fallen into haram”. (Muslim 012)  
 
One interviewee suggested that transparency will eliminate uncertainty which is an important 
part of Muslim traditions, with uncertainty perceived as a source of distrust:   
 
“Islamic Tradition, all the speeches, and decisions - everything was transparent with 
no hidden agendas. In this way, transparency removes uncertainty, and uncertainty 
breeds distrust. There is a strong practice among Muslim traditions to reduce or 
remove uncertainty. And transparency reduces anxiety”. (Muslim 022)    
 
These results suggest the existence of a cultural perception that uncertainty equates to risk and 
should be actively avoided. In simple terms, Muslim communities are less tolerant of 
uncertainty and more inclined, in the face of uncertainty to terminate relations that are the 
source of such uncertainty. This may be the case where Muslims remain uncertain about the 
true intentions of police to engage them.  
 
4.7 Uncertainty, Islamic Paradigm, Coping Mechanisms and Engagement 
 
105 | P a g e  
 
 
A consistent opinion expressed throughout almost all of the community responses related to 
the characteristics of a Muslim who expresses the greatest desire to engage and trust. The data 
appears to suggest that Muslims who experience less uncertainty in their faith have a greater 
propensity to engage and trust others. In a similar vein, respondents articulated that Muslims 
who experience more uncertainty in their faith are less likely to engage and trust another. In 
this regard, it appears that Islam is a protective mechanism to cope with uncertainty. In this 
respect, the following respondent suggests that a certain or firm grasp of prophetic values as 
the basis of faith increases resilience to tackle growing challenges: 
 
“When you grasp what your religion is about, you are better prepared to embrace the 
world that is becoming more and more challenging. I absolutely agree that the 
prophetic values help you become stronger”. (Muslim 013) 
 
One respondent expressed the view that those less certain in their faith tend to struggle more 
with Islamophobia, and represent most of the Muslims who are attracted to extremist groups 
such as ISIS. This could be observed in the following remark: 
“Definitely, the certainty of my faith allows us to cope better with times of injustice and 
uncertainty. They are most of the guys that went to ISIS do not have certainty around 
their faith.  And yes those that aren’t secure in their paradigm are less inclined to cope, 
they are more affected by Islamophobia and are less inclined to trust police”. (Muslim 
023) 
 
The data exposed numerous views that Muslims who have a correct and in-depth understanding 
of Islam appear to have a greater propensity to trust authorities. For example, one interviewee 
commented: 
 
“If they have a correct understanding of Islam, they are less affected by uncertainty 
and Islamophobia. They won’t have any problems living as a good Muslim, and the 
more they live as a good Muslim, the easier it is to trust authorities”. (Muslim 004)   
 
The following interviewee remarked that Muslims who preach tolerance and peace in the 
mosques, should become the focus of developing engagement opportunities. This sentiment 
was evident in the following response:  




“If you know your religion well, knowing your faith allows you to exist in a peaceful 
paradigm, I would suggest that a practicing Muslim is far easier to live with – the one’s 
in the mosque are the ones to work with,  they preach tolerance, peace, and are more 
likely to trust others”. (Muslim 012)  
 
Another participant that stated that Muslim youth are most at risk because they are confronted 
with the challenges and frustrations of the current climate at a time in their lives when they 
lack spiritual maturity and less certain (more uncertain) about their faith. For example, this 
could be observed in the following statement:  
 
“A very important concern for our community is that our youth face the greatest 
pressures including discrimination and an uncertain future at a time in their lives when 
they have yet developed spiritual maturity and strength. This makes them angry and 
frustrated, and even vulnerable to manipulation”. (Muslim 016)   
 
The notion that faith is a protective mechanism that improves the capacity of adherents to cope 
with the challenges of uncertainty is supported in the literature (Hofstede, 1998). In this regard, 
more certainty in one’s Islamic understanding appears to increase the resilience of community 
members to deal with uncertainty and also potentially improve the prospects of community 
engagement. 
 
4.8 Summary  
 
The results presented in this chapter suggest an awareness on the part of Muslim community 
members that uncertainty is propagated by terrorists with the strategic intent to provoke 
miscalculation and an overreaction by the media, the government, community and the police.   
It appears the intended outcome transfers suspicion to the entire Muslim community. In this 
light, there was a clear consensus in the community interviews concerning the perception that 
authorities including police are targeting Muslim communities, which creates implications for 
community engagement.  This dilemma appears to highlight the strategic application of 
uncertainty as a means to impair efforts on the part of community members to ascertain the 
true intentions of police. The research literature views intentionality as a critical element to 
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secure relationships of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998; Doney et al., 1998) suggesting that Muslims 
will not implicitly trust police until they are satisfied of their intentions. In short, it appears that 
government policy around counter-terrorism creates uncertainty that undermines community 
efforts to ascertain the intentionality of police, which impairs trust relations as the foundation 
of community engagement.  
 
The results also exposed resentment from some community members that Muslim leaders 
would engage police who are simultaneously perceived as oppressing Muslim communities. In 
addition, the data appears to highlight the presence of anxiety associated with a perception that 
all Muslims are targeted, and police have powers and authority to enter a Muslim’s home at 
any time. The potential consequence is withdrawal from and avoidance of a perceived threat, 
which can impact on community engagement where police are themselves are perceived as one 
source of that threat. 
 
The results also highlight a number of factors that appear to have the capacity to negatively 
impact the community engagement efforts of police. These includes the potential to impair 
trust relations; community resistance to Muslim leaders engaging police; a determination of 
Muslim leaders to not partnership to access CVE funding; and the potential for withdrawal and 
avoidance from engaging with police.  
 
This research did not attempt to measure the overall extent of “uncertainty avoidance” within 
Muslim communities, however, the results indicate the presence of high uncertainty avoidance 
characteristics exposing the possible propensity for community members to terminate relations 
in the presence of excessive uncertainty. This suggests that Muslim communities that are 
recognised as possessing high uncertainty avoidance tendencies, maybe more vulnerable to 
uncertainty as a tool of terrorism than other communities, such as the wider Australian 
community.  
 
The data further suggests that Muslims who experience less uncertainty in their faith have a 
greater capacity to cope with the challenges of uncertainty and may be more willing to engage 
authorities. In contrast, the community responses also indicate that Muslims who may be less 
certain about Islam do not cope as well with the challenges of uncertainty and are less inclined 
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to trust police. This highlights the point that police community engagement needs to take 
account of culturally specific qualities evident within Muslim communities.  
 
In line with the aim of this thesis, this chapter has addressed the role and application of 
uncertainty in a manner that highlights a number of strategic opportunities and pitfalls to 
improve or impair the efforts of police to engage Muslim communities. This chapter considered 
the role of uncertainty to impede trust relations with police, while the next chapter will provide 
an analysis on the deeper dynamics that that govern trust relations including cultural nuances 
unique to Muslim communities.  
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Chapter Five: Results on Cultural Notions of Trust 
 
5.0  Introduction     
 
As already mentioned, the theoretical framework of this thesis examines three environments 
considered critical to successful counter-terrorism community engagement; namely - 
leadership, uncertainty and trust. As discussed in previous chapters, aspects of trust cannot be 
separated from leadership and uncertainty, however in this chapter trust will be treated as a 
distinct theme in its own right.  
 
Trust paradigms and subsequent impact on trust relations will be explored in an attempt to 
identify basic patterns that expose assumptions and beliefs with respect to how trustworthiness 
is demonstrated by police and trust is bestowed in South East Queensland’s Muslim 
Communities. This chapter will also examine the propensity of Muslim communities to bestow 
trust. 
 
5.1 Direct Experience, Relationship and Prediction 
 
Responses routinely exposed that the preferred method of participants is to decide an 
individual’s trustworthiness based on direct or personal experience. Direct or personal 
experience, or in other words, to meet someone and decide for one’s self was clearly the 
preferred method among participants to determine the trustworthiness of a potential trustee. In 
this respect, meeting somebody for the first time appeared to mark the commencement of trust 
relations, and as such, represents the most basic level of trust.  This was evident in the following 
comments: 
 
“First, I rely on personal experience, this is because we need to recognise that there 
are different levels of trust.” (Muslim 013) 
 
A. Goldsmith (2005) argues that trust is rooted in experience, and in individuals’ interactions 
with other people. Interviews revealed that direct experience appears to commence the 
gathering of the necessary information that will allow a relationship to progress through 
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identifiable milestones to stronger trust relations. This could be observed in the following 
response: 
 “Direct experience is the most important, you can’t trust someone until you have had 
dinner with them and travelled with them.” (Muslim 006) 
 
The following comment reinforces the notion that creating the necessary exposure through 
direct experience requires more time and extended interaction highlighting a culture difference 
in trust negotiations. This tends to explain a recognition in the literature that the engendering 
of trust in Muslim communities requires more time than other communities as evident in the 
following comment.  
 
“I like the opinion of the great Egyptian Scholar Imam Sharfi.  You can never truly 
befriend someone until you have ate, slept, or travelled with them – it is a long process 
– of getting to truly know each other. It is a process through dealings demonstrating 
integrity through dealings”. (Muslim 003) 
 
The interview data routinely supports the notion that it is difficult to achieve outcomes in 
Muslim communities in the absence of relationships. This was particularly apparent in the 
space of counter-terrorism community engagement as apparent in the following response:  
 
“There are no shortcuts and some people feel that relationships are an old cliché but 
the fact of the matter is that in Muslim communities, without relationships, nothing 
happens, at least when the going gets tough.” (Muslim 016) 
 
This comment exposes the importance and functionality of relationship as a critical mechanism 
to gather the necessary information to predict behaviours in a decision to bestow trust, and 
progress to stronger trust relations. It also suggests that direct experience will not progress into 
a more robust relationship of trust until certain information sought by the trustor is provided or 
provided by the trustee. This notion was evident in a statement that reveals the importance of 
police engagement practitioners demonstrating an awareness and understanding of Muslim 
communities: 
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“More so it is important to ascertain awareness and understanding of the community 
– empathy and capacity to understand the community.” (Muslim 017) 
 
Doney et al. (1998) states that “prediction” is the most common method applied in Muslim 
communities to determine that the behaviours of a potential trustee will fall between desired 
parameters. The notion of prediction was apparent throughout most interviews and can be 
observed in the ensuing statement: 
  
“To predict behaviour in a Muslim paradigm is very important.” (Muslim 015) 
 
The results suggest that the initial stages of information gathering as the basis of prediction are 
primarily concerned with ascertaining the values of a potential trustee based on a simple logic 
that key values will expose key behaviours. This could be observed in the following remark:  
 
“To predict with confidence is to know the key values that lead to key behaviours.” 
(Muslim 010) 
 
According to Gillespie and Mann (2004), shared values create the basis of trust. In this regard, 
the community interviews suggest that the next stage of trust relations is to establish an 
alignment of values. This was evident in numerus responses including the following statement: 
 
“The fastest way to secure my trust is to have the same views as myself, to have the 
same ethics.” (Muslim 027) 
 
Community responses further consistently exposed the importance of demonstrating Islamic 
values as an effective platform to demonstrate an alignment of values. The following insight 
reinforces the critical importance of a trustor’s capacity to predict behaviours based on values 
aligned to Islam, but also warns that this is an ongoing process that takes time where gains can 
be quickly lost. These traits are contained within the following observation: 
 
“We need confidence to predict within an Islamic paradigm – trust is bestowed and 
withdrawn in a continual process, and trust can take a long time to win and lost in a 
moment.” (Muslim 013) 




Community members recognise that gaining a knowledge of Islam starts with an awareness of 
the Prophet Mohammad that constitutes a useful knowledge to win trust in Muslim 
communities. Interview results consistently nominated Islamic values such as integrity, 
honesty and delivering on promises to predict future behaviour, however respondents routinely 
embodied these virtues by highlighting the importance of the Prophet Mohammad (pbuh) as an 
exemplar of Islamic values.  
 
“Predictability is important, for example people who respect the Prophet, it gives me 
some confidence to trust because we share the same values.” (Muslim 016) 
 
Respondents appeared to recognise that winning trust in Muslim communities is going to 
require practitioners who importantly possess a proficient level of knowledge and 
understanding of the Islamic faith and associated cultural dynamics. The ability of police to 
communicate respect for Islamic values was without doubt, highly regarded by community 
respondents. This was further evident in the following comment: 
 
“Confidence that a police officer will respect an Islamic paradigm goes a long way – 
says a lot about respect of the culture and values – it goes a long way to building trust 
– even saying Salam Wa Alaikum.” (Muslim 002) 
 
The data also suggests that when the prediction process establishes an alignment of more 
influential values between trustor and trustee, the result appears to be the emergence of a more 
implicit trust. As discussed in an earlier results chapter, justice is considered a “supreme” or 
“exalted” Islamic value. In this respect, a congruence in notions of justice suggests that trust 
relations are further strengthened. This was observed in the following comment:   
 
“There is power in bringing about a shared notion of justice – bringing about a 
congruence in shared values – finding a congruence in definitions – especially when it 
concerns freedom of religion and beliefs.” (Muslim 018) 
 
The data further exposed a tendency on the part of community respondents to ask 
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justice related questions as a means to minimise risk and enhance predictive capacity to 
establish a congruence the most influential values. This could be observed in the following 
statement:  
  
“I see that there are justice questions around that make or break trust relations – it has 
to be genuine – the most powerful examples are where one genuinely cares for most 
Muslims. People here are displaced, justice is always relevant.” (Muslim 026) 
 
Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) describe these critical skills as “sign reading” or decoding as 
a fundamental part of deciding whether to trust. This decoding process can be observed in the 
following comments concerning the importance of exchanging ideas before trust can be 
bestowed: 
 
“It is important to exchange ideas – if we do not and it results in detrimental ideas, then 
I don’t trust you.” (Muslim 019) 
 
This is a particularly critical practice when community engagement police are attempting to 
resolve issues of distrust that could be observed in some of the responses, particularly among 
young Muslims.  This was demonstrated by the following statement: 
 
 “If I meet somebody for the first time then I start with distrust.” (Muslim 021) 
 
The results suggest that a failure to demonstrate situational awareness can result in 
inconsistencies or doubts about the stability of the connection and further stands to jeopardize 
the bestowal of prediction-based trust. This conclusion was evident in the following statements: 
 
“In order to protect myself, somehow I need to predict their behaviour – so I look for 
red flags.”  (Muslim 008) 
 
“Do I know they are telling the truth, I have to ask questions – If I meet somebody for 
the first time then I start with distrust”. (Muslim 021) 
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As such, compliance with social norms and situational awareness is very important to enable 
predictability and establish if the trustee’s behaviour will fall within a desirable range. In this 
vein, interviews further highlighted that situational awareness requires community engagement 
practitioners to be aware of collectivist dynamics, and the potential to impact a decision to 
bestow trust. The importance of collectivism was constantly highlighted among responses 
including the following statements: 
 
 “We are a very collectivist society – impact to community is far more important than 
impact to the individual.” (Muslim 010) 
 
“Muslims are always about the community – individuals are important but community 
is more important”. The individual is expected to sacrifice individual needs for the 
community”. (Muslim 015) 
 
This highlights a critical difference between dispositional and contextual/situational 
approaches to the bestowal of trust. Dispositional based trust is the result of the trustor’s 
impressions based on the disposition of the individual seeking to win trust. This approach is 
consistent with individualistic cultures (Branzei, Vertinsky & Camp, 2007) like Australia that 
emphasises personal attitude and personal attributes in negotiating trust relations. In contrast, 
collectivist cultures that assert prediction-based trust are more dependent upon a wider 
situational context that stands to impact the collective (Butler Jr, 1991; Kramer, 1999; Nisbett 
et al., 2001).  
 
In this vein, the “prediction process” reveals that direct experience is the basis of relationship 
which creates opportunity to gather the required information to establish a congruence of values 
as the basis of trust. The data also suggests that an alignment of more influential Islamic values 
such as justice between trustor and trustee stands to deepen trust relations. This further exposes 
efforts to screen potentially untrustworthy individuals who have failed to answer key questions 
often based on justice as a means to more effectively predict behaviours that impact the 
collective. This highlights the importance of police practitioners possessing a specialist 
knowledge with capacity to demonstrate situational awareness that enables shared values and 
interpretations as a foundation to build trust. 
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5.2 Intentionality  
 
The literature supports the interview results that suggests the prediction process is the most 
preferred, and most commonly applied approach adopted by Muslim participants to assess the 
potential to bestow trust. In this vein, the data further reveals that prediction is critical to 
assessing intentionality which appears to possess the capacity for a deeper more implicit trust. 
This is a salient issue as a key aim of this research is to develop stronger trust relations that are 
not currently characteristic of counter-terrorism community engagement in the current climate.   
 
The results clearly exposed a consistent and widespread perception on the part of respondents 
concerning the importance of establishing true intentions when confronted with a decision to 
bestow trust. Hardin (2006) states: “to say we trust you means we believe you have the right 
intentions towards us and that you are competent to do what we trust you to do” (p.17). Scholars 
have found a significant relationship between trust beliefs and trust intentions within 
individuals (McKnight et al., 1998). 
 
In this regard, intentionality was perceived by participants as having greater relevance in the 
determination of trust relations than other considerations including qualifications and 
intelligence, which was observed throughout numerous responses, and was evident in the 
following statement: 
 
“Fundamentally, it all comes down to intent – I don’t care how many qualifications or 
how brilliant a person is – if they don’t have honourable intentions then I won’t trust 
them.” (Muslim 018). 
 
In direct response to policing in a climate of counter-terrorism, a number of respondents 
suggested that they were not prepared to bestow trust until the intentions of police became 
evident. As observed in the following statement:  
 
“You cannot bestow trust until intentions are clear. I look for deeper motivations to 
expose true intentions.” (Muslim 006) 
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The results also suggested that direct personal experience provides an important platform to 
establish true intentions. This could be observed in the following comment: 
 
“I give people the benefit of the doubt – but I would really judge someone through 
personal experience, I look for deeper motivations – or expose true intentions.” 
(Muslim 016) 
A number of participants suggested that successful counter-terrorism community engagement 
will only be achieved where police can effectively demonstrate honourable intentions. This 
was apparent in the following response: 
 
 “You will only be successful where you have the right intention.” (Muslim 022) 
 
The importance of intention is further supported by community responses that suggest it is a 
religious notion of Islam and that trust relations start with demonstrating honourable intentions.  
One interviewee stated: 
 
“Intentions are very important in Islam – especially at the start of trust relations.” 
(Muslim 016) 
 
There was widespread recognition among police and community respondents that hostile 
experience with authorities prior to settlement in Australia resulted in doubt concerning the 
true intentions of police here in Australia. In this vein, there was an apparent perception on the 
part of some community members that an effort to establish true intentions is actually a 
protective mechanism. In a related vein, one community member remarked how centuries of 
lies and deceit offers some insight as to how intentionality becomes a protective mechanism. 
This was evident in the following remark: 
 
“Intention is important because Muslims have always been lied to, and deceived, from 
the crusades to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; you have to understand that not 
only words and promises can mean nothing but actions too, our best protection is to 
know someone’s true intentions.” (Muslim 024) 
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In contrast to a western perception that “actions speak louder than words”; the above quote 
exposes a perception that actions are often as meaningless as words and promises. In this 
regard, another respondent stated that actions are actually legitimised by proper intentions: 
 
“Intention is who you are, you can behave good but not have good intentions. It is 
perfect when intentions and actions are good. Actions can only be legitimised through 
proper intention otherwise it does not count.”  (Muslim 029) 
 
Three separate Muslim respondents expressed discontent and frustration at the disproportionate 
allocation of resources in the space of counter-terrorism. Respondents largely acknowledged 
that police (and government authorities) continue to advocate that the solution to counter terror 
can be found in working with communities but challenged that this is not reflected in the 
allocation of resources between reactive and proactive needs. In this respect, the results suggest 
that this becomes a measure to gauge or predict deeper intentions. 
 
“1300 million, it shows the true intention not even 10% of the overall spend is on 
engagement; engagement cannot be done of the cheap – spending top dollar on 
operational, and not spending on community engagement is a big shortfall – we need 
to invest in relationships which is a paradigm that we need to operate in.” (Muslim 
019) 
 
“There is an enormous and disproportionate allocation of resources that is put into this 
area. 1.3 billion, and only 30 million into engagement, if that doesn’t send a true 
message of intention. I don’t know what does.” (Muslim 019) 
 
The importance of intention continues to be highlighted where the facilitation of community 
liaison meetings by police are viewed as worthwhile where community members are clear 
about the true intentions of police. This could be observed in the following statement: 
 
“Intention is critical as coming to a meeting, we want to know the true intentions – is 
this going to be a tick and flick episode with the agenda controlled by the police or will 
the community take some responsibility. A controlled agenda prevents voice – and voice 
is extremely important.” (Muslim 002) 




The results further suggest that failure on the part of authorities to effectively demonstrate 
honourable intentions can result in suspicion with the capacity to undermine the strategic intent 
of liaison activities.  It is appears that the efforts of police to develop trust have fallen short of 
intended outcomes at a liaison day initiated by police and partners at Dreamworld. After 
interviewing police respondents it was clear that the day was part of a well-intentioned strategy 
initiated to build trust relations with Muslim communities. And although this is how the event 
was received by some Muslim participants, it was not the intention perceived by all Muslim 
respondents. This notion was exposed in the following comment: 
 
“The best is example is Dreamworld Eid celebrations, a week after Eid, there were 
police walking around in groups of four with vests and weapons – one interpretation is 
to protect Muslims, but the second interpretation is why so many police, do we need to 
be policed, the only other time I saw a similar response was at a brawl, maybe that is 
why. The clear perception was that police were stopping us from causing problems”. 
(Muslim 021) 
 
In contrast, the results indicate that liaison events that have the greatest capacity to engender 
trust are those that have been most successful in demonstrating the true intentions of police 
concerning the wellbeing of Muslim communities. This was evident in the following response: 
 
 “The most powerful examples of increasing trust are where one genuinely cares for 
most Muslims.” (Muslim 026) 
 
This was apparent in the following response where the actions and intentions of police were 
perceived as not only genuinely advocating the wellbeing and safety of Muslim communities 
but doing so in a manner that demonstrates an equal standing with other communities. 
 
“The Most effective trust building exercise on the part of police was in 2014 when a 
right wing extreme group called for violence and harassment against Muslims – the 
police immediately called in the leaders – warning them, coming up with a response 
plan, and actively demonstrated that the community sat under the protection of police 
like every other community”. (Muslim 002) 




The results reveal that the proactive interaction with Muslim communities instigated by the 
executive leadership of the Queensland Police including the Commissioner, which appears to 
have been instrumental in demonstrating honourable intentions. This appears to be the case 
because the most senior police leaders have done more than simply send out low ranking police 
with a message that Muslim communities are valued; instead the executives have gone out 
themselves to communicate this message face-to-face through community interaction.  This 
was evident in the following comment made about the Commissioner of Police: 
 
 “The proactive approach of the Police Commissioner – getting out into the community 
with the support of executive leaders - shaking hands and looking you in the eyes – face to 
face make themselves available. A good example capitalised by Bob Atkinson was the death 
of a young Somali boy – the community saw the response of police as about their wellbeing. 
The Commissioner rang me up personally to thank me – it was very effective. The message 
was that Somali’s are valued as much as Australians”. (Muslim 012) 
 
There were a number of comments suggesting that engagement by the executive police 
leadership had been an effective means to engender more favourable support from within 
Muslim communities. The two following comments observe the proactivity and progress based 
on the contribution of the senior executive. 
 
 “The individual proactivity of the Commissioner was also a great help in developing 
trust - being highly engaged was also a key contributing factor to developing trust with 
Muslim communities.” (Muslim 002)  
 
Interview results consistently indicated that when a police leader speaks in public defence of 
Muslim communities despite public opposition, it is perceived as demonstrating true intention. 
This could be observed in the following interview response: 
 
“When a leader speaks publicly in defence of the Muslim community, it creates 
enormous optimism – it shows empathy and the human side of policing which breeds 
connection.” (Muslim 017) 
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The results further highlight that a strategic miscalculation on the part of police can be more 
easily managed if the community believes that police have acted with an honourable intention. 
This could be observed in the following response: 
 
“Community members think the police should know, so when the police don’t do 
something, you are left to wonder; “do you do this on purpose, or are you innocent and 
ignorant?” Is it a genuine mistake and you came to build a relationship?  Intention is 
the really big thing- its called “mia”, it is very big in Islam – as long as they can see 
sincere intention then the community can be very forgiving.” (Muslim 026) 
 
The interviews also revealed the importance of transparency as a mechanism to expose the true 
intentions of police in order to ensure that meetings will be successful. This was evident in the 
following response: 
 
“Transparency is required to demonstrate intention; giving ownership to the 
community – genuine engagement with sincere intention – to the extent to which they 
listen and follow the advice of the community – work with the community as a whole – 
if related to the community at large then there is no confidentiality – especially in the 
sense of community.” (Muslim 017) 
 
It is noteworthy that a number of community interviewees considered liaison meetings to be a 
critical mechanism for police to demonstrate transparency and intention as evidenced in the 
following response: 
 
“Liaison meetings are important to demonstrate intentions and transparency.” 
(Muslim 017) 
 
It was equally observed that meetings where authorities failed to demonstrate honourable 
intentions through perceived tokenism were considered destructive to trust relations. The 
following comments suggest that Muslim leaders lose a desire to persevere because of 
tokenistic consultation:  
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“A tick and flick culture is more dangerous than no consultation at all.  There are 
clearly times when they (community members) don’t wish to engage because it is felt to 
be fruitless.” (Muslim 002) 
 
This highlights the interdependent nature of the relationship where communities are not only 
expected to trust police, but police are expected to trust the advice of Muslim communities 
when it comes to solving problems through community partnership:  
 
“For everybody to get where they are going on our roads, the traffic has to be two ways 
otherwise there will be frustration and accidents. And trust is exactly the same, if it 
doesn’t go two ways then there will be issues and things will break down very quickly.” 
(Muslim 016) 
Frustration on the part of respondents was widespread with respect to the perceived 
misrepresentation and distortion propagated by media sources presenting Muslims as the 
problem. This could be observed in the following response: 
 
“There are problems with the media constantly hammering the community – Muslims 
constantly being defined as part of the problem.” (Muslim 022) 
 
Participants often felt that the response on the part of police has the capacity to either enhance 
or erode trust relations. This could be observed in the following remark: 
 
“Giving details to the media about the investigation clearly damages trust.” (Muslim 
021) 
 
In contrast, efforts on the part of police to demonstrate genuine intention for Muslim wellbeing 
by taking the necessary time to investigate an incident before labelling it terror related was also 
recognised and praised by Muslims respondents in the following manner:  
   
“Police take their time to investigate before saying it is terrorism – it wins points with 
Muslims.” (Muslim 025) 
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The results suggest that where police initiatives have been able to successfully demonstrate 
honourable intention through genuine concern for Muslim well-being, the result has been 
growth in community trust relations. The results also suggest where police have been 
unsuccessful in demonstrating honourable intentions there has been lost opportunity as well as 
trust.  
 
5.3 Cognitive verses Affective Based Trust 
 
The interview results reflect the importance of affective trust in Muslim communities and the 
lessor importance of cognitive trust. Affective trust is described as trust from the heart and 
emphasises relationship based on emotional attachment, empathy or friendship.  In contrast, 
cognitive trust is described as trust from the head, and focuses on the task and not the 
relationship while emphasising a simple calculated assessment where the probability of gain 
outweighs the probability for loss (Coleman, 1990). Cognitive trust is based on the confidence 
you feel in the capability, accomplishments, skills and reliability.  Fox (1974) describes 
cognitive approaches to building trust as cold, and barely constituting a form of trust because 
they do not rely on a functional relationship. 
 
The interviews revealed the presence of affective based trust that highlighted the need to invest 
in relationships before any attempt at solving community problems. This was apparent from 
the following observation: 
 
“We need to focus on that which unites us more than that which divides us. Sometimes 
we just need to focus on the relationship, and just enjoy each other before we try and 
address all the issues.” (Muslim 022) 
 
One police respondent suggested that the construct of trusting a vast organisation like the 
Queensland Police Service is very challenging for new migrants including many Muslims. As 
demonstrated in the following comment, it is a foreign concept in the absence of personal 
relationship:  
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“At times, the culture differences are obvious, especially for new migrants both Muslim 
and non-Muslim alike, it is difficult for them to connect to, and trust an organisation, it 
is like a new concept, and doesn’t happen without personal relationships.” (Police 013) 
 
It is apparent from community responses that in the space of counter-terrorism, qualifications 
including “expert status” is not viewed with enough regard (in and by itself) to add value to 
trust relations. One respondent who is viewed as an active Muslim leader and respected 
community problem solver in the space of counter-terrorism stated that in the last two decades 
of having worked in this space, he is yet to seek one’s qualifications as a basis to bestow trust. 
This was apparent in the following two following remarks: 
 
“In twenty years I have never asked someone or challenged qualifications in this 
space.” (Muslim 017) 
 
 “Qualifications are not paramount for trusting information.” (Muslim 004) 
 
Earlier in this chapter, results revealed how intentionality appears to legitimise actions, 
qualifications and skills that are the basis of “capability”, and the focus of a cognitive approach. 
In this regard, it is intentionality that appears to expose the intended destination while capability 
provides the thrust and movement to get there. In a climate of distrust where some community 
respondents wonder if the war on terror is a front for a war against Islam, then it is only efforts 
to differentiate deeper true intentions that provides the greatest safety mechanism.  In this 
regard, the results suggest that capability in the absence of demonstrating honourable intentions 
has the capacity to engender fear. This was evident in the ensuing remark: 
 
“Qualifications and skills are important, but the question is to be applied in what 
direction. I look at the skills of the U.S. Army in Iraq, they are enormous but I believe 
it was the wrong intent. And the results are terrifying.” (Muslim 018) 
 
Some respondents suggested that there was anxiety and fear associated with the unprecedented 
introduction of new anti-terror powers. Respondents were not so much challenging the 
capability, but the deeper intentions of authorities that govern its application.  This was 
particularly the case in view that a number of community respondents felt that new legislative 
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powers were only used to target Muslim communities. This perception was evident in the 
following comment:  
 
 “The label of terrorist seems to be reserved for Muslim communities”. (Muslim 002) 
 
The research exposes that capability is only valued where a potential trustee could successfully 
demonstrate clear intentions. The results also expose how relationships in Muslim communities 
act as critical mechanisms to gather the required information to effectively predict 
intentionality. In this manner, it appears that intentionality is the key to winning a more implicit 
trust that is not characteristic of current relations between police and Muslim communities, and 
is desperately need.  In this regard, it is clear that cognitive trust emphasising skills, capability 
and qualifications not only lacks sufficient capacity to improve trust relations in Muslim 
communities, but can be further perceived as dangerous or engendering fear in the absence of 
demonstrating clear intentions.  In contrast, affective trust based on relationships creates 
opportunity for prediction affording a platform to identify intentionality which enables trust 
relations to progress.  
5.4 Transference or Third Party Referral 
 
The results suggest that in the absence of direct personal experience, transference becomes a 
mechanism to draw upon a credible third-party source whose assessment is considered a valid 
form of prediction.  Applying an external third-party proof source to transfer trust to a potential 
trustee is referred to as transference (Doney & Cannon, 1997).  
 
The following comment uses the term “trust reference” and suggests that asking a third party 
is a credible means to establish the views and concerns of a potential trustee. This practice was 
apparent in the following comment: 
 
“I ask others for a trust reference to ascertain their views and concerns (Muslim 007) 
 
The results indicated a wide response among community participants that this is an important 
process on condition that the third party is a trusted source. Most community participants 
agreed that they routinely search for a trusted third party proof source as a tool to establish 
trustworthiness.  This could be observed from the following remark: 




“I like to trust people until they prove otherwise – third party endorsement is very 
important I will always go and ask somebody who I can trust.” (Muslim 023) 
 
Respondents further explained that this was a very common or widespread practice applied by 
Muslim community members which sentiment could be observed in the following response. 
 
 “Third party endorsement is very common in the community.” (Muslim 016) 
 
The significance and importance of transference as a protective mechanism was observed 
where a number of participants indicated that they were prepared to exhaust significant energies 
to establish the trustworthiness of a potential trustee. In this respect, transference not only 
conveyed trust, it was a means to prevent problems. This notion was clearly evident in the 
following remark: 
  
“When people come to Brisbane from Sydney, I will ring friends in Sydney to ask about 
his reputation. When I have a problem, I then know him, even to avoid a problem, you 
know who your friends truly are when there is trouble.  It really only takes one trouble 
to see that you never really even knew someone.” (Muslim 029) 
 
The results suggest that reputation is critically important in Muslim communities, and that it is 
simply another transference mechanism that communicates trustworthiness. Aiken, Liu, 
Mackoy and Osland (2004) suggest that transference through reputation carries greater 
significance and becomes a recognised “certification” that an individual or group is 
trustworthy. In this light, it appears that reputation is a recognised community stamp of 
approval that the behaviours of a potential trustee can be safely predicted.   
 
Police responses revealed an awareness that reputation was critically valued among Muslim 
communities. This notion was evident in the following remarks: 
 
“In Muslim communities trust is like a currency, you can’t get anywhere without it, and 
reputation shows you can be trusted, we have to protect our reputation.” (Police 013) 
 
126 | P a g e  
 
 
“100% - reputation has to be credible and authentic, it is where we rise or fall, 
especially in Muslim communities”. (Police 014) 
 
Community responses revealed a perception that in the space of counter-terrorism, reputation 
of police is clearly considered a protective mechanism for community members. The following 
comment suggests that community members prefer to deal with specific police officers who 
have a good reputation in the community: 
 
“Is reputation important? The reputation builds with the interaction. It is seen as 
protection for everyone, it is actually a protective factor for everyone. We will ask for 
specific police officers - that will happen.” (Muslim 025) 
 
The results suggest that a good reputation constitutes a community recognition that an 
individual or group can be trusted. When it comes to dealing with police, a respondent 
suggested that demeanour, appearance and non-verbal communication are important but 
reputation is critical. The following comment suggests that community members will invest 
significant energies to ask trusted friends to then ask trusted friends if specific police can be 
trusted. The response infers that it would be unwise (foolish) to not seek further advice from a 
trusted third party source. 
 
“Many things to build trust – his uniform and his actions, kind face, reputation is the 
most important, if you don’t know who they are then you must ask a friend, we have to, 
we would be foolish not to – I even ask friends to ask their friends to find out the 
reputation.” (Muslim 029) 
 
5.5  Propensity to Trust 
 
The literature suggests that Muslim communities experience a low propensity to bestow trust, 
however the results of this research expose divided opinions. The World Trust Survey suggests 
that collectivist societies characterised by high uncertainty avoidance (characteristic of Muslim 
communities) have the greatest propensity to bestow trust. Yet, in a confusing stance, the World 
Trust Survey also identifies that five of the six most trusting countries in the world are 
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individualist, low uncertainty avoidance and low power distance reflecting societies and culture 
more culturally consistent with countries like Australia and Canada.  
 
The interview responses of police reveal a common perception that Muslim communities are 
often suspicious and reluctant to bestow trust. Numerous police officers perceived that a low 
propensity to bestow trust on the part of Muslim community members was largely present, and 
often the result of hostile experience with corrupt police prior to immigration in countries of 
origin. This could be observed in the following statement: 
 
“We shouldn’t be surprised that it can be challenging to win trust in Muslim 
communities, after all, most of the community are migrants who have had hostile 
experience with police before coming to Australia. And with Islamophobia, we can 
expect them to be more guarded than other communities.” (Police 014) 
 
In stark contrast, interviews with Muslim community members suggest that Muslims have a 
clear desire and propensity to bestow trust, even beyond other communities. One respondent 
stated as follows: 
 
“We trust quite well as a community, more so than other communities.” (Muslim 008) 
 
Other respondents indicated that Muslims are expected to bestow trust and demonstrate 
trustworthiness as part of a religious responsibility in Islam.  This was observed in the 
following statements:  
 
 “The first response is that Islam teaches the need to trust”. (Muslim 017) 
 
 “Islam teaches you to trust – you have to trust.” (Muslim 008) 
 
The results revealed that Muslim participants adopt identifiable behavioural patterns to gather 
information to make trust decisions. Branzei et al. (2007) explains that cultural norms that are 
conducive to the efficient production of trust in one setting may be impotent, and even 
misleading or damaging in another.   In this vein, the results concerning propensity to trust 
differ according to the choice of the culturally preferred trust paradigm applied between trustee 
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and trustor. Where paradigms not emphasising relationships that are most consistent with 
Anglo Australian culture were applied as strategies to win trust, there was clear hesitation on 
the part of Muslim communities.  
 
The data supports Doney et al. (1998) that the cognitive approaches are more consistent with 
the west which includes mainstream Anglo Australian society while prediction, intentionality 
and transference are more consistent with Muslim societies throughout the world. According 
to the interview results, where the basis of measurement were the two trusting styles most 
consistent with Anglo Australian culture (calculative and capability) then there appears to be a 
lower propensity to bestow trust. However, in valuable contrast, if the basis of measurement 
becomes the three trusting styles most consistent with Muslim communities (prediction, 
intention and transference) then there was clearly a greater propensity on the part of 
interviewees to bestow trust.  
 
Furthermore, the results support the proposition of Doney, et al. (1998) that prediction is the 
preferred paradigm in Muslim communities to initiate trust relations, but uniquely suggest that 
prediction (at least in the space of counter-terrorism) is more significantly a mechanism to 
ascertain intentionality which appears to be the more salient consideration in a decision to 
develop stronger trust relations.  
  
The results demonstrated that the most powerful catalysts of trust were the result of experiences 
where police had very clearly demonstrated intentionality based on Muslim community 
wellbeing. In contrast, cited examples that were destructive to trust were often the result of 
perceived ambiguity on the part of community members concerning the actual intentions of 
police.  
 
The research suggests that a significant number Muslim participants are caught in a “battle of 
perceived intentionality” in that, “is the war on terror a war against Islam?” This appears to 
translate at a local level to “are the police truly about the wellbeing of Muslims, or is the deeper 
agenda to spy on Muslim communities?” This tends to explain the state of ambivalence raised 
in a previous results chapter where the last decade and a half of Police/Muslim community 
relations can be characterised by damage from counter-terrorism policing and subsequent 
repair efforts from proactive community based efforts. The difference appears to highlight a 
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dilemma of intentionality where one arm of police (counter-terrorism) is often perceived as a 
war against Islam while the other seeks to promote Muslim community wellbeing.  
 
5.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Muslim communities are divided into smaller communities where some have more trust, and 
others have distrust suggesting that not all communities experience the same challenges. Most 
Muslim participants celebrate the existence of a relationship of trust with the Queensland Police 
but point out that it can, and should be stronger to endure future challenges. The results indicate 
that trust is domain specific, and in the context of the Queensland Police highlights a state of 
ambivalence between proactive community-based policing and reactive counter-terrorism 
policing.  
 
The community response most exemplary of the process is highlighted in the following 
response: 
“Firstly, I rely on personal experience, and recognise that there are different levels of                                                                   
trust. 
  Secondly, a reference check is then very important. 
 Thirdly, I ask questions about the individual – to ascertain their true intentions.” 
 (Muslim 013)                
 
The data indicates that direct experience with a potential trustee is the most common and 
preferred means to ascertain trustworthiness. This highlights the importance of relationship as 
a time and space to gather the required information to establish intentionality. This highpoints 
how affective trust based on the heart has greater application than cognitive trust (based on the 
head) to develop trust in Muslim communities, simply relationship is critical. 
 
Examples exposing the most significant trust victories for police appear to be the result of 
passing what the researcher has termed the “intentionality test”. In contrast, clear examples of 
damage or struggling trust relations appear to be the result of failing the intentionality test. The 
research suggests that actions only speak louder than words upon passing the “intentionality 
test”. If community engagement actions do not pass the intentionality test then there is a risk 
that strategies will achieve limited results. In this light, the results literally suggest that 
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intentionality legitimises actions which is a critical consideration for the future formulation of 
new counter-terrorism engagement strategies. 
 
The above participant’s response further highlights that there are a number of levels of trust 
where relations start with personal experience (relationship), and then in what appears to be an 
attempt to develop a more implicit trust, the participant articulates the tools of transference and 
intentionality. This is a process that often requires multiple and more intimate interactions 
resulting in a recognition that winning trust in Muslim communities requires more time and 
effort than wider Anglo Australian communities.  
 
These results do not necessarily equate to a low propensity on the part of Muslim communities 
to bestow trust. To the contrary, the results suggest that a knowledge of the cultural dynamics 
that govern the bestowal of trust carries the capacity for practitioners to more effectively 
unleash what appears to be a clear and present willingness on the part of Muslim community 
members to bestow police with a more durable and implicit trust.  
 
The data also suggests that the cultural mechanism to enhance predictive capacity is asking 
situational and background questions to ensure a congruence of values and minimise risk. 
Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) describe these questions as “sign reading” or decoding as a 
fundamental part of deciding whether to trust. Interview responses suggest that these questions 
are often based on notions of justice which is a highly influential value of Islam. As such, the 
challenge of community engagement practitioners is to enhance the prediction process of 
community members so that the perceived answers will fall within a desirable range that 
warrants the bestowal of trust.  
 
The most conducive answers represent a specialist knowledge where success is the result of 
demonstrating a congruence of key values, with further capacity to emphasise shared notions 
of justice that advocate group wellbeing. Failure to demonstrate situational awareness results 
in inconsistencies or doubts about the stability of the connection and stands to jeopardize the 
bestowal of prediction-based trust. These results highlight the need for engagement 
practitioners to comfortably and confidently impart the necessary information that allows 
community members to effectively assess intentions with minimal or unnecessary obstruction.  
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The results also highlight that trustors from individualistic cultures are often satisfied with a 
relationship dynamic that focuses on the disposition of a potential trustee. This is in contrast to 
collective cultures that will ask numerous questions to establish how the collective or group 
may be affected by a decision to trust. This highlights the difference between dispositional trust 
and contextual trust. 
 
The results further suggest that where prediction is not possible through insufficient direct 
experience, a trustor will draw upon a trusted third party who is considered capable of a 
competent prediction. This is considered a common practice among community participants 
where some respondents indicated that they would ask trusted friends to ask their trusted 
friends about the trustworthiness of a police officer. 
 
The results also suggest that reputation is extremely important as it was perceived as a 
community wide recognition or “certification” that an individual can be trusted. In this regard, 
the results indicate that challenges to reputation were treated very seriously.  
 
In all, it is hoped that these observations constitute credible and strategic considerations to 
improve training of engagement practitioners and enhance the formulation of new innovative 
strategies to improve trust relations in an environment that is considered complex with limited 
results.   
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Results Chapter 6: Muslim Leadership and Counter-Terrorism 
 
6.0  Introduction     
 
The aim of this research is to better understand the factors that erode and enhance the process 
of counter-terrorism community engagement with Muslim communities in Queensland. As 
such, the theoretical framework examines three environments (portrayed in the below diagram) 

















This chapter will present results with respect to key considerations around Muslim community 
leadership while the next chapter will focus on results concerning the issue of uncertainty. The 
strategy of authorities to engender trust with Muslim communities is largely contingent upon 
two key relationships; firstly, between police and community leaders; and secondly, between 
Muslim leaders and their own communities. In this respect, there is a critical recognition that 
the larger success of counter-terrorism community engagement cannot be achieved without the 










Al-Marayati (2007) states that legitimate, authentic and credible Muslim leadership is the key 
to countering extremism and radicalisation. In this vein, there are three research aims in this 
chapter; firstly, establish if the Queensland Police are engaging Muslim leaders who are 
perceived as legitimate and representative in their own communities; secondly, ascertain the 
religious and cultural considerations that determine and bestow leadership legitimacy in 
Queensland Muslim communities, and how it impacts community engagement; and thirdly, 
where Muslim leaders are considered as legitimate, what are the dynamics and actions of 
police, if any, that can erode legitimacy, resulting in a reduced capacity to influence the 
behaviours of Muslim community members to achieve sustainable outcomes. 
  
Interviews with Muslim community members were undertaken to better understand and explain 
the dynamics of Muslim leadership legitimacy, including the tensions and impact of 
engagement efforts by police. The interviews revealed a consistently positive relationship with 
the QPS and Muslim communities in Queensland. However, respondents characterised a state 
of ambivalence, or the simultaneous existence of trust and distrust resulting from a perceived 
cycle of reactive counter-terrorism policing, and subsequent repair efforts by proactive 
community-based policing. In this vein, counter-terrorism policing was perceived as the 
greatest threat to undermining and/or damaging the existing relationships of trust between the 
Queensland Police and Muslim communities. 
 
The interview results highlight a widespread perception among community members that a loss 
of legitimacy is experienced by Muslim leaders who attempt to appease both Muslim 
communities and police.  This raises a need to ascertain if a tenant of Islam is being 
compromised, and if so, how does it impact legitimate leadership practice in Queensland 
Muslim communities. In this light, there is an apparent absence in the literature addressing the 
religious and cultural continuum that Muslim leaders must travel in their own communities, if 
there is to be any genuine hope of winning legitimacy and trust as the basis of successfully 
influencing community members in a climate of counter-terrorism community engagement.   
 
Respondents exposed a conflict of values based on notions of justice that was seen as having 
direct implications in a religious and cultural process that requires Muslim leaders to speak out 
against perceived injustice to win leadership legitimacy. The interviews revealed that speaking 
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out against injustice is considered the highest standing for a Muslim leader, and that failure to 
do so not only constitutes a second injustice, but can be perceived as a form of hypocrisy that 
can erode the legitimacy of Muslim leadership.  
 
The findings of this research is that there is a widespread perception among respondents that 
some Muslim leaders have experienced a loss of legitimacy for not fulfilling this cultural 
obligation. In this light, speaking out against injustices that include Australian involvement in 
Iraq and Afghanistan appears to bolster the legitimacy of Muslim leaders while simultaneously 
drawing the negative attention of media and authorities. This can help explain why various 
Muslim leaders who have legitimacy with police often do not have legitimacy amongst their 
own community; and leaders who experience legitimacy in Muslim communities do not have 
legitimacy with the police. In this vein, there is a clear inference in the literature and within the 
interview data that Muslim leaders with the greatest legitimacy and capacity to lead change in 
their community can be overlooked or not engaged by police. 
 
This chapter will analyse and present findings with respect to the pressures and challenges 
confronting Muslim leaders in southeast Queensland when attempting to win legitimacy within 
their own communities, and how it is affected by the actions of authorities in a climate of 
counter-terrorism policing. Twenty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
Muslim community members including imams, mosque trustees, community service providers 
and youth (18 years and older). Eleven  interviews were conducted with police.  
 
6.1  QPS Relationship with Muslim Communities 
 
Most respondents praised the Queensland Police for the positive relationship that it maintains 
with Muslim communities. The following comment was not uncommon: 
 
“In general, police relationships have been very good, with a perception that it is much 
better than the relationships experienced with police in other states. Police have a liaison 
meeting each month, and clearly go out of their way to attend community activities. Police 
were well engaged with the opening of the Slack Creek Mosque”. (Muslim 001) 
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A number of comments widely acknowledged the proactive engagement of the Commissioner 
of Police and the senior executives. One interviewee observed this engagement in the following 
way: 
 
“They’ve employed the right people.  The proactive approach of the Police Commissioner 
– getting out into the community with the support of executive leaders - shaking hands and 
looking you in the eyes – face to face make themselves available. A good example 
capitalised by Bob Atkinson was the death of a young Somali boy – the community saw the 
response of police as about their wellbeing. The Commissioner rang me up personally to 
thank me – it was very effective. The message was that Somali’s are valued as much as 
Australians.” (Muslim 012) 
 
There were a number of comments suggesting that engagement by the executive police 
leadership had been an effective means to engender more favourable support from within 
Muslim communities. A number of interviews suggested that Muslim Police Liaison Officers 
have also undertaken a valuable role in assisting the community to more comfortably engage 
police. Other comments recognised the value of police having created opportunities that ensure 
a first positive experience for new Muslim migrants. Community members often remarked that 
the relationship has improved in recent years, but has not been without its challenges. This was 
evident in the following remark: 
 
“Police in the past use to be bias but in the last few years that has become less and less, 
it is much better.” (Muslim 015) 
 
There were numerous comments exposing a perception that the police relationship in 
Queensland is far more positive than its counterparts in southern states with a participant 
observing:   
 
“Police have a trust in Queensland, it is very good even beyond the other states – it is 
actually an amazing trust - there are some hard line groups in the police that struggle 
but most police are very good.” (Muslim 024) 
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One Muslim leader remarked how he had attended a countering violent extremism conference 
in Sydney, and was surprised to observe a Sydney based Muslim Leader decline an opportunity 
to be photographed with police for fear that it would affect his relationship with his community.  
Another respondent pointed out that Muslim leaders in Victoria had chosen to cancel the Iftar 
dinner with police in protest to comments by the then serving Prime Minister Tony Abbott, 
while Queensland based Muslim leaders chose to honour their dinner engagement.  
 
In responses that are clearly supportive of the police, two Muslim community leaders 
recognised complexities in the relationship, that include the deliberate and apparent agitation 
by particular Muslim community members who were perceived by the respondents as falsely 
accusing police of discrimination in efforts to distract community attention from their own 
criminal behaviour.  One community leader responded: 
 
“I have seen myself a situation, a raid where police came in, and found drugs and guns 
– and at the same time the person was violently resisting arrest so police responded 
aggressively. So the Muslim went to Facebook, and the community ignored the 
offending and the whole matter became emotionally charged. And these things spread 
throughout the various Muslim communities like wild fire”. (Muslim 0025) 
 
Two respondents recounted in the interviews how they verbally challenged Muslim community 
members who had been charged by police, asking them if drugs or weapons had been found. 
Upon ascertaining that they had been found, the respondents recounted how they reprimanded 
the concerned individuals with a warning that there were enough challenges without them 
making matters worse, and to desist from further criminal behaviour. Both respondents agreed 
that this demonstrated growth and maturity in police Muslim relations. 
 
However the feedback was not always positive from other segments of the Muslim community 
especially with respect to the 2014 counter-terrorism raids. This involved the arrest and 
charging of two Muslim men, one for providing financial support to a terrorist group, and 
another for trying to recruit individuals to leave Australia and travel to Syria in support of the 
Islamic State. For example one interviewee stated: 
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“Some pockets of Muslim Communities have been badly affected by the raids.  Raids 
are seen as destroying trust, and there is too much of a focus in this area”. (Muslim 
013) 
 
Another participant who is an imam recognised that over recent years there had been growth 
in the levels of trust with police, but was quick to point out that trust has a number of levels. 
The imam used the analogy of “motor oil” as follows: 
 
“Like ‘thin oil’ in the motor of a car, it will suffice in routine local trips but in the event 
of a more intensive journey, it will burn quickly, and may even damage the motor. A 
thin oil will not suffice when the motor reaches high revs which may be the case if we 
have a major terrorist incident.” (Muslim 006) 
 
This respondent suggested that trust does exist between police and Muslim communities but 
he suspects that it may not be sufficient to endure a major incident such as a terrorist event.   
 
Another concerning aspect of police relations with Muslim communities was constant and 
regular comments exposing the negative perceptions of Muslim youth towards police. One 
respondent commented: 
 
“I know many cousins that have beards, and they say that they are constantly harassed 
by police – the police aren’t rude but they always ask them for their details because 
they look Muslim”. (Muslim 026) 
 
Another interview suggested that there is a significant amount of anger among younger 
Muslims that has the capacity to worsen: 
 
“Young men are the greatest of a concern – easily flaring up because they are the most 
disenfranchised, and there is a lot of anger”. (Muslim 007) 
 
In all, most comments concerning police were positive in recognition that the relationship has 
improved in recent years, however there was also a widespread fear that aspects of counter-
terrorism policing presented a threat to undermine sustainable trust relations.  








Impact of Counter-Terrorism Operations 
There was an array of responses that routinely expressed frustrations in response to a series of 
raids conducted in 2014 by the Queensland Police and the Australian Federal Police. There was 
empathy and recognition on the part of most respondents for the necessity of police counter-
terrorism efforts, but there was also a clear consensus that there were better ways to achieve 
this goal, and that the present approach is destructive to police relations. One interviewee 
commented for example: 
 
“Trust has been destroyed through raids and over-reaction, it is fine that the police 
have a job, but it is how they go about doing it. But clearly the reactive quickly 
undermines the proactive forms of policing”. (Muslim 011)  
 
The result is a state of ambivalence, where the simultaneous existence of trust and distrust was 
observed where most Muslim participants felt they were treated equally by police when it 
comes to, for example a traffic violation, or when victim of crime. However, this was clearly 
not the case when it came to the application of anti-terror laws. Many of the respondents felt 
there was a clear distrust, and at times ill feeling towards the application of these laws by police. 
One respondent observed: 
 
“Abuse of justice in the raids is the single most destructive threat to undermine trust; 
communication and quality information really matters ……. If its in the mosque as a 
discussion point then it is clearly important, and it comes up many times. And the 
impression from the discussion is that things are getting worse. Imams have said that 
your house can be raided at any time – these discussions are very common in the 
mosques”. (Muslim 016) 
 
The interviews revealed a common perception among Muslim participants that the war on 
terrorism is often perceived as a war on Islam. This was evident from the following comment: 




“Definitely – of course they feel that the Australian CT response is an ideology targeted 
against Muslims – the AFP, and within that the CT unit of the QPS, they share a lot”. 
(Muslim 024) 
 
Some leaders described that over the last decade, the relationship with police can be 
characterised as a cycle of damage to community relations from counter-terrorism policing, 
and subsequent recovery or damage control through the application of proactive community 
based policing. In this respect, there was an array of community members who expressed 
concern that the biggest threat to relations with police will not be a major terrorist act, but the 
resulting damage from counter-terrorism responses.  
 
Police Engagement and Representative Muslim Leadership  
 
The success of counter-terrorism community engagement not only depends upon Muslim 
leaders with legitimacy, it also depends upon leaders who are sufficiently representative of 
Muslim communities (Spalek, El Awa, McDonald & Lambert, 2008). A leader who is not 
considered representative by his or her community does not possess the capacity to lead change 
(Purdue, Razzaque, Hambleton, Stewart, Huxham, & Vangen, 2000). In this respect, authorities 
have been criticised by Muslim community members for engaging Muslim leaders without 
perceived legitimacy in their own communities (de Guzman, 2002; Skogan, 2006). 
 
The results suggest that the Queensland police while having active relationships with most 
Muslim communities, do not always engage leaders who are representative. Lambert (2008) 
argues that the “ideal yes-saying” Muslim leaders that are often targeted by authorities tend to 
lack credibility in their communities with little or no capacity to influence change.  The results 
suggest that police need to identify more representative community leaders who are perceived 
as legitimate by both policing partners and Muslim communities.  For example one interviewee 
stated: 
 
“The community doesn’t trust some leaders who the government trusts, and the 
government doesn’t trust some leaders who the community trusts, and this damages the 
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catalyst for change. The community is very diverse and can be better represented”. 
(Muslim 012) 
 
A specialist community engagement police officer pointed out that police have made attempts 
to engage some of the more challenging Muslim communities but with limited results. This 
was reflected with the following comment:  
 
“All Muslim communities have been invited to engage liaison activities with police but 
it doesn’t seem to matter what you do, there are some Muslim segments that are not 
interested in developing relationships or attending meetings, they just want to be left 
alone”. (Police 007) 
 
There were a number of participants who felt that Muslim leaders originating from the sub-
continent (Pakistan, India and Bangladesh) monopolised engagement and liaison with 
Queensland government agencies, such as police. Two participants responded that the Islamic 
Council of Queensland, the main Muslim "representative" body in Queensland, failed to 
represent the needs of African and Afghan Muslim refugees. For example one of those 
respondents stated: 
 
“ICQ (Islamic Council of Queensland) is dominated by Muslims who are more 
professional from the sub-continent, and ignore the needs of the refugees. When it 
comes to the Muslim community, if you cannot speak up then no one will speak for 
you…… The only time we have been engaged as Somalis was to provide youth for a 
CVE course – where our community was targeted for criminality”. (Muslim 012) 
 
Shiite respondents made it clear that the Islamic Council of Queensland does not represent or 
advocate the needs of the Shiite community. Shiite respondents felt that because other Islamic 
groups have been in Australia much longer, they are more established and better funded, having 
experienced greater representation and liaison with government. One of these Shiite 
interviewees responded: 
 
“Those Muslims who are funded and established have more presence and 
representation than those who do not”. (Muslim 027)  




The younger Muslim respondents also felt that pre-dominantly Middle Eastern sheiks rarely 
related nor connected with Australian born Muslims, and failed to appreciate the dynamics of 
being raised in the west. One respondent commented as follows: 
 
“Language, generation and massive culture gaps, imams coming from the Middle East, 
but we need to target the younger sheiks, don’t go to the old sheiks, they don’t relate. 
Our Moofti only speaks Arabic, and our youth don’t speak Arabic, it creates a space 
for manipulation”. (Muslim 025) 
 
It was not uncommon for younger participants to point out that too many Muslim leaders are 
perceived as being out of touch through a limited understanding of what it means to be raised 
in Australia. One responded observed: 
 
“One key issue is that you don’t see too many youth at a grass roots level.  There is a 
clear recognition that there has to be more young Muslim leaders…..  There is a clear 
sentiment on the part of the youth that Muslim leaders do not understand what it means 
to be a Muslim leader in Australia.  They are perceived as out of touch”. (Muslim 002) 
 
In view that Muslim youth constitute a group at risk of distrusting police, this presents a 
strategic concern where leaders are expected to perform a mediating role to build trust with 
police. Responses revealed what appears to be a major concern in the widespread 
disillusionment of youth with Muslim leadership. Furthermore, this was highlighted as a 
concern that it creates a space for manipulation by radical elements in the community. 
 
A number of respondents felt that female Muslims are also inadequately represented in their 
own communities. One participant stated that when meetings take place with government, there 
is often a last minute rush by male leaders to organise the attendance of women to create the 
impression of equal participation. In this vein, there were further comments that domestic 
violence is a significant problem, and that it had been inadequately addressed by predominantly 
male community leaders. 
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Two Muslim participants pointed out that the police continue to engage certain Muslim leaders 
who in the past performed extremely valuable roles in the early days of building relationships 
with Muslim communities when little was known about Islam. However, the point was made 
by two respondents that the status and influence of these same individuals had not increased 





Legitimacy and Muslim Leadership 
 
In view that the strategic rationale of authorities to win the hearts and minds of Muslim 
community members is largely contingent upon the perceived trust in, and legitimacy of 
representative leaders, this research sought to expose community perceptions concerning the 
existing levels of trust and legitimacy of Muslim leaders in Queensland. In this regard, the 
interview results revealed a diversity of opinions towards the legitimacy and trust of Muslim 
leadership. Interviews revealed that there are Muslims who deeply trust their leaders.  
 
Positive feedback included the following comment: 
 
 “The leaders are so amazingly trustworthy”. (Muslim 010) 
 
 “Most practicing Muslims trust their imams”. (Muslim 014) 
 
Integrity can be defined as an alignment between beliefs and actions (Simons, 1999). In this 
vein, one respondent observed: 
 
 “Most Muslim leaders are qualified and have integrity”. (Muslim 011) 
 
The Islamic Council of Queensland (ICQ) is the most prominent representative Muslim body 
in Queensland with active networks across many government departments. There was a clear 
recognition by community members that in recent years, ICQ has been more actively engaged 
with government, and supporting the community. This can be observed by the following 





“The Islamic Council of Queensland has changed the style of leadership, it has 
become far more transparent, honest, consistent, with sacrifice – and trying hard to 
unify the community” (Muslim 007).  
 
One respondent acknowledged that there has been much change to move away from past 
leadership styles that have been perceived as problematic, but also recognised that some 
community sectors remain critical of Muslim leaders.  
 
In contrast one participant described the wider leadership environment as lacking unity with 
too main divisions. This was apparent in the following remark: 
 
“Disunity, large amount of leaders but not enough real leaders - some are not                              
recognised, too many leaders, not united and appear to be divided”. (Muslim 012) 
 
Another interviewee simply stated that a lack of trust in Muslim leaders is a widespread concern 
throughout Muslim communities, and is related to the old style of leadership found in some of 
the national leadership forums. This was apparent in the following comment: 
 
“There is a distinct lack of trust between Muslim community members and Muslim 
leaders – for what is perceived by the old style leadership with the like of AFIC 
(Australian Federation of Islamic Councils) and ICQ which feeds down into the 
mosques”. (Muslim 002) 
 
There were widespread negative comments towards the national Muslim leadership forums, as 
evident in the following remarks: 
 
“AFIC (Australian Federation of Islamic Councils) does not represent Muslims in 
Australia. Nepotism and corruption is rampart, it is a problem that we do not have 
proper processes that look for qualified leaders with integrity – we are infested with 
nepotism and corruption”. (Muslim 012) 
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“Internal credibility is a big problem – including Muslim institutions like AFIC”. 
(Muslim 008) 
 
Other comments suggested that there is a lack of competent Muslim leaders with the necessary 
knowledge to resolve current challenges of the west. This was evident through the following 
comment: 
 
“By and large, Muslims see their leaders as incompetent and lack the knowledge to 
address challenges. Credibility has to be earned through a process – Muslims don’t 
care about titles – they care about honesty, genuineness, selflessness and sacrifice. 
They have to pass this test”. (Muslim 017) 
  
There was also a clear sentiment among numerous interviewees that Muslim religious leaders 
from the Middle East lack the necessary understanding and skills to address issues for Muslims 
who are raised in Australia. For example, one respondent stated:  
 
“Many of the imams have never been trained to adopt or solve the problems of the west 
– they cannot be expected to solve the problems of the west, DV, marriage disputes, 
mental health issues”. (Muslim 007) 
  
This opinion was repeated with respect to the need of some Muslim leaders to have a better 
understanding of Australian values. This could be observed as follows: 
 
“I believe that Muslim community leaders often have a very limited knowledge of 
Australian policy, politics, and need more awareness of Australian values”. (Muslim 
004) 
 
In this respect, some respondents pointed out that Muslim religious leaders from the Middle 
East were trained in sharia, which governs the political, social, financial and spiritual 
landscapes in predominantly Muslim countries but this is not the case in the west.  This appears 
to have resulted in comments suggesting religious leaders would find it easier to win legitimacy 
if they only focused on religious affairs. 
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“It would be far easier for a Muslim religious leader to achieve legitimacy if he focused 
only on religious affairs as a religious instructor”. (Muslim 008)  
 
The interviews revealed that police appear to maintain networks and liaison with an array of 
Muslim leaders. However a number of respondents indicated two categories of leaders; leaders 
who enjoy legitimacy with police, and not with Muslims communities; and secondly, leaders 
who enjoy legitimacy with the community and not with the police. Some respondents felt that 
police too often engage with the first group of leaders who lack the capacity and representation 
to bring about the desired change.  
 
In all, the interview results suggest that some segments from within Muslim communities 
perceive their leaders as legitimate while other segments do not, or are struggling to win 
legitimacy.  In terms of counter-terrorism community engagement, there is an apparent need to 
ensure that police engage leaders who are perceived to have legitimacy within their own 
communities as a catalyst to improve the winning of hearts and minds. 
 
6.2  Muslim Leadership, Exalted Values and Islamic Legitimacy 
 
This section will present insights concerning the dynamics and plight of Muslim leaders to 
win and maintain legitimacy of their communities. Markus and Kitayama (1991) explain 
that different cultures have different cultural expectations about leadership, which can 
present complex challenges for leaders despite shared religious values. Respondents 
routinely recognized the complex dynamic through cultural diversity among Muslims, one 
participant made the following observation: 
 
“The community is divided because we come from 183 countries, different ethnicities 
race and theology, so diverse that without good leadership, this is a recipe for 
divisions.” (Muslim 022) 
 
Hassan et al. (2011) postulate that an Islamic leader is deemed to be legitimate to the extent 
that he or she abides by core Islamic values as deemed by the Prophet Mohammad, and that 
deviation from these core values would weaken leadership legitimacy and acceptance by 
followers.  The interviews exposed a constant and widespread recognition that legitimacy 
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starts with the example of the Prophet Mohammad (pbuh). In this respect, the interviews 
suggested leaders legitimize their leadership by aligning themselves to the Prophet’s 
example. This notion is evident in the following comment: 
 
“Hypocrisy is the most dangerous – Mohammad is the ultimate example, basically to 
do what Mohammad said.” (Muslim 006) 
 
Mir (2010) states that the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), provides a practical demonstration 
of the values that all Muslims must emulate.  This highlights a salient line of inquiry as 
values are organized in hierarchies according to their perceived importance, and capacity to 
legitimize leadership (Feather, 1995). 
 
Kamali and Society (2002) argue that the first mission of Muhammad was to bring justice 
and equality. In this vein, interviews consistently revealed comments that justice is 
described as a supreme or exalted value of Islam. One participant made the following 
comment: 
 
“When it comes to justice we are only scratching the surface – it impacts at every level. 
Justice sits at the top of an Islamic hierarchy of values – Justice is simply number one, 
the foremost fundamental tenant of Islam – being just to yourself, the community and 
the broader community”. (Muslim 018) 
 
In a similar vein, another interviewee observed: 
 
“Very, very important – if you want to explain Islam in one word, it is Justice.” (Muslim 
008) 
 
This exposes a critical recognition with respect to leadership legitimacy where the specific 
value of justice has the greatest capacity to affect the behavior of group members as it is the 
key predictor in the acceptance of group authority or leadership (Lind & Earley, 1992). All 
Muslim respondents related that the value of justice is of paramount importance and sits 
high on the Islamic hierarchy of values.  One respondent described how all other qualities 
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are a bi-product of justice. This notion was observed in the comments made by the following 
participant: 
 
“Justice relates to the way your live your everyday life – I am proud to say that Islam 
keeps Justice on top – the way we live, every day, every minute raises a value of justice 
– every relationship, every job has to be done in justice – justice needs to permeate 
every second of my life.”  (Muslim 016) 
 
The interviews exposed a culturally complex environment where leadership legitimacy is 
based upon emulating the example of the Prophet Mohammad whose first mission is 
perceived as securing justice. Ramadan (2009) and Kuhn (2007) concur that both action and 
reform in Muslim societies starts by using Mohammad (pbuh) as the ultimate exemplar.  In 
terms of counter-terrorism community engagement, it is critical that police avoid where 
possible, or better manage where necessary, conflicts that are based on notions of justice 
which have the greatest capacity to challenge the legitimacy of leaders. As a value, justice 
appears to have the greatest capacity to influence group behaviours creating the need to 
better understand the deeper implications for Muslim leadership legitimacy in a climate of 
counter-terrorism, which can be perceived as inherently unjust by Muslim communities.  
This is further explained in the next section.  
 
Amanah and Religious Duty Concerning Justice 
 
According to Beekun and Badawi (1999), the term amanah meaning “trust”, represents a 
psychological contract between a Muslim leader and followers that he or she will try his or her 
best to guide them, to protect them, and to treat them justly. In short, Hassan et al. (2011) 
explains that when amanah is based on justice it becomes the process of achieving leadership 
legitimacy. This is reflected in the comment of one respondent: 
 
“Amanah is honoured and applied through justice – if it is violated then it results in a 
loss of legitimacy and influence. Key Islamic values – trust, honesty, justice including 
anti-oppressive practices.  The first injustice is a problem but not to address it creates 
a second injustice.” (Muslim 010) 
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A'la Mawdudi (1991) also supports the notion that justice legitimizes the symbolic authority of 
Muslim Leadership and bestows trust and influence. This was observed by a participant who 
stated: 
 
“Without demonstrated justice, a Muslim leader cannot excel in the ranks, everyday 
involves choices that are justice decisions, there needs to be justice in every 
relationship, and if there isn’t then there will be problems.” (Muslim 006) 
 
One Muslim leader explained the lengths that were required to demonstrate justice in fulfilment 
of “amanah” (trust) as a means to achieve leadership legitimacy. 
 
“I was accused by a community member of taking money from the government, so in 
response, I sent copies of my bank accounts to the accuser to prove that no money was 
ever received. The accuser upon receiving the copies, offered an apology and withdrew 
the accusation.” (Muslim 018) 
 
Rahman (1996) argues that the concept of justice is so significant in Islam that there is a 
religious duty to speak out, and that failure to do so is tantamount to hypocrisy (Fry, 2003; 
Kriger & Seng, 2005). Rigoni (2005) states that the pursuit of justice in Islam carries a 
consistent message to resist and correct conditions of injustice even to the point of activism. 
The interviews with Muslim respondents revealed that justice comes with a series of cultural 
obligations where fulfilment legitimizes leadership, and negligence can be detrimental to a 
leader’s standing. One interviewee stated:  
 
“The highest standing of a Muslim is to speak out against a tyrant ruler, but not many 
people are brave enough.”  (Muslim 024)  
 
Another participant supported this notion of a religious duty for a Muslim leader to speak out 
through the following comment:  
 
“The issue is not whether or not Muslim leaders should speak about injustice – it is 
how and when, and with who.” (Muslim 017) 
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Rowsell and Berry (1993 p.18) maintain that “the leader is primarily an expert in the promotion 
and protection of values”. According to the interviews, this suggests that a Muslim leader is an 
expert in the promotion and protection of justice; and when he or she fails to speak out against 
injustice (e.g. against counter-terrorism policing, laws, and foreign policy), there is a perceived 
incongruence of values that erodes leadership legitimacy. This sentiment can be found in the 
following comment: 
 
“Adl or justice is very important, if an imam is seen as seeking justice, this is a very 
important way to legitimise authority. Justice is so important that not speaking up about 
it, is perceived as a greater problem, and undermines influence. With compassion, 
justice is the key Islamic value.  In the same vein, if an imam is seen as not having 
sufficient regard for justice, it undermines his authority and diminishes his influence.” 
(Muslim 002) 
 
The results reveal that there is no greater standing in Islam than to speak out against perceived 
oppression. However, the obligation to speak out against injustice can become problematic in 
view of a phenomena described by Green and Aly (2011) as the “spiral of silence” which argues 
that the fear of isolation prevents individuals from speaking out on topics that are perceived to 
be in conflict with public opinion. One respondent remarked: 
 
“I have found here in Queensland that the imams are very scared to speak out.” 
(Muslim 023) 
 
Aly and Green (2010) explain how this is manifest through a fear being labelled or implicated 
as a terrorist if they express opinions that dissent from those presented in the media and political 
discourse. This sentiment was further expressed by Muslim leaders in the following comment: 
 
 “It is difficult because if you if give a sermon on honesty – and you mention anything 
controversial, the leader will be dobbed in on the NSA hotline. Look at Sheik Shady – 
he is getting it – he has been hassled here in Australia, and ISIS has called for a hit on 
him – he can’t win.” (Muslim 014) 
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It was also evident that there were consequences for leaders who failed to honour the notion of 
“amanah” by failing to speak out against injustice. One respondent observed the following:  
 
“Justice is all about rights and responsibilities – not only to be passionate about it but 
you are singled out for not calling it what it is – yet when that happens in Australia – 
you are labelled a trouble maker.” (Muslim 008)  
 
Another interviewee revealed that failing to speak out can be a problem in the minds of 
community members as demonstrated by the following statement: 
 
“Justice is very high – a leader has two responsibilities to apply justice and stand for 
justice.  If there is no legitimate excuse then it can be a problem in the minds of the 
community. Those who know the truth, and don’t make it clear – there will be hell-fire.” 
(Muslim 011) 
 
The above comment reveals the significance of the cultural obligation and religious duty to 
speak out, associated with the supreme value of justice. In simple terms, the results expose a 
rationale where Muslim leaders are expected to honour the psychological contract known as 
“amanah” by demonstrating justice in a manner that requires leaders to speak out. In this regard, 
there is a common perception among respondents that those leaders who do honour this 
commitment stand to win greater legitimacy in their own communities, but simultaneously risk 
being labelled as trouble-makers in the wider community resulting in a loss of legitimacy with 
police. In a further problematic dynamic, those leaders who refrain from speaking out lose 
legitimacy within their own communities, but appear to be more approachable by police. This 
duality was evident in the following comment: 
 
“A leader who has the genuine support of the people is probably under suspicion of the 
police yet they have the greatest influence to change.” (Muslim 022) 
 
One respondent criticized authorities for failing to understand this dynamic that requires 
Muslim leaders to demonstrate a congruence between action and Islamic values by 
highlighting the impact on leadership legitimacy, power and influence. This was reflected 
in the following observation: 




 “Authorities do not respect that leadership is about influence, and without influence, 
the leader has no power ………  A leader who has no influence is not a leader. They 
lose power when they lose legitimacy, when they move away from Islamic values, an 
incongruence between Islamic values and actions.” (Muslim 022)  
 
Loss of Legitimacy and Consequence 
 
Interviewees exposed a variety of consequences to a perceived loss of legitimacy that affects 
the wellbeing of Muslim leaders and the operation of the mosque. A number of responses 
suggested that the mosque will begin to die as attendees may choose to attend another mosque.  
These responses included:  
 
“The consequences of de-legitimacy are simply that members will go away to another 
mosque.”  (Muslim 022)  
 
“If a Muslim leader demonstrates an incongruence between value and actions – the 
mosque will begin to die.” (Muslim 011) 
 
Other respondents explained that not only will Muslims start attending another mosque where 
leaders are perceived with legitimacy but they may go on-line or choose a mosque with an 
ideology that may become problematic in terms of radicalisation. 
 
“Young people will stop attending, and not take the leader as a reference point, then 
they will look on line for somebody they can take as a reference point. They will simply 
seek assurances elsewhere.” (Muslim 017) 
 
 “People vote with their feet -they will go to other mosques – they will go elsewhere to 
get the views that they are chasing. If the imam is delegitimised, then this provides 
fertile ground in which views and perspectives can grow that can be problematic.” 
(Muslim 019)   
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In terms of counter-terrorism community engagement, it appears that police need to recognise 
the religious obligation of a Muslim leader to speak out in fulfilment of “amanah” on perceived 
issues of injustice. This suggests the need for maturity on the part of police to recognise that a 
Muslim leader may not be untrustworthy because he or she shares a particular view of justice 
as propagated by terrorist elements.  Managing this issue creates an opportunity for authorities 
to identify potential community leaders with the greatest legitimacy in Muslim communities.   
 
6.3 Foreign Policy and Conflicting Values of Justice 
 
 Muslim interviewees expressed some degree of concern regarding a perceived conflict of 
justice between Muslim communities and authorities over Australian foreign policy, and 
Australia’s overseas military involvement affecting Muslim lands. One interviewee suggested 
that Australia’s support of the United States and Israel makes Muslims feel less wanted in 
Australia and results in community anger.  
 
One respondent suggested that many of the problems confronting Muslim communities in 
Australia started when former Prime Minister John Howard agreed to allow Australian troops 
to enter Iraq. The following comment suggests that authorities cannot start addressing the real 
issues until this perspective is acknowledged: 
 
“You have to understand that all of our problems started with John Howard allowing 
Australian troops to go into Iraq. And if we don’t accept that then we can’t address the 
real issues.” (Muslim 023) 
 
Another respondent commented how Muslim leadership legitimacy can be eroded when leaders 
are observed by community members to engage the Australian government. This notion is 
contained in the following statement: 
 
“What sort of imam are you if you follow a corrupt government – you can’t lead my 
prayers because you are not an imam of Justice – the quickest way to destroy yourself 
and others is to depart from justice.” (Muslim 027) 
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Another respondent explains that there is a problem in Muslim communities if Muslim leaders 
are perceived as aligning themselves to the Australian government in the face of an ideological 
conflict that requires Muslim leaders to speak out. The following statement also reveals the 
religious obligation on the part of leaders to speak out: 
 
 “There is an ideological approach in foreign policy towards Muslims that needs to be 
addressed, if Muslim leaders are seen to support a government with an ideological 
conflict – and align themselves – there is a problem- but those leaders need to speak 
out so we can deal with the issues.” (Muslim 024) 
 
Other respondents critically responded that Muslim leadership in Australia has not done 
enough to confront these issues by speaking out against government policy, and that the result 
is “the stirring up” of emotions in Muslim communities. Interviewees stated:  
 
“The Muslim leadership in Australia has not done enough to confront elite positions 
that enforce injustice which is stirring up emotions in Muslim communities; and the 
Australian government is one of the greatest supporters of Israel”. (Muslim 022) 
 
“The Community clearly gets riled up when they do not see the community as 
addressing concerns. Concerns are usually around justice especially where there are 
perceived double standards.” (Muslim 013) 
 
There was a clear recognition of the difficulties experienced for Muslim leaders in trying to 
appease both government and Muslim communities. This was evident from the following 
comments:  
 
“It is a juggling act trying to honour their beliefs, and then do their part for team 
Australia.” (Muslim 019) 
 
 “Often Muslim leaders are seen as compromising the tenant of Islam to appease 
government partners. Legitimacy is often about going back to legitimate practice.” 
(Muslim 002) 
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Responses also exposed further criticism of national Muslim representative bodies including 
ANIC (The Australian National Imams Council) and the Australian Federation of Islamic 
Councils (AFIC), who according to some respondents have tried to appease both government 
and Muslim communities, resulting in a loss of legitimacy and credibility with both Muslim 
communities and government.   
 
Numerous respondents suggested that the term “sell out” is common in Muslim communities 
to describe leaders who fail to speak out and address the needs of the community. For example 
two respondents stated:  
 
“The term ‘sell out’ is giving in, and not standing for the community – choosing the 
government over the community.” (Muslim 011) 
 
 “The fastest way to lose legitimacy is to lose touch with the community. A sell out is a 
leader who is not seen as addressing the issues – not putting the real issues on the 
table.” (Muslim 010) 
 
Some respondents suggested that Muslim leaders especially imams are often seen as sell outs 
for engaging in partnerships with the Australian government. This was evident through the 
following observations: 
 
 “Imams are often seen as sell outs – why would they partnership with somebody who 
is oppressing us.” (Muslim 002) 
 
“There are too many leaders that are too apologetic, not telling the government what 
they need to hear, and misrepresenting the sentiments of the community.” (Muslim 012) 
 
One interviewee suggested that leaders who sell out are simply not fit to be leaders: 
 
“By not addressing injustice, the community will label you a sell-out, that you are not 
strong enough to represent the community.” (Muslim 008) 
 
Interview results support the notion that issues of perceived injustice relating to issues of 
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foreign policy contain a dynamic with the capacity to erode the legitimacy of Muslim leaders. 
Results suggest that legitimacy can be lost by leaders who engage government and fail to speak 
out as part of their religious obligation.  Results also appear to suggest that Muslim leaders are 
widely perceived as “sell outs” in some segments of the Muslim community. 
 
The Queensland Police – Extension of the Federal Government? 
  
Muslim interviewees were asked whether foreign policies of Australia impact the local efforts 
of the Queensland Police Service to win trust with Muslim communities.  Despite differences 
in Muslim communities, there was an overwhelming consensus towards the affirmative that 
Australian foreign policy does negatively impact these local efforts. In this respect, a number 
of statements exposed widespread perceptions among respondents that the Queensland Police 
cannot be separated from the Australian Federal Government. This was observed in the 
following remark: 
 
 “The same political body that sends Australian troops abroad is the very same body 
that legislates the terrorism laws that are used against us by the Queensland Police.” 
(Muslim 012)   
 
Another respondent suggested that the perceived relationship between the Queensland Police 
and the Federal Government has the capacity to impact reactions and perceptions of Muslim 
community members:  
 
“You cannot separate foreign policy from the local efforts of police. This Counter-
Terrorism approach is born out of a momentum that is coming from the Federal 
Government – you hear it everywhere in the community – and it does govern reactions.” 
(Muslim 017) 
 
One interviewee suggested that a failure to recognise this dynamic may actually result in 
Muslim community members rejecting both the Federal Government and the Queensland 
police. This view is evident in the following comment that uses the analogy of a parent and 
child: 
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“In terms of foreign policy, if you have a child, and one parent says one thing, and the 
other parent says another thing, then the child will probably reject both parents.” 
(Muslim 022) 
 
A comment was made by a Muslim respondent that most Muslim community members do not 
understand the concept of a separation of powers, which suggests they will not see police as 
independent of government military action. For example the comment was made that: 
 
“No separation of powers, it is not a concept understood by enough Muslims – leads to 
the perception that all government is one coordinate whole – this means that education 
becomes a critical tool.” (Muslim 002) 
 
 In this respect, another respondent literally referred to the police as “agents” of the Australian 
government: 
  
“Police are perceived as the authority, and it comes down from the top – so they are 
guilty by association, they call them agents of the Australian government.” (Muslim 
025) 
 
One implication for counter-terrorism community engagement is that the state police are often 
perceived as an extension of the federal government that is engaged in a highly provocative 
conflict involving the value of justice and military action by Australian soldiers overseas. 
 
Stigma of Contact with Police 
 
Despite recognition that there has been positive growth in relationships with the Queensland 
police, there clearly remains a negative stigma in some Muslim communities with respect to 
the extent and nature of Muslim engagement with police.  This was demonstrated by the 
following comments: 
 
“There is still an issue that when I meet with the police – the community thinks I am a 
spy.” (Muslim 015) 
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 “There is always a risk of being called a snitch, and dogs.” (Muslim 014) 
 
Another respondent suggested that being too close to authorities is perceived as not putting the 
needs of the community first. In this regard the following statement was made: 
 
“If there is too close a relationship between the police and the imam …… it suggests 
that you are sucking up to authorities, and not putting the needs of the community first.” 
(Muslim 024)  
 
One young respondent shared how the negative stigma associated with police was used against 
her despite never having any contact with police. The interviewee shared the following 
experience: 
 
“I had a terrible experience where I had just moved to Brisbane, and I started mixing 
with other young Arab Muslim girls, I started having problems with one particular girl 
so she spread a rumour that I was a police informant. It was terrible and I had no idea, 
I would announce that I was coming to a party, and one by one the other girls would 
pull out; or I was told that the party was cancelled and then the following day I saw all 
the highlights on Facebook. It was almost traumatic I was getting it from both 
communities.” (Muslim 026) 
 
Another interviewee suggested that when Muslim leaders receive community awards from the 
police this can at times be viewed as problematic by community members, as being too close 
to the police.  
 
6.4 Shura  
 
Interview responses reveal the notion of “shura” meaning “consensus” and exposes a style of 
Islamic governance where the power base to make decisions in the mosque sits with the 
community and not the leader.  In terms of community engagement by police, this is a relevant 
concern, as sustainable change cannot be achieved by simply winning the confidence of the 
leaders, but involves strategizing how to help leaders win the confidence and approval of 
community members.  




One participant described “shura” as a democratic process:  
 
“Shura can happen any place, it is where the leader conforms to democratic decisions.”   
(Muslim 015) 
 
Another respondent described how the objective of “shura” is to achieve and maintain justice 
through a mechanism that prevents the abuse of authority by leaders. This notion is reflected 
in the following comment:  
 
“Concepts of shura are where the people are consulted and then the imam conforms to 
the consensus of the people ….. it was put in place by the Prophet to hold leaders 
accountable and stop the abuse of authority.” (Muslim 016) 
 
Sayyid and Mawdudi (1991) state that there will neither be leaders or leadership without 
followers who are prepared to give meaning and bestow legitimacy. Theologically, the 
community in Islam is the source of legitimacy and that leadership position is contingent upon 
the approval of the community (Ali, 2009). The notion that the community is far more 
important than any individual leader, can be seen in the following statement: 
 
“For leaders, community has to come first, the greater cause should not be sacrificed 
for a smaller cause.” (Muslim 006) 
 
Ali (2009) states that “shura” creates the right of subordinates to take a proactive role in 
confronting and correcting Muslim leaders. Wallace (2007) suggests that an Islamic 
organisation is considered unhealthy unless it periodically holds it leaders accountable for their 
actions. According to Siddiqi (1997), it is the responsibility of leaders to empower the people 
to criticise what they perceive as an injustice. Interview responses reveal that leaders are often 
held accountable, which is reflected in the following statement: 
 
“From what I see there is a lot of criticism for Muslim leaders – for example when 
something happens then the wider community challenges Muslim leaders.” (Muslim 
026)  




The point is that Islam not only allows, but requires followers to freely express their views, 
voice their objections, and have their questions answered. In this regard, concepts of “shura” 
are applied in relation to holding a leader accountable for not speaking out in relation to 
perceived injustice (e.g. foreign policy). This was also apparent in the following comment: 
 
“The community often criticises their leaders for not saying something – not speaking 
out is perceived as an injustice – it is high up there.” (Muslim 013) 
 
Interviews also revealed that “shura” may not be understood and practiced throughout all 
Muslim communities. One respondent commented; 
 
“Shura is mandated in the Muslim Community even in the daily life of a family, it is a 
mechanism to understand, it is the recommended practice of the Prophet but whether it 
is being practiced is another question.” (Muslim 003)  
 
Most interviews confirmed that “shura” is a widespread notion of governance that can be 
found in Queensland Muslim Communities. It suggests that the power base to determine 
legitimacy sits with the community, and that a Muslim organisation may be perceived as 
unhealthy if not periodically challenging a leader’s behaviour. “Shura” actually asserts the 
need for a time and space for community members to hold Muslim leaders accountable as 
part of a theological process that determines leadership legitimacy.  
 
6.5 Three Styles of Mosque Leadership and Governance in Queensland 
 
Bass and Avolio (1990) suggests that mosque governance models vary greatly between 
participative and consultative styles, while Abdullah (2006) contends that many Muslim 
organizations are authoritarian. The research exposed three styles of governance in Queensland 
mosques that can be characterised by where the power base for decision-making is situated.  
 
The first can be termed the “Prophetic Model” named after the example of the Prophet 
Mohammad (pbuh), where leaders are expected to conform themselves to a group consensus 
obtained through a process of consultation known as “shura”. In this model the power base 
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sits with the community. Second is the “Caliph Model” that is more authoritarian where the 
imam, or a single Muslim leader ideally consults the group, but holds the power base to make 
decisions. This does not constitute a form of “shura”, as the leader is not required to conform 
to group consensus. Finally, there was also a “Trust Committee Model” where the mosque 
trust or leadership committee dominates the decision making and the imam is expected to 
conform to the trust board decision. In this model, the imam is often viewed as an employee. 
This model is criticised where the trustees do not conform to the consensus of mosque 
attendees, and the imam is further disempowered. According to Faris and Abdalla (2018) this 
type of governance model (committee style) is the most common in Queensland, where 
Mosques are governed by committees empowered by a trust or incorporated society. 
 
The differing models appear to suggest that the engagement styles of police will need to adjust 
according to the specific model of governance that is characteristic of a particular mosque. 
Police engagement will require differentiation with respect to where the power base for 
decision-making is situated. 
 
Faris and Abdalla (2018) state that it is inaccurate to assume that the ‘Prophetic Model’ is 
expected to conform to group consensus, but rather the requirement is to demonstrate genuine 
consultation with mosque attendees.  Faris and Abdalla (2018) also point out that it is 
inaccurate to assume that the Caliph Model is authoritarian and does not constitute a form of 
shura where consultation is present. 
 
6.6  Discussion 
 
This chapter began with the premise that the success of counter-terrorism community 
engagement by police is largely contingent upon the legitimacy of Muslim leaders who need 
to be representative within their own communities. Results of the interviews suggest diverse 
community opinions between respondents who do, and do not perceive their leaders as 
representative and/or legitimate. The interviews further revealed that although the Queensland 
police engages an array of Muslim leaders, there are clearly community segments that believe 
improvements can be made to more carefully represent Muslim communities. This creates a 
concern for the community engagement rationale of authorities who strategically rely on 
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Muslim leaders to bring about change in the hearts and minds of the wider Muslim populace. 
Community perceptions concerning the legitimacy of Muslim leaders, do however, over recent 
years, indicate an increase in legitimacy with respect to the Islamic Council of Queensland, 
although there remain some negative appraisals.   
 
Justice, described as an exalted value of Islam appears to exert significant influence over 
behaviours in Muslim communities. Interviews raised the notion of “amanah” (meaning trust) 
which has been described as a psychological contract between a Muslim leader and community 
member.  In this respect, a leader wins legitimacy by honouring amanah through demonstrating 
justice.  According to Islamic leadership jurisprudence, demonstrating justice involves a 
religious obligation on the part of a Muslim leader to speak out against perceived injustice.  
 
In this vein, Aly and Green (2011) raise the notion of “spiral of silence” where many Australian 
Muslims choose to not speak out concerning notions of justice for fear of being labelled a 
“terrorist or trouble-maker”. A number of respondents suggest this is why certain leaders who 
choose to not speak out appear to experience credibility with the police but not so within the 
Muslim communities; while those leaders who do speak out appear to experience credibility 
with Muslim communities but may be viewed with suspicion by police.  Furthermore, this 
dynamic may be further exacerbated by the religious practice of “shura” where some 
commentators suggest it is unhealthy for Muslim organisations to not periodically hold their 
leaders to account.  
 
The interviews revealed an overwhelming sentiment that Australian foreign policy, such as 
military action initiated by the Australian government, is perceived as an injustice by 
Queensland Muslims. Furthermore, the collective Islamic notion of ummah suggests that an 
injustice affecting Muslims in one part of the world imposes a religious duty on Muslim leaders 
in every part of the world to speak out. In this regard, the Queensland police were constantly 
viewed as an extension of the government, or described as agents of the Federal Government, 
and as such, viewed as part of the mechanism oppressing Muslims elsewhere. This may offer 
some insight as to why some respondents felt that it was unhealthy to be too close to police in 
an environment where there still remains a risk of being labelled a “spy” or “sell-out” by 
community members. The implications of ignoring this dynamic, and its subsequent impact on 
counter-terrorism community engagement will be explored in the discussion chapter.  
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Chapter Seven: Discussion 
7.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter positions and compares the overall findings derived from interviews with Muslim 
community members and Queensland Police personnel within the context of current literature. 
In terms of community engagement with Muslim communities, this chapter focuses on three 
main areas. The first is to better understand how uncertainty impairs the development of trust 
relations; the second is to identify how the process of developing better trust relations is 
influenced by a deeper dynamic relating to cultural nuances. The third section will explore the 
associated implications when Muslim leaders engage police including loss of leadership 
legitimacy, trust and influence. The chapter will then close by summarizing the key points in 
need of consideration to achieve successful community engagement in a climate of counter-
terrorism. 
 
7.1 A Climate Characterized by Uncertainty  
 
The interviews exposed views among community members concerning an awareness that the 
aim of terrorism is to achieve a climate of uncertainty with the potential to disrupt the social 
order that help to fosters exchange, which includes the engagement efforts of police. The 
resulting outcomes were perceived by community respondents as hostile to Muslim 
communities in a manner that not only interferes with the proactive efforts of police, but seeks 
to engender community empathy with the terrorist cause.  
 
Murphy (2004) points out that the most important weapon of a terrorist is not a gun or a bomb, 
but rather uncertainty that results in fear and alarm, and further undermines peace and security. 
This sentiment was present when community members described the agenda of terrorism as 
one of “fear and division” where “government missteps” engender Muslim perceptions of 
being targeted, victimized and “feeling anger”. The data also exposed perceptions that acts of 
terrorism provoke a miscalculation and over-reaction by authorities. McFadden et al. (2008) 
states that the deliberate creation of uncertainty is a clear terrorist goal because it leads to the 
disruption of societal functionality (also in Gill, 2001). In this vein, the data exposed the 
capacity of uncertainty to raise doubt as a strategy to pitch two groups in contention against 
each other.  




The findings indicate that as an antithesis to trust and a synonym to doubt, uncertainty 
possesses the capacity to erode and/or destroy trust as the basis of successful community 
engagement. Elster (1989a) noted that “trust can be characterized as a social ‘lubricant’, 
without which, the wheels of society would soon come to a standstill” (p. 252). Trust promotes 
cooperation between group members, sustains social order, and permits beneficial long-term 
exchanges that otherwise might never occur (Cook & Cooper, 2003; Ostrom et al., 2003).  As 
such, there is reason to suggest that the destruction of trust through that application of its 
opposite “uncertainty” (doubt), stands to impair cooperation and exchange that challenges the 
long-term sustainability of social order which include community relationships with police. 
 
The data suggests that Muslim communities endure a “suspect status” where suspicion has 
moved from a handful of terrorists to the entire Muslim community. This community sentiment 
is supported in the literature where Pickering et al. (2008) highlights that Muslim communities 
now bare a “suspect community” status.  This was observed in community perceptions that 
Muslim communities are “suspect until proven innocent” and that when a terrorist incident 
occurs in Australia the Muslim community is placed on public trial. Green and Aly (2011) add 
that Muslim community members feel they are “under siege”, and are almost entirely perceived 
through a prism of security concerns (Cherney & Murphy, 2015, Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 
2010). 
 
A number of interview responses exposed the perception of an over-reaction by authorities 
resulting in a counter-terrorism approaches that target Muslim communities. This finding is 
consistent with an array of literature suggesting that Australia’s counter-terrorism response 
involved a period of “hyper legislation” unmatched by any other country (Spalek & Lambert, 
2008) resulting in claims by Muslim communities that they have been unfairly singled out 
through indiscriminate counter-terrorism policing (Murphy, Cherney & Barkworth, 2015; 
Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2013; Spalek, 2013; Spalek & Lambert, 2008; Walklate, 2011). 
Interview data suggested that a common dialogue in mosques include warnings by Muslim 
leaders that all Muslims are potential targets by police, with concerns expressed that the civil 
liberties of Muslims will be effected in the name of national security.  
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The results highlight a number of challenges in the minds of community participants 
concerning notions of uncertainty and the efforts of police to engage Muslims communities. 
Community perceptions that Muslims are being targeted raised numerous questions concerning 
the safety and future wellbeing of Muslims in a climate of perceived uncertainty.  As such, an 
array of interviewees expressed concerns about engaging police when it appears the underlying 
intention of police is not Muslim wellbeing, but the targeting of Muslim communities.  
McKnight et al. (1998) states that intention is a critical consideration in a decision to bestow 
trust. In this vein, the data suggests that while Australian Muslims perceive that the deeper 
intention and/or motivation of police is the targeting of Muslim communities, then community 
engagement attempts by police to secure trust will continue to struggle.  
 
The data further exposed some community resentment towards Muslim leaders who choose to 
engage with the police and are perceived as “oppressing” Muslim communities. The results 
further provide insight that a failure amongst community leaders to manage this dynamic 
results in an erosion of influence and community trust in Muslim leaders. Community 
responses also revealed the presences of other behavioral responses considered detrimental to 
community engagement, including avoidance of partnership efforts to access CVE funding, 
withdrawal by community leaders and decisions to not provide police with information. This 
supports arguments in the literature that community partnerships are difficult to sustain and are 
often fraught with tension as police seek to engender Muslim community trust (Baker, 2012; 
Pickering & Lambert, 2011; McCulloch & Wright-Neville, 2008; Spalek, 2013; Spaleket al., 
2009; Thacher, 2005). 
 
The results suggest community members experience a degree of anxiety and withdrawal 
associated with a sense of vulnerability in a climate of uncertainty where Muslims perceive 
their communities are being targeted. Aly and Green (2011) support these findings and argue 
that anxiety is more pronounced in Muslim communities because of the implications of over-
reaction by governments to terrorist attacks.  Salkovskis (1997) explains that anxiety results in 
withdrawal and avoidance behaviours, while Turner (1988) contends that if anxiety is too high, 
individuals are not motivated to communicate, and instead, try to avoid and/or remove 
themselves from the perceived source of anxiety. This appeared to be the case in the data where 
community members challenged the wisdom of Muslim leaders engaging police who are 
perceived as oppressing or targeting Muslims.  




The data exposes the possible presence of high uncertainty avoidance tendencies in Muslim 
communities. A number of community members explained that uncertainty equates to risk, and 
that there is an Islamic instruction to avoid unnecessary risk.  Other respondents suggested that 
Islam clearly describes “halal”, as that which is acceptable to Islam and “haram” as that which 
is prohibited by Islam. In this regard, interviewees exposed community opinions that where 
there is doubt then the prevailing Islamic instruction is to treat uncertainty as haram 
(forbidden), and as such, it should be avoided. The Islamic instruction to avoid uncertainty 
(“gharar” - Arabic: ررغ) and its associated risk when making decisions is notably present 
throughout the literature (Al-Suwailem, 2000; Berg & Kim, 2014; Elgari, 2003; Nordin et al., 
2014).  
 
Gudykunst (1995) asserts that failure on the part of low uncertainty avoidance societies 
(including Australia) to recognize the implications of high uncertainty avoidance societies 
(including Muslim societies) can result in problematic relationships.  In this regard, community 
respondents exposed a degree of intolerance to uncertainty that was evident where community 
responses equated uncertainty to unnecessary risk, as such, highlighting the need to avoid 
uncertainty through the termination of trust relations. In a related vein, the data exposed 
community members will struggle to trust police in the midst of uncertainty surrounding efforts 
to ascertain if the true intentions of police are the targeting of Muslims or the wellbeing of 
Muslim communities. 
 
Kühlmann (2005) adds that increased uncertainty in high uncertainty avoidance cultures, not 
only creates a greater need for more trust, but requires critical recognition that trust requires 
the management of uncertainty. Berger (1987) suggests that the negotiation of trust relations 
requires uncertainty reduction through clear explanation of intended actions (intentions) that 
allows for predictability. This may explain the salience of transparency in the data as a means 
to remove uncertainty and demonstrate intentionality, because it is perceived as a commitment 
to more fully disclose the nature and extent of all activities.  The findings further highlight 
community responses suggesting that a congruence between police and community 
surrounding notions of justice removes uncertainty. This appears to be the case where shared 
views of fairness tend to reduce views that police are targeting Muslim communities. Such 
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recognition is supported in the literature that fairness, including a shared sense of justice, is a 
tool to reduce uncertainty (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Tyler & Smith, 1998).   
 
Throughout the interviews, a consistent opinion started to emerge in relation to the 
characteristics of Muslims who express the greatest desire to engage and trust police. Although 
in need of further investigation, the data appears to suggest that Muslims who experience less 
uncertainty in their faith have a greater propensity to engage and trust police. In a similar vein, 
community respondents articulated that Muslims who experience more uncertainty in their 
faith are less likely to do so. Hence, it appears that Islam may be a protective mechanism to 
cope with uncertainty and encourage the need to trust.  
 
7.2  Trust 
 
This section addresses the specific dynamics and cultural nuances associated with the way 
trustworthiness is demonstrated and trust is bestowed in Muslim communities. The findings 
indicate that both Islamic theology and community members advocate the virtues and necessity 
to trust others; however, this tends to only occur when certain conditions exist which will be 
the focus of this section.   
 
A focus throughout this thesis has been a recognition by Spalek (2010) concerning an almost 
complete absence of research concerning the deeper dynamics of trust as a foundation to 
improve the capacity of counter-terrorism community engagement. The framework of Doney 
et al. (1998) articulates five strategies to bestow trust which are calculus, capability, prediction, 
intentionality and transference. The findings suggest that direct experience is preferred by 
Muslim community members as a means to determine if an individual should be trusted. The 
findings suggest that prediction and intentionality are the most salient considerations in a 
decision on the part of community members to bestow trust and demonstrate trustworthiness. 
Although the findings concur with the conclusion of Doney et al. (1998) regarding the process 
of prediction being most preferred by Muslim communities, a key finding is that intentionality 
appears to be a more salient consideration than prediction in a decision to bestow trust in a 
climate of counter-terrorism. This may be explained by McEvily, et al. (2003) who state that 
intentionality becomes more salient in the face of a perceived threat, which may be the case 
where community members perceive that they are targeted by police.  




These findings continue to highlight the crucial importance of what has been referred to as the 
“intentionality test”. In this regard, passing the “intentionality test” empowers actions and 
words as a catalyst of trust, particularly in view of a desire expressed by community members 
who were interviewed that they want to trust the police. The findings indicate that in a climate 
of counter-terrorism, Muslim participants are routinely caught in a battle to ascertain 
intentionality of authorities, including police, surrounding the true aims of new legislation and 
increased police powers. According to Kull (2011), this frame is connected to world-wide 
Muslim perceptions that the war on terror a war against Islam.  At a local level, the findings 
indicate that this translates to beliefs as to whether the police are truly about the wellbeing of 
Muslims, or if there is another agenda to spy on Muslim communities? In this light, the police 
risk a loss of credibility to all their community engagement approaches if Muslim communities 
perceive community engagement as little more than an apparatus to gather intelligence (Birt, 
2009; Currier, 2015; Kundnani, 2014; Lambert, 2011; Muslim Advocates, 2015; O’Toole et 
al., 2015; Richards, 2012; Spalek & O’Rawe, 2014).   
 
The results support Doney, et al’s. (1998) assertion that Muslim communities prefer to use 
prediction as a means to predict behaviours prior to a decision to trust.   This was evident in 
community responses where relationships were perceived as a critical mechanism to gather the 
necessary information to enable the prediction of behaviour and intentionality. This highlights 
a point made by Mayer et al. (1995) who state that most models of trust in a western context 
do not include the element of prediction, which features in both the results and literature as a 
primary determinant to trust in Muslim communities.  
 
Community respondents stated that upon meeting an individual, a decision to trust first requires 
the gathering of information as a means to increase their capacity to predict behaviour by asking 
relevant questions. The data suggests that trust relations would commence through a series of 
questions based on notions of justice that impact the collective as the basis of predicting 
behaviour and ascertaining the true intentions of police. The findings show that this is achieved 
by asking specific “screening” questions that relate to situational awareness that includes issues 
of perceived justice or injustice. According to Charles R Berger and Calabrese (1975), the 
mechanism to enhance predictive capacity is asking demographic, situational and background 
questions to ensure a congruence of values. Failure to demonstrate situational awareness results 
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in inconsistencies or doubts about the stability of the connection and stands to jeopardize the 
bestowal of prediction-based trust. The findings expose community efforts to ask a series of 
questions based on notions of justice with respect to the perceived targeting of Muslim 
communities by authorities including police, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
oppression of Palestinians by Israel. It appears that the underlying aim of asking strategic 
questions is to remove uncertainty, and minimise risk by reducing uncertainty to expose 
intentionality. 
 
The findings suggest that the value of justice has the greatest capacity to engender trust while 
perceived injustice (conflict between justice values) carries the greatest capacity to drive 
distrust. When a perceived congruence of values falls within a desired range deemed 
compatible to Islamic values, then a degree of trust is bestowed. This supports Sitkin et al. 
(1993) and Lewicki et al. (1998) who argue that trust grows through a congruence of values. A 
community member further stated that trusting is easy where the other person shares the same 
views and values as yourself; while another community member responded likewise adding 
that this is particularly easy when the other’s values are compatible with Islam. In this respect, 
Sitkin et al. (1993) and Lewicki et al. (1998) propose that a failure to establish a congruence of 
values represents a lost opportunity to engender trust, while a perceived conflict or 
incongruence of values can result in distrust.   
 
The findings indicate implications attributed to differences between individualist and 
collectivist paradigms. Responses by community participants routinely emphasised the 
importance of the community collective. Such comments included that the community’s 
aspirations are far more important than the aspirations of any single individual. In this light, 
collectivist cultures that assert prediction-based trust including Muslim societies (Doney et al., 
1998; Hofstede, 1998) are more dependent upon a wider situational context because it stands 
to impact the collective (Butler Jr, 1991; Kramer, 1999; Nisbett et al., 2001).  
 
The findings indicate that community efforts to ascertain the intentionality of police and predict 
associated behaviour requires multiple interactions between police and community members 
that may include multiple dinners and other community engagements. This equates to a 
recognition in Muslim communities that more time, and cultural expertise is required to provide 
answers that ensure the growth of trust. In intercultural encounters, a lack of predictability, 
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despite the pretence of a relationship, results in an inability to predict attitudes, feelings, beliefs, 
values, and behaviour resulting in a failure to secure trust (Berger & Calabrese, 1975; 
Gudykunst, 2005). In the context of community engagement, this highlights the risk on the part 
of police in assuming that the presence of a relationship infers the presence of trust.  
 
The findings indicate that the notion of extending trust beyond an individual to an organisation 
such as the police can be a foreign concept, particularly with Muslim migrants who have 
endured hostile experience by authorities. Zucker (1986) notes that relational trust has a more 
social, interpersonal, irrational, and embedded character (Baier, 1986; McAllister, 1995; Sabel, 
1992). In circumstances where officers are not known to respondents the results suggest that 
Muslims will actively seek to engage a police officer with reputation instead of dealing with 
“any” police officer. This suggests that trust won by particular officers does not easily translate 
to trust in the overall organisation. The results indicates a widespread recognition among police 
respondents and community members that Muslims will usually return to, or ask for specific 
officers that can be trusted.  
 
Applying an external third-party proof source to bestow trust to a potential trustee is referred 
to as transference (Doney & Cannon, 1997). The findings indicate that when confronted with 
a decision to trust police in circumstances where a relationship does not exist, community 
members tend to draw upon a trusted third party as a means of transference (to transfer trust).  
The findings indicate this is a common practice among community participants to ask trusted 
friends, to ask their trusted friends, about the trustworthiness of particular police officers which 
allowed the transference of trust. The findings suggest that community members tend to accept 
the prediction process of other trusted community members including assessment of 
intentionality of a particular police officer central to a decision to trust.   
 
The findings suggested that reputation of a particular officer is highly regarded, as it is 
perceived as a community wide recognition that an individual is trustworthy. As such, a 
positive reputation concerning a particular officer is perceived as having more influence than 
a single third party referral, because it is the result of multiple endorsements that an individual’s 
intentions and behaviour has been assessed by other community members as being trustworthy. 
In this regard, the data indicates that in Muslim communities, the positive reputation of an 
individual police officer appears to represent a valuable platform to win trust relations with 
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community members who may not personally know a particular police officer, but are aware 
of his or her reputation.   The community interviews suggested that when reputation is highly 
regarded, accusations against reputation can become highly emotional and fiercely contested.  
 
Drivers of Trust 
 
The findings indicate that the most significant trust victories for police appear to be the result 
of passing the “intentionality test”. Actions on the part of police that appear to have convinced 
community members that police have honourable intentions appear to be the most powerful 
drivers of trust. These actions include the strategic investment at a relationship level by 
executive officers particularly the Commissioner of Police. In this vein, rather than tasking 
junior officers to go out and announce that police are concerned about Muslim wellbeing, 
senior officers have sought proactive opportunities to do so themselves at a grass roots level.  
 
Another driver was the proactive and immediate response of calling Muslim leaders together 
to communicate and explain how the community will be protected during protests against 
Islam, the building of mosques, or in response to significant international or domestic events 
that raises safety concerns. Another driver was speaking out in defence of Muslim communities 
in the midst of a media attack launched in response to a terrorist event. The findings indicate 
that these examples have been particularly powerful because they assist in exposing the true 
intentions of police. Furthermore, these examples highlight the concerns of police with respect 
to justice related issues. In simple terms, the police have enhanced the capacity of community 
members to predict behaviour by exposing true their intentions that allows alignment on justice 
related issues.  
 
The findings indicate that transparency is a powerful engagement tool because it removes 
uncertainty (an antithesis of trust) and demonstrates justice (a driver of trust) that exposes 
honourable intentions. Govier (1998) adds that openness and transparency deters the perception 
of cover ups, and demonstrates taking responsibility that results in the growth of trust. The 
implications of failing to acknowledge these dynamics includes lost opportunities to engender 
trust where community members struggle to interpret the motives and intentions of police. Levi 
(1998) supports this position by stating that transparency through the provision of relevant 
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information ensures that all communities can verify for itself that the police are performing 
well, and that the appropriate action is being taken. 
 
The data exposed clear examples where damaged or struggling trust relations appear to be the 
result of failing the intentionality test. In this vein, counter-terrorism efforts represent the 
greatest capacity to erode or impair trust relations. For instance, respondents pointed out that 
police constantly advocate communities as the primary resource to defeat terrorism yet little 
funding is allocated to community engagement strategies. This was interpreted by community 
respondents as a means to expose the true intentions of authorities where counter terrorism 
investment is predominantly focused on technology, intelligence and investigation as the basis 
of reactive strategies that are often perceived as targeting Muslim communities.  In terms of 
community engagement, this tends to reinforce problematic community perceptions that the 
true intentions of authorities including the police is the reactive targeting, or spying of Muslim 
communities before any substantial investment in Muslim wellbeing. The findings indicate the 
presence of a widespread recognition on the part of community members that there is a need 
to respond to terrorism, but expressed concerns regarding the potential for counter-terrorism 
police to harm community relations. The results exposed community beliefs that Muslims will 
not be treated differently by police for a routine traffic infringement; however the same could 
not be said for counter-terrorism. In this climate, the fear is the alienation of the very 
communities who are considered the key line of defence against terrorist propaganda and 
recruitment.  As such, in the current climate, there remains a concern that ill-conceived counter-
terrorism engagement strategies that fail to address the complexities of this environment will 
continue to undermine community trust and the perceived legitimacy of authorities to deal with 
counter-terrorism (Allen, 2010; Briggs, Fieschi & Lownsbrough, 2006; La Free et al., 2009;  
Meer et al., 2010; Poynting & Mason, 2007; Spalek, 2010).  
 
The data exposed the negative impact of tokenism wherever community members perceived a 
“tick and flick” engagement response on the part of police, without any genuine attempt to 
address the deeper concerns and priorities of the community.  The results also exposed 
incidents where community members had made sincere efforts to develop solutions to counter-
terrorism for the consideration by the police, and further experienced a sense of being 
demoralised where they perceived no real consideration had been given to their suggestions.  
Govier (1997) and Kramer (2001) support these findings by suggesting that superficial 
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engagement without any real opportunity for people to have a say, or influence outcomes can 
be judged as manifestly unfair and can actually be more damaging to trust than no consultation 
at all. 
 
Trust Relations between the Queensland Police and Muslim Communities 
 
The findings indicate the existence of a positive relationship between the Queensland Police 
and Muslim communities. This was evidenced by the responses of participants who perceived 
that the Queensland Police enjoyed a positive relationship with the wider Muslim community 
that was stronger and less problematic than relationships experienced by their southern counter-
parts.  
The findings suggest that trust relations between police and Muslim communities since 9/11 
can be largely characterized by a cycle of damage to community relations inflicted by counter-
terrorism policing followed by community engagement efforts to repair and restore trust. In 
this regard, the data suggests that the low point of trust relations between police and Muslim 
communities was associated with the counter-terrorism raids of 2014.  
 
The results highlighted that not all Muslim communities have been affected the same way by 
the climate surrounding counter-terrorism. Respondents pointed out that communities directly 
impacted by police raids are far more cautious than those not affected. Community participants 
largely recognized the numerous and honorable efforts of police to engage Muslim 
communities that have resulted in a positive relationship, but highlight that an active 
relationship does not automatically infer that the desired levels of trust, especially with the 
wider Muslim community extends beyond Muslim leadership. In this regard, a number of 
participants suggested that police need to develop relationships well beyond their leaders. 
 
7.3 Muslim Leadership  
 
The findings expose community perceptions that community liaison between Muslim 
communities and government authorities including police is often dominated by a narrow range 
of Muslim leaders. The findings indicate that newly arrived Muslim populations including 
Afghans and Africans (largely Somali and Sudanese) felt that their needs were either 
overlooked or were perceived by mainstream Muslims as more problematic (a minority in a 
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minority). The findings also indicated that female Muslim leaders are under-represented in 
liaison activities with partners external to the community.  
 
The interview findings illustrated that Muslim leaders represent a critical dynamic in the 
strategy of police to win the hearts and minds of Muslim communities in a climate of counter-
terrorism community engagement. Birt (2006) notes that post 9/11, Muslim leaders including 
imams quickly became the central feature and the perceived bridge to building trust between 
authorities and community members. In this regard, imams were considered among the most 
significant change agents in the battle to win the hearts and minds of Muslim community 
members (MCRM, 2006).  The findings indicate that a strategic victory of hearts and minds in 
Muslim communities requires police to win legitimacy with Muslim leaders who have won 
legitimacy within Muslim communities. Al-Marayati (2007, p. 1) states that the key to 
partnering with Muslim communities can be found in its “legitimate, authentic and credible 
leadership”. In this vein, community responses suggest that the good will generated between 
police and Muslim leaders does not often translate to goodwill with the wider Muslim 
communities. One possible explanation is that some of the leaders engaged by police do not 
have legitimacy in their own communities. 
 
The findings indicate that “shura” or an expectation that a Muslim leader will conform to 
community consensus is a widely applied throughout Queensland’s Muslim communities. 
According to Ala’ Mawdudi (1991), in Islamic societies the centre of power sits best with the 
community who ensure a decisive mechanism that serves the people.  Community responses 
highlighted how the power base for decision-making sits with the community, which is an 
expression of “shura”. The findings support the literature that local communities are 
empowered with the authority to determine their own local solutions, and the leader is 
accountable to the community (also in Kundah, 1999).  
 
The findings indicate that leadership legitimacy in Muslim communities requires Muslim 
leaders to demonstrate sufficient regard to the core Islamic value of justice. The interviews 
further suggested that justice is perceived by community members as an exalted value within 
Islam that exerts significant influence over a range of behaviours including governance 
structures and processes that determine leadership legitimacy. In this vein, participants 
explained that “shura” (local governance structures) are based upon notions of justice to 
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prevent injustice. In this regard, the findings illustrate that a number of Islamic governance 
structures and associated processes for Muslim leaders to win legitimacy are heavily influenced 
by the value of justice. This interpretation is supported in the literature where it has been 
explained that when amanah meaning “trust” (Beekun et al., 1999) representing a 
psychological contract between leader and follower based on justice, becomes the process of 
achieving leadership legitimacy (Hassan et al., 2011). Community responses highlight the 
notion of amanah as a contract through an understanding that community members will trust 
and revere Muslim leaders who demonstrate compliance to key Islamic values including 
justice. Although the data exposes that justice is a salient value of Islam, community responses 
also indicated that it needs to be equally balanced by the salient Islamic value of mercy.  
 
The findings show that community expectations of Muslim leaders is to not only to demonstrate 
justice in both their private and public lives; but also imposes a further religious obligation to 
speak out against perceived injustice. In this vein, the cultural significance of justice could be 
observed by community comments that suggest the highest standing of a Muslim leader is to 
speak out against injustice. Other community responses highlighted that if a leader is not strong 
enough to speak out against injustice, (in support of justice) then that leader is not strong 
enough to represent the community. 
 
Interviews exposed community perceptions that Muslim leaders who speak out against 
perceived injustices including global hotspots such as Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, are the 
same leaders who receive the negative attention of authorities including police, and are at times 
viewed as a security risk and with suspicion by authorities.  This can be problematic in an 
environment characterised by the “spiral of silence” where Muslims choose to not speak out 
because of a fear of drawing the suspicion of the police and being labelled a “terrorist or 
trouble-maker” (Green & Aly, 2011).   
  
In a valuable contrast, community responses also highlight consequences for Muslim leaders 
who choose to not speak out against perceived injustices, which appears to result in community 
criticism for failing to comply with a key Islamic values and ensuing a loss of leadership 
legitimacy. This sentiment was further observed through responses that a second injustice is 
committed when Muslim leaders fail to speak out against the first injustice. This was also 
construed by community respondents as putting the needs of government before the needs of 
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the community resulting in certain leaders being labelled “sell outs”. Highlighting these 
complexities, Chowdhury et al. (2009) and Vermeulen et al. (2012) assert that the label of “sell 
out” is derived from Muslim leaders being too close to police and government which equates 
to a loss of leadership legitimacy. 
 
The findings exposed the presence of a conundrum where leaders who choose to not speak out 
generate legitimacy and credibility with the police, but fail to generate legitimacy within their 
own communities; while those leaders who do speak out appear to build legitimacy and 
credibility with Muslim communities, but may be viewed with suspicion by authorities 
including the police. The resulting conundrum was evident through numerous comments 
exposing perceptions that leaders who are trusted by the community, are not trusted by the 
police; and leaders trusted by police are not trusted by the community.  This creates a dilemma 
as any genuine hope of winning hearts and minds depends on community engagement with 
Muslim leaders who experience legitimacy in their own communities. Chowdury (2009) 
explains that in these circumstances the targeting of “moderates” by authorities actually plays 
into the hands of extremists by supporting a problematic perception that the war on terror is 
actually an affront to a war against Islam (Kull, 2010).  
 
The findings indicate that it can be challenging for Muslim leaders to win and retain legitimacy 
in their own communities while engaging with police who are perceived as an extension of the 
same government mechanism that targets Muslims, and sends troops abroad to support 
perceived injustices that include Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. The data indicates that this 
not only has the capacity to challenge the legitimacy of Muslim leaders, but can result in 
distrust where community members perceive a conflict of values. The findings exposed 
community perceptions that the counter-terrorism approaches and actions of police at times, 
not only generate distrust for police, but also generate distrust for Muslim leaders.  
 
The findings suggest that the empowering of Muslim leaders by police who are not considered 
legitimate in Muslim communities carries the potential to further divide already fragmented 
communities. Skogan (2003) and de Guzman (2002) advocate that the success of community 
policing often revolves around the selection of the most appropriate community segments that 
need to be contacted and consulted. It was acknowledged by some police interviewees that at 
times the selection of community leaders was based on how they relate to police, and not on 
176 | P a g e  
 
 
how they relate to their own community, with such actions carrying the potential to cause 
divisions  within Muslim communities. Dunn et al. (2016) suggest Muslim communities have 
at times expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the spokespeople that government agencies 
and media select for their consultation and partnering. According to Maher and Fampton 
(2009), these decisions can profoundly alter the balance of power within communities, which 
in turn has the capacity to define community relationships with the police, and further 
exacerbate existing divisions within Muslim communities.  The findings draw attention to the 
fact that the choice of engagement partners by police can cause community divisions, and 




The data suggested that an absence of trust has the potential to negatively impact engagement 
efforts by police. Consequences include decisions to not provide information; resistance by 
community members for their leaders to engage police; and resistance to partnership 
opportunities. Where community members perceive a genuine risk of being targeted by police; 
uncertainty appears to have the capacity to cause anxiety and avoidance behaviours that impair 
community engagement.   
 
The findings on trust provide valuable insights that enable a better understanding of the deeper 
dynamics that characterise the process of demonstrating trustworthiness and bestowing trust in 
Muslim communities. These dynamics include the functionality of relationship, screening 
questions, the preference of prediction, the salience of intentionality, the role of uncertainty, 
third party referral, reputation, the impact of collectivism, and the application of values relating 
to justice.  
 
In terms of Muslim leadership, the success of community engagement by police to win the 
hearts and minds of Muslim communities requires police to engage Muslim leaders who have 
the greatest legitimacy; where leadership legitimacy appears to determine the extent of a 
leader’s trust and influence in Muslim communities. Muslim leaders have to demonstrate the 
application of key Islamic values as a means to legitimize their leadership to win trust and 
influence.   Interviews results appear to expose a perceived preference on the part of police to 
engage Muslim leaders based on their ability to relate to police, and not their ability to relate 
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to Muslim communities. This appears to carry the potential to negatively impact the internal 
dynamics of Muslim communities. As such, failure on the part of police to better understand 
and manage these unique dynamics carries the risk of losing valuable opportunities to build 
relationships with Muslim communities.  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
8.0  Introduction 
 
Research has consistently shown that successful counter-terrorism policing depends on 
a positive relationship between the police and the community it is trying to work with 
(Bartlett & Miller, 2010).  
 
This dissertation has sought to critically analyse the factors of uncertainty, trust and Muslim 
leadership that erode and/or enhance the process of counter-terrorism community engagement. 
There is a consensus within the literature that the police do not possess the capacity to defeat 
terrorism in the absence of community support. In this respect, the effectiveness of efforts to 
counter terrorism depends upon community engagement strategies capable of winning 
community hearts and minds. This research has drawn upon a qualitative approach to explore 
the issue of counter-terrorism community engagement and has set out to answer a number of 
key research questions. I will answer each of these research questions in light of the findings 
from the interview data, outline the unique contributions to the literature and offer 
recommendations for future research.  
 




How do the dynamics of uncertainty characterise the current climate of counter-
terrorism community engagement, and undermine the efforts of police?   
 
One of the key aims of this research is to improve the understanding concerning the destructive 
capacity of uncertainty to undermine the success of counter-terrorism community engagement.  
Ransley and Mazerolle (2011) characterises the current era of policing as the “era of 
uncertainty”. By exchanging the term uncertainty with its synonyms “doubt and distrust”, the 
current era can be described as the “era of doubt and distrust”, which is problematic to the 
community engagement efforts of police. 
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The findings highlight a problematic dynamic between terrorists, media and politicians which 
is beyond the control of police but has negative consequences for community engagement by 
police with Muslim communities. An increase in terror increases the leverage of media to 
propagate uncertainty causing fear and alarm that results in a perception of over-legislation, 
over-policing and the targeting of Muslim communities. These dynamics impair the capacity 
of Muslims to ascertain the true intentions of police where intentionality is not only critical to 
trust negotiations, but further the culturally preferred method applied by Muslims to determine 
the trustworthiness of police in a climate of counter-terrorism.   According to Covello and 
Mumpower (1985) uncertainty equates to greater perceptions of risk that frustrates the 
development of trust relationships (also in Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978). 
Intentionality is critical to demonstrating trustworthiness which precedes a decision to bestow 
trust.  In this vein, an inability of Muslim community members to ascertain the true intentions 
of police impairs effective trust relations with Muslim communities. The risk in these 
circumstances is that counter-terrorism responses alienate the very communities that are a key 
line of defence against terrorist propaganda and recruitment. 
 
This highlights a salient point that police are simultaneously competing with terrorists in efforts 
to win legitimacy for their respective causes. In these circumstances, police need to recognise 
that community members are bombarded with messages that police are actively engaged in a 
war against Islam; and examples of over-policing, over-legislation and an abundance of 
community perceptions that Muslim communities are being targeted appears to support 
terrorist claims. Furthermore, terrorists deliberately promote problematic eschatological 
interpretations that a far more destructive showdown between authorities and Islam is 
imminent. In this regard, uncertainty increases the risk of self-fulfilling prophecies where 
community members begin to perceive that problems between police and Muslim communities 
are inevitable.  
 
Furthermore, the literature documents a clear link between uncertainty and anxiety. In these 
circumstances, community participants exposed perceptions of experiencing anxiety from 
being powerless to stop a state sponsored counter-terrorism mechanism targeting Muslim 
communities. This was observed through findings where community leaders had mentioned 
that any Muslim house could be raided at any time. This anxiety appears to be further supported 
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by a climate of uncertainty concerning the potential for backlash from the wider community 
connected to notions of Islamophobia. 
 
That literature further suggests that failure to carefully manage uncertainty not only results in 
anxiety, but reduces the quality and reliability of communication (Gudyknust et al., 1995), 
which results in avoidance and maladaptive behaviours (Witte, 1992). Freeston et al. (1994) 
highlights other reactions to reduce uncertainty include bias information processing, 
exaggerated appraisals of a threat, and a reduced ability to cope. Turner (1988) contends that 
if anxiety is too high, individuals are not motivated to communicate, and instead, try to avoid 
and/or remove themselves from the source of anxiety. The findings suggest these dynamics can 
result in community resistance to providing information, partnering with police, reluctance to 
access to CVE funding, and community resentment to Muslim leaders who choose to engage 
with police.  All of these responses can be detrimental to the success and sustainability of 
community engagement by police.  
 
It is evident from this research that there are cultural factors that can shape Muslim reactions 
to uncertainty. There appears to be a cultural proclivity in Muslim communities that uncertainty 
equates to unnecessary risk, and should be strenuously avoided by eliminating contact with the 
perceived source of risk and uncertainty. The literature corroborates this reaction where 
Hofstede (1998) suggests that Muslim communities will make strenuous efforts to avoid 
uncertain situations. Doney et al. (1998) add Muslim communities are more likely to terminate 
trust negotiations before other cultures that are more tolerant of uncertainty (including 
Australian). This highlights the need for police practitioners to carefully manage uncertainty 
as a means to reduce the risk of the premature termination of trust negotiations.  
 
There is also reason to believe that growth in the relationship of trust equates to a better capacity 
for both police and Muslim communities to minimise the destructive capacity of uncertainty.   
This is because trust alleviates suspicion and fear (Govier, 1998) and further liberates anxiety, 
watchfulness; and allows spontaneity and openness (Luhman, 1979, p. 8). Trust bridles 
expressions of inter-group hostility and xenophobia, and civilises disputes (Parry, 1976; 
Sztompka, 1998).  This can be highlighted by an example where trust in police empowered a 
community member to chastise another community member for attempting to distract attention 
to his criminal offending by claiming that he was only being targeted by police because he was 
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a Muslim.  This suggests that maturity in the relationship of trust will equate to more resilience 
and a better capacity to manage uncertainty.    
 
The removal of uncertainty does not infer the presence of trust, but allows the focus to become 
trust. A useful analogy highlighting the threat of uncertainty is to compare the task of 
community engagement with the aim of growing produce (trust) in a vacant patch of land. 
Before the focus of trust through the planting of seeds, watering and nurturing; the land has to 
first be cleared of its rocks and weeds that stand to choke or impede the growth of produce 
(trust). In this vein, the weeds and rocks (uncertainty) need to be cleared before there can be 
any focus on the growth of produce (trust).   
 
A unique contribution of this research is that it has explored the application of uncertainty as a 
tool of terrorism to impair the efforts of Muslim community members to predict behaviour and 
ascertain intentionality, which the research highlights as the two most salient culturally 
preferred processes to bestow trust. It has not been recognised in the literature that uncertainty 
frustrates the risk assessment required to bestow trust, and further impairs a threat assessment 
of police resulting in anxiety and avoidance behaviours.  A unique contribution to the literature 
of this research is the consideration of “high uncertainty avoidance” proclivities suggesting that 
the cultural nuance of a lessor tolerance to uncertainty is likely to result in earlier termination 
of trust relations, than a different culture that is far more tolerant of uncertainty (the wider 
Australian community). 
 
These findings on uncertainty have practical implications and point to a number of key practical 
recommendations. Firstly in genuine partnerships through consultation, both community and 
police formulate innovative and culturally tailored strategies to reduce uncertainty with a view 
to improving communication, removing resistance to trust negotiations, and minimising 
anxiety that results in community withdrawal.  
 
It is recommended that police develop a mechanism with capacity for immediate response to 
sporadic events that peak uncertainty through a style of reassurance policing that demonstrates 
intentionality and reduces uncertainty.  Police should directly partnership with Muslim 
communities to formulate an engagement strategy that aims to remove uncertainty and alleviate 
anxiety in Muslim communities. This should involve counter-terrorism staff attending Muslim 
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community forums to remove uncertainty and anxiety concerning the targeting of Muslim 
communities, promote shared values, address problematic community perceptions and 
advocate Muslim community wellbeing. This may provide a more transparent opportunity that 
reduces uncertainty without compromising operational integrity. 
It is recommended that Muslim leaders provide seminars/education including Islamic 
instruction that promotes shared values including notions of justice, and the 
intellectual/spiritual tools to improve resilience and reduce uncertainty concerning 
contemporary societal challenges.  Muslim leaders should promote the separation of political 





What are the key cultural considerations that erode and bestow trust between police and 
Muslim communities? 
 
There is a void of literature in relation to cultural nuances unique to Muslim communities. This 
is concerning for the simple reason that trust is acknowledged to be culturally complex (Weick, 
1979; Mayer et al., 1995, Mishler & Rose, 2001) while Branzei et al. (2007) states that cultural 
norms conducive to the efficient production of trust in one setting may be impotent and 
damaging in another (Branzei et. al., 2007). In this regard, a recognition of limited success in 
the area of engagement including accounts of withdrawal by Muslim leaders raises the 
significance of understanding cultural implications. In simple terms, the perceived enormity of 
terrorism and recognition of existing challenges highlights the need for more detailed research 
to better understand and explain these phenomena.  
 
The findings suggest that justice is a highly regarded value by Muslim participants with the 
capacity to influence community perceptions and behaviours. In this regard, a congruence of 
values based on justice appears to be a powerful means to engender trust while an incongruence 
of justice values appears to equally result in distrust. The interviews suggest this is the case 
because justice includes a sense of fairness, which is a key issue in the current climate where 
community members perceive numerous injustices against Muslim communities.  
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Despite the success of the Queensland police in achieving active community relationships with 
most Muslim communities, the research suggests that this does not necessarily translate into 
implicit community trust. This is because the findings indicate that relationship between trustor 
and potential trustee is a culturally significant mechanism to gather specific information often 
based on shared notions of justice that impact the Muslim collective wellbeing. This suggests 
that a growth in trust is not contingent upon the presence of active relationships between police 
and Muslim communities. In this respect, growth in trust is contingent upon the success of 
community members acquiring specific information that indicates the presence of a moral 
congruence between police and community on issues that affect the Muslim collective. This 
sentiment was apparent from a number of Muslim leaders who actively attend police liaison 
gatherings, but point out that the result remains a thin form of community trust still in need of 
further development.   
 
Doney et al. (1998) states that trust grows quickly when the trustor perceives that the direction 
taken by the intended trustee takes the same route that the trustor follows to establish whether 
the trustee is trustworthy. This highlights the importance of understanding and characterising 
unique nuances that create pitfalls and opportunities to grow trust relations. This highlights the 
importance of understanding the dynamics that secure private trust victories as a foundation 
for community engagement practices that ultimately achieve the highly desired victory of 
wining community hearts and minds. Molinsky (2007) adds that it is little wonder that cross-
cultural interaction often involves misunderstandings, feelings of low efficacy, even 
psychological distress.  In terms of counter-terrorism community engagement, enhanced 
understanding can highlight pitfalls to avoid frustrating community relationships and the 
wastage of precious resources.  
 
As is the case in community responses concerning uncertainty, the findings indicate the 
salience of ascertaining intentionality in order to assess the trustworthiness of police in a 
climate of counter-terrorism. In this vein, the findings expose a dilemma that can be 
characterised as a struggle to determine if the true intentions of police are to “spy on Muslim 
communities” or “ensure the wellbeing of Muslim communities”. This highlights the 
contentious dichotomy between counter-terrorism policing and community based policing that 
exposes the wider struggle of community members to determine if the “war on terror” is 
actually a “war against Islam”.  




In a western paradigm, actions may speak louder than words but the data suggests that in 
Muslim communities, both words and actions can be rendered insignificant without 
demonstrating honourable intentions. In this vein, the data revealed community perceptions 
that police advocate the value and importance of Muslim wellbeing through actions that include 
the initiation of community meetings, but the findings suggests that a more implicit community 
trust will not be secured until Muslims are convinced that words and actions are supported by 
honourable intentions.  
 
Despite the genuine efforts of police, this will require strategies that lead to a perceptual shift 
from a hidden agenda of targeting Muslim communities to an agenda that genuinely promotes 
Muslim wellbeing. Community members challenge how authorities including the police can 
realistically expect Muslims to believe that Muslim wellbeing is a priority where a large 
percentage of counter-terrorism resources are spent on reactive policing strategies in the same 
period where police and government advocate that community matters most.  
 
Responses suggest that community members tend to doubt the intentions of police where there 
is uncertainty through tokenistic meetings that are perceived as not addressing critical 
community concerns. Govier (1998) states that superficial engagement without any real 
opportunity for people to have a say or influence an outcome can be judged as manifestly unfair 
and can actually be more damaging to trust than no consultation at all (also in Kramer, 2012).  
In this respect, implications of perceived tokenistic engagements with police can reduce the 
capacity of community members to positively interpret the motives and intentions of police. 
  
Zucker (1986) highlights another cultural consideration where building trust with organizations 
can be difficult for those who are more relational and dependent upon relationships to make 
trust judgements. In this respect, relational trust has a more social, interpersonal, irrational, and 
embedded character (Baier, 1986; McAllister, 1995; Sabel, 1992). As such, police and 
community responses suggest that the notion of extending trust beyond an individual to an 
organisation can be a foreign concept, particularly with migrants who have endured hostile 
experience with authorities prior to migration. This emphasises the importance of an active 
relationship and personal contact between police officers and community members. 
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Another cultural nuance is collectivism which emphasises the importance of demonstrating 
situational awareness concerning the wellbeing of the collective while individualistic cultures 
emphasise the disposition of an individual (the potential trustee). Yamugashi (1994) adds that 
ignorance to a wider situational context makes little difference in individualist cultures but 
results in a greater propensity to distrust in collectivist cultures (Huff & Kelly, 2003). As such, 
situational interpretation affecting collectivist communities is very important for practitioners 
to enable predictability and establish if behaviour will fall within a desirable range. This 
highlights the importance of community engagement practitioners being able to navigate from 
dispositional approaches consistent with individualistic societies to situational/contextual 
approaches consistent with collective societies including Muslim communities. Failure to 
demonstrate situational awareness results in inconsistencies or doubts about the stability of the 
connection and stands to jeopardize the bestowal of prediction-based trust (Doney et al., 1998).  
 
The culturally preferred processes of prediction and ascertaining intentionality in Muslim 
communities requires multiple and intimate interactions to create a relationship conducive to 
gathering specific information in a decision to trust. Furthermore, the principle of “shura” 
characterised by a community power base requires leaders to return to communities to facilitate 
ongoing community consultation where a decision to engage is finally approved by community 
consensus. In addition, the decentralised structure of mosques and community divisions 
suggests that relationships need to be replicated through the many different Muslim 
communities. The implications of these dynamics is that community engagement by police 
requires more time and resources to win trust throughout the diaspora of Muslim communities. 
In summary, the findings suggest that Muslim communities value trust with police and assert 
its critical importance but only where certain conditions are met. Community respondents do 
not dispute the need for a mechanism to defeat terrorism, but they do challenge the way it is 
being done. Australian Muslims point out that they are best placed to understand the needs of 
their own communities, and further provide recommendations to address existing challenges 
with solutions that benefit all Australians.  
 
In terms of a unique contribution to the literature, there are apparent attempts to characterise 
the cultural nuances of a decision by Muslim community members to trust police in a climate 
of counter-terrorism. This research suggests intentionality is a more prominent process than 
prediction, while Doney et al. (1998) asserts that prediction is the preferred process of Muslim 
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communities. Intentionality becomes more salient in the face of a perceived threat (McEvily, 
Perrone & Zaheer, 2003), which is applicable to the climate of counter-terrorism.  
 
Other contributions of this research to the literature include pragmatic guidelines such as the 
specific functionality and application of “relationship” as a time and space to predict behaviour 
and ascertain intentionality, and situational based questions concerning perceptions of justice 
and the Muslim collective wellbeing as a platform to determine trustworthiness. Other nuances 
such as the difference between dispositional and contextual trust in a climate of counter-
terrorism community engagement addressing collective communities is also yet to be addressed 
in the criminological literature with regard to counter-terrorism community engagement. 
 
The findings on trust point to range of key practices required to enhance the effectiveness of 
police engagement efforts. Recommendations include extended partnership efforts between 
police and Muslim leaders to develop more innovative police engagement strategies that 
consider the unique dynamics of “shura” (power base sits in community) to lead more 
community involvement, awareness and support. 
 
It is recommended that Muslim leaders develop innovative ways to highlight moral alignment 
between police and community to reduce the negative impact of uncertainty, improve trust 
relations, and lessen community resistance to the engagement of Muslim leaders with police. 
This will also include suggestions by leaders to identify, understand and a means to address 
challenges that stem from a perceived incongruence of values based on justice notions.    
 
Police and community members should further formulate strategies to more effectively 
demonstrate and communicate honourable intentions while simultaneously recognising that 
police are competing with terrorists to win legitimacy in the minds of community members.  
This may involve evaluation concerning the necessity of community engagement officers 
wearing firearms and full accoutrements to liaison forums as a means to reduce the risk of 
exacerbating problematic community perceptions that police are targeting Muslim 
communities. 
 
It is recommended that practitioners develop culturally specific skills and knowledge that both 
hasten and enhance the process of prediction as a means to demonstrate trustworthiness and 
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bestow trust in Muslim communities.  This may require an allocation of funding between 
proactive and reactive police mechanisms that supports the notion and intention that police are 
more concerned with community wellbeing than spying on Muslim communities.   
 
It is recommended that police respond to accusations that negatively impact their reputation 
and/or challenge the validity of their intentions, as failure to do so can be culturally construed 
as an admission of guilt that can be detrimental to intentionality. This would require the more 
proactive application of liaison officers to identify incidents or rumours that are detrimental to 
trust relations. Where possible in manifestly unfair circumstances, police leadership should 
seek to publicly defend Muslim communities to reduce uncertainty and validate police 
intentions.   
  
Police should conduct periodic surveys to gauge their progress on a continuum between 
perceived genuine consultation and perceived tokenism to ensure community relationships are 
most conducive to growth in trust relations.  This may involve an invitation to Muslim leaders 
to provide police with a list of the most pressing justice issues that stand to impede trust 




How can the partnering of Muslim leaders with police in a climate of counter-terrorism 
negatively impact the legitimacy of Muslim leaders within their own communities? 
 
The notion of leadership is culturally defined (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Hofstede, 1999) 
suggesting that not all cultures respond the same way in every situation. This highlights the 
need to identify and understand implications for Muslim communities in a climate of counter-
terrorism community engagement. Community responses exposed the application of “shura”, 
which is an Islamic governance model common in Muslim communities, and empowers the 
community to determine community affairs. This paradigm requires a Muslim leader to be 
accountable to the community where the power base for decision-making is situated soundly 
with community and centred on the principle of consensus. A number of community responses 
indicated that community members are invited to openly and constructively provide feedback 
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regarding the performance of Muslim leaders in community forums that may involve praise or 
criticism.  
 
In the first instance, it was not uncommon for community members to resent or challenge 
Muslim leaders who choose to engage with police who are simultaneously perceived as part of 
a wider government mechanism targeting Muslim communities. Other responses suggested 
leaders were labelled “sell outs” and experienced a further loss of trust by community members. 
Furthermore, the principle of “shura” permits open criticism of leaders who are expected to 
openly respond to community accusation.  
From a community engagement perspective, this dynamic has the potential to undermine trust 
relations between a Muslim leader and community where police have sought to meet Muslim 
leaders in privacy which is perceived to negate the principle of “shura” requiring the 
participation and endorsement of community. In this regard, the result is not only the potential 
for accusations against Muslims leaders for failing to comply with Islamic process, but also the 
risk of being accused of colluding with authorities resulting in the possible label of a “sell out”. 
By bypassing the principle of “shura”, police may risk the undermining of a leader’s trust and 
influence in his or her own community.  
 
At a deeper level of community engagement, trust and influence represent the capacity of a 
Muslim leader to draw upon community members to perform the myriad of volunteer roles 
(including donations) that ensure the successful operation of the mosque. Community trust and 
influence results from community perceptions that a Muslim leader is legitimate. In Islam, a 
critical point is that popular legitimacy is the product of community members observing divine 
legitimacy, which stems from Muslim leaders demonstrating strict compliance to Islamic 
values. Both literature and community responses highlight the supreme prominence of “justice” 
as an exalted value of Islam. In order to win popular legitimacy, a Muslim leader must therefore 
demonstrate strict compliance to Islamic culture and tradition based on notions of justice. In 
this regard, failure on the part of a Muslim leader to speak out against a perceived injustice is 
construed by community members as a second injustice and can be detrimental to that leader’s 
legitimacy. In this vein, community responses exposed perceptions that the highest standing of 
a Muslim leader is to speak out against injustice. 
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However, Green and Aly (2011) describe a “spiral of silence” where Muslims choose to not 
speak out against perceived injustices including Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and the targeting 
of Muslim communities because of a fear that they will draw the suspicion of police and be 
labelled terrorists. In this light, community perceptions suggest that Muslim leaders who 
choose to not speak out risk a loss of legitimacy, which equates to a loss of community trust 
and influence. In contrast, Muslim leaders who do speak out appear to expand their legitimacy, 
which enhances community trust and influence but stands to attract the suspicion of police.  
This may explain community perceptions that the community tends to trust Muslim leaders 
who the police do not trust, and the police trust Muslim leaders who the community does not 
trust. 
 
This raises a risk of police preferring to engage Muslim leaders who may attract less suspicion, 
but do not experience the necessary legitimacy and influence to secure the desired victory over 
hearts and minds. According to Maher and Fampton (2009), these decisions can profoundly 
alter the balance of power within communities, which in turn has the capacity to define 
community relationships with police, and further exacerbate existing divisions within Muslim 
communities (Esposito, 2010; Tibi, 1997).   The research exposed similar findings that the 
empowering of certain Muslim leaders by police who are not considered legitimate in Muslim 
communities carries the potential to further divide already fragmented communities. This was 
evident by community resentment suggesting that if a Muslim leader is not strong enough to 
speak up then he or she is not strong enough to represent the community. 
 
Another implication is raised by Birt (2015) who states that the West begins to characterise 
and/or label “good imams” and “bad imams” highlighting that a bad imam who speaks out is 
perceived as divisive to social cohesion and should be deterred through bureaucratic hurdles 
and even deported where possible. In this regard, Grossman and Tahiri (2015) acknowledges 
the frustration of police attempting to engage perceived radical leaders.  In contrast a good 
imam who agrees with authorities should be rewarded and become the focus of community 
engagement. In these circumstances, there are clear implications when authorities not only fail 
to engage leaders with legitimacy but treat them with suspicion. In this regard, a preference by 
police to engage Muslim leaders who struggle with legitimacy can be perceived by community 
members as a deliberate action to target leaders with a readiness to compromise sacred values. 
Chowdhury and Krebs (2009) explain that in these circumstances, the targeting of “moderates” 
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by authorities actually plays into the hands of extremists by supporting a problematic 
perception and self-fulfilling prophecy that the war on terror is actually an affront to a war 
against Islam (Kull, 2011).  
 
In the midst of the many pressures and demands to operate a mosque and ensure community 
wellbeing, a leader’s legitimacy is the key to the required trust and influence that makes it all 
happen. In this regard, engaging with police stands to make little or no contribution to the 
operation of the mosque yet may represent the greatest threat to a leaders influence by 
challenging his or her legitimacy. This may explain why both police and community responses 
suggest that some Muslim leaders want to be left alone, including an apparent withdrawal and 
disengagement by Muslim leaders (Blackwood et al., 2013; Hilal, 2014; Cherney & Murphy, 
2015; Currier, 2015). 
 
The concluding point is that success of counter-terrorism community engagement not only 
requires police to win legitimacy with Muslim leaders, it more critically requires engagement 
with Muslim leaders whose leadership legitimacy remains intact within their own communities. 
The result is that Muslim leaders are placed firmly on the firing lines trying to appease both 
the police and community members.  
 
A unique contribution to the literature is an insight into a conundrum suggesting that efforts to 
legitimise Muslim leadership can simultaneously draw the suspicion of police and frustrate 
community engagement.  Furthermore, there is no literature examining the implications of 
“shura” and “amanah” on the community engagement efforts of police in a climate of counter-
terrorism. 
 
The findings recommend the following to accommodate the culturally specific nature of 
Muslim leaders into counter-terrorism community engagement efforts. Muslim leaders should 
be invited to recommend a culturally safe process and associated forum in partnership with 
police that empowers Muslim leaders to speak out in a manner that is genuinely heard, and not 
destructive to, and promotes wider community participation. 
 
Police should develop the capacity to recognise Muslim leadership legitimacy and 
representation as the basis of engaging Muslim leaders who are perceived as representative and 
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legitimate.  Furthermore, in partnership with community, police need to develop culturally 
tailored strategies to move the momentum of goodwill beyond community leaders into the 
wider community. 
 
Police need to develop a community-based approach that bolster Muslim leadership legitimacy 
in the midst of strategic efforts to have Muslim leaders perceive the police as legitimate.  This 
may require police to emphasise efforts to portray and demonstrate their independence of 
government to rebut notions that police are an extension of the same government body that 
sends troops abroad. 
 
8.2  Future Research 
 
This research draws attention to a number of issues requiring further investigation as part of an 
effort to enhance the skills of police to overcome barriers, avoid pitfalls and seize opportunities 
for better community engagement in a climate of counter-terrorism.  
 
The findings agree with Aly and Green’s (2010) recommendation that more research needs to 
be conducted on integrating the management of anxiety into community engagement 
approaches of police to counter terrorism.  As such, future research should focus on developing  
a style of reassurance policing that reduces uncertainty and enhances the efforts of community 
members to conclude that the overall  intentions of police is not the targeting of Muslim 
communities but the wellbeing of Muslim communities.  
 
There is also a further need for research on the application of uncertainty as a tool of terrorism 
in high uncertainty avoidance communities, with a goal to impair a decision to bestow trust 
and induce anxiety resulting in avoidance behaviours that are destructive to community 
engagement. As trust is the foundation of community engagement, the result will be improved 
outcomes including enhanced communication and community participation, better problem-
solving, and less withdrawal of community leaders.  
 
There is a need to further research the salience and meaning of a moral alignment based on 
shared notions of justice. It is significant that shared notions of justice minimised the negative 
impacts of uncertainty, improved trust relations, and stands to reduce the detriment to the 
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legitimacy of Muslim leaders who are engaging police. Furthermore, pursuit of justice is cited 
as a risk factor in radicalisation, while a definition framed in community responses for terrorism 
was the pursuit of justice without mercy.  In this regard, the role of justice is a central theme 
with the potential to improve key environments critical to the success of community 
engagement.  
 
There is a need for additional work to develop training resources for police based on the cultural 
nuances highlighted in this research as a means to avoid engagement pitfalls and enhance skills 
that improve the outcomes of community engagement. This includes the specific functionality 
of community engagement relationships between police and community, the need to 
demonstrate a congruence of values, particularly the salience of justice as a core Islamic value 
and other considerations including dispositional and contextual trust, and the differences in 
individualistic and collective approaches when bestowing trust.  
This supports the recommendation by Goleman (2006) that law enforcement requires a new 
emphasis on topics such as emotional and social intelligence. Spalek et al. (2009) also advocate 
the need for a deeper understanding of emotional intelligence, noting the critical value of 
“effective partnerships grounded in empathy, reciprocity, and in emotional connections 
between partners” (p. 57). 
 
The findings also highlight the need for research that identifies obstacles (and associated 
solutions) to achieve moral alignment as the basis of diffusing the detrimental consequences of 
the justice/leadership conundrum. This requires additional research into the development of 
strategies that enable Muslim leaders to fulfill a religious obligation to speak out against 
perceived injustice as part of a progressive relationship with police that advocates greater 
community participation. This may provide a means for Muslim leaders to simultaneously 
legitimize their leadership while simultaneously engaging police. 
 
There is also the need for future research to focus on how ways in which police can manage 
and engage Muslim community collectives in recognition that “shura” creates a unique 
dynamic where the power base for decision-making lies with the community. As such, “shura” 
may be a key consideration in the pursuit of winning Muslim hearts and minds.  
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8.3 Concluding Comments 
 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the current body of knowledge regarding the 
effectiveness of police community engagement with Muslim communities in a climate of 
counter-terrorism.   This was achieved by examining the deeper dynamics of uncertainty, the 
cultural nuances of trust and the implications for Muslim community leadership when dealing 
with police.   
 
The literature exposes an undeniable emphasis concerning the need for authorities to engage 
communities in a climate of counter-terrorism as a foundation for preventing terrorism. 
However, there is an overwhelming absence of literature addressing any deeper dynamic 
including the strategic application of uncertainty to cause social dysfunction; the cultural 
nuances of Muslim community trust; and the impact of police engagement on the efforts of 
Muslim leaders seeking to win legitimacy and influence in their own communities.  
Furthermore, recognition that engagement with Muslim communities in a climate of counter-
terrorism can be complex, fraught with tension and difficult to sustain with examples of 
withdrawal by Muslim leaders suggests that there are many lessons that still need to be learned. 
This study demanded an investigation of a single case study qualitative approach, so as to 
understand and explain community perceptions that stand to either impede or improve the 
community engagement efforts of police.  
 
It is recognised that this research is not without limitations. However, many of the observations 
drawn from experience in Queensland are directly applicable to other western democratic 
police services given the focus on community partnerships to tackle terrorism. These include 
the identification of factors that erode trust and create obstacles to the development of trust, 
and strategies that promote a better understanding of deeper dynamics that enhance trust 
negotiations.  
 
The emerging lesson is that counter-terrorism community engagement strategies that fail to 
integrate unique community dynamics stand to jeopardize sustainable trust with Muslim 
communities. As such, it is the hope of this research that these observations constitute credible 
and strategic considerations to enhance engagement efforts and inform the formulation of new 
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strategies that improve the outcomes of community engagement with Muslim communities by 
police. 
  





A'la Mawdudi, S. A. (1991). The Islamic movement. Leicestershire, UK: The Islamic 
Foundation.  
 
Abo-Kazleh, M. (2006). Rethinking international relations theory in Islam: Toward a more 
adequate approach. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 5(4), 41–
56.  
 
Ahmad, K. (2009). Leadership and work motivation from the cross cultural perspective. 
International Journal of Commerce and Management, 19(1), 72–84.  
 
Ahmad, K., & Fontaine, R. (2011). Islamic leadership at the International Islamic University 
Malaysia. International Journal of Economics, Management and Accounting, 19(2), 
121–135. 
 
Aiken, K. D., Liu, B. S., Mackoy, R. D., & Osland, G. E. (2004). Building internet trust: 
signalling through trustmarks. International Journal of Internet Marketing and 
Advertising, 1(3), 251–267.  
 
Al-Banna, H. (1978). Toward the light. The Five Tracts of Hassan al-Banna, Berkeley : 
University of California Press, 103-132. 
  
Al-Buraey, M. (1985). Administrative development: An Islamic perspective. London, UK: 
Taylor & Francis. 
 
Al-Marayati, S. (2007). Assessing and addressing the threat: Identifying the role of the 
National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown 
Terrorism. Retrieved from http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/ 
20070614135307-44582.pdf. 
Al-Suwailem, S. (2000). Towards an objective measure of gharar in exchange. Islamic 
Economic Studies, 7(1/2), 61–102. 
 
Alade, T. E. A., Hussain, M., Nasri, M., & Aziz, A. B. (2016). Islamic leadership principles on 
mosque performance in Lagos state, Nigeria. International Journal of Islamic Business 
(IJIB), 1(2), 1–19.  
 
Albaba, M. (2015). The Exalted Kingdom of Values and Wisdom. Bloomington, IN: 
AuthorHouse. 
 
Alderson, P., & Goodey, C. (1998). Theories of consent. The British Medical Journal, 
317(7168), 1313–1315.  
 
Alhabshi, S. O., & Ghazali, A. H. (1994). Islamic values and management. Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia: IKIM. 
 
196 | P a g e  
 
 
Ali, A. J. (2009). Islamic perspectives on leadership: a model. International Journal of Islamic 
and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 2(2), 160–180.  
 
Ali, A. J. (2011). Leadership and Islam. In B. D. Metcalfe (Ed.), Leadership Development in 
the Middle East (pp. 86–103 ). Cheltenham, UK:Edward Elgar  
 
Allen, C. (2012). A review of the evidence relating to the representation of Muslims and Islam 
in the British media. Birmingham, AL: Institute of Applied Social Studies.  
 
Allen, C., & Nielsen, J. S. (2002). Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001: Summary 
report. Philadelphia: Diane Pub Co. 
 
Altalib, H. (1991). Training guide for Islamic workers. Herndon, Virginia: The International 
Institute of Islamic Thought. Human Development Series Vol. 1. 
 
Alvesson, M. (1996). Leadership studies: From procedure and abstraction to reflexivity and 
situation. The Leadership Quarterly, 7(4), 455–485.  
 
Aly, A., & Green, L. (2008). 'Moderate Islam': Defining the Good Citizen. M/C-A Journal of 
Media and Culture, 11(1), 28–28.  
 
Aly, A., & Green, L. (2010). Fear, anxiety and the state of terror. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 33(3), 268–281.  
 
Apentiik, C. R., & Parpart, J. L. (2006). Working in different cultures: Issues of race, ethnicity 
and identity. In V. Desai & R. B. Potter (Eds.), Doing Development Research (pp. 34–
43). London, UK: Sage. 
 
Arabicpod (101)  https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAfOAWYEdZmg-TEKxBd-
 Xq6qqk30vHN_L 
Ariño, A., De la Torre, J., & Ring, P. S. (2001). Relational quality: Managing trust in corporate 
alliances. California Management Review, 44(1), 109–131.  
 
Asmundson, G. J., Taylor, S., Bovell, C. V., & Collimore, K. (2006). Strategies for managing 
symptoms of anxiety. Expert Review of Neurotherapeutics, 6(2), 213–222.  
 
Bacharach, M., & Gambetta, D. (2001). Trust in signs. Trust in Society, 2, 148–184.  
 
Baier, A. (1986). Trust and antitrust. Ethics, 96(2), 231–260.  
 
Baier, A. (1995). Moral prejudices: Essays on ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Baker, P., Gabrielatos, C., & McEnery, T. (2012). Sketching Muslims: A corpus driven 
analysis of representations around the word ‘Muslim’in the British press 1998–2009. 
Applied Linguistics, 34(3), 255–278. 
 
197 | P a g e  
 
 
Bangash, Z. R. (2000). The concepts of leader and leadership in Islam. Retrieved from 
http://www.islamicthought.org/pp-zb-leader.html. 
 
Barlow, D. (2002). Anxiety and its disorders. New York, NY: Guilford.  
 
Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2010). The power of unreason: conspiracy theories, extremism and 
counter-terrorism. London, UK: Demos.  
 
Bass, B. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1990). Developing transformational leadership: 1992 and beyond. 
Journal of European Industrial Training, 14(5), 21–27.  
 
Batten, J. (1998). Servant-leadership: A passion to serve. In L. C. Spears (Ed.), Insights on 
leadership: Service, Stewardship, Spirit, and Servant-Leadership (pp. 38–53). 
Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
 
Bayley, D. H., & Weisburd, D. (2009). Cops and spooks: The role of police in counter-
terrorism. In D. Weisburd, T. Feucht, I. Hakimi, L. Mock, & S. Perry (Eds.), To Protect 
and to Serve: Policing in an Age of Terrorism (pp. 81-99). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Springer. 
 
Bazeley, P. (2009). Analysing qualitative data: More than ‘identifying themes’. Malaysian 
Journal of Qualitative Research, 2(2), 6–22.  
 
Beekun, R. I., & Badawi, J. A. (1999). Leadership: an Islamic perspective. Beltsville, MD: 
Amana. 
 
Benjamin, D. (2010). US Government’s efforts to counter violent extremism. Statement for the 
Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities Subcommittee, Washington, DC.  
 
Berg, B. L. (2004). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Boston, MA: 
Pearson Education.  
 
Berg, D. N. (1988). The self in social inquiry: Researching methods.:Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
 
Berg, N., & Kim, J.-Y. (2014). Prohibition of Riba and Gharar: A signaling and screening 
explanation? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 103, S146-S159.  
 
Berger, C. R. (1987). Planning and scheming: Strategies for initiating relationships. Accounting 
for relationships: Explanation, representaion and knowledge (pp. 158–174). New 
York, NY: Methuen.  
 
Berger, C. R., & Calabrese, R. J. (1975). Some explorations in initial interaction and beyond: 
Toward a developmental theory of interpersonal communication. Human 
communication research, 1(2), 99–112.  
 
Berlin, I. (1998). On value pluralism. New York Review of Books, 45(8), 11.  
 
198 | P a g e  
 
 
Beutel, A. (2015). Discussion point: communities on the front line against terrorism. National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorisms, START.  
 
Birt, J. (2006). Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Britain post‐
9/11. The Muslim World, 96(4), 687–705.  
 
Bjelopera, J. P. (2012). Countering violent extremism in the United States. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service. 
 
Black, D. (1980). The manners and customs of the police. New York, NY: Academic Press. 
 
Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. (2013). I know who I am, but who do they think I 
am? Muslim perspectives on encounters with airport authorities. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 36(6), 1090–1108.  
 
Blanchard, C. M. (2007). Islam: Sunnis and Shiites. Washington: Congressional Research 
Service. In Library of Congress. 
 
Blau, P. M. (1964). Justice in social exchange. Sociological Inquiry, 34(2), 193-206. 
  
Block, P. (1993). Stewardship: Choosing service over self-interest: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
 
Blomqvist, K. (2005). Trust in a dynamic Environment-Fast trust as a threshold condition for 
asymmetric technology partnership formation in the ICT Sector. Trust in Pressure, 
Investigations of Trust and Trust Building in Uncertain Circumstances, 127-147.  
 
Bloomberg, L., & Volpe, M. (2008). Completing qualitative research: A roadmap from 
beginning to end: Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Bolognani, M. (2007). Islam, ethnography and politics: Methodological issues in researching 
amongst West Yorkshire Pakistanis in 2005. International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, 10(4), 279-293.  
 
Bond, M. H. (2002). Reclaiming the individual from Hofstede's ecological analysis--A 20-year 
odyssey: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002). American Psychological Association 
 
Borkovec, T. D., Alcaine, O., & Behar, E. (2004). Avoidance theory of worry and generalized 
anxiety disorder. Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Advances in Research and Practice, 
2004.  
 
Boulton, D., & Hammersley, M. (2006). Analysis of unstructured data. Sage Publications Ltd. 
London. 
 
Bowling, B., and Coretta Phillips. (2007). Disproportionate and  discriminatory: Reviewing the 
evidence on police stop and search. Modern Law Review, 70(6), 936-961.  
 
Bowling, B., & Phillips, C. (2007). Disproportionate and discriminatory: reviewing the 
evidence on police stop and search. The Modern Law Review, 70(6), 936-961.  
199 | P a g e  
 
 
Branley, A., (2016). Muslim State Councils Accused of Running Unaccountable              
 ‘Dictatorships’. ABC. June 27, 2015, Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/     
 news/2015-06-27/muslim- state-councils-accused-of-avoiding-  
 accountability/6577366.  
 
Branzei, O., Vertinsky, I., & Camp, R. D. (2007). Culture-contingent signs of trust in emergent 
relationships. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 104(1), 61-82.  
 
Bridges, L., & Gilroy, P. (1982). Striking back. Marxism Today, 26, 34-35.  
 
Briggs, R. (2010). Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United 
Kingdom. International Affairs, 86(4), 971-981.  
 
Brodbeck, F. C., Frese, M., Akerblom, S., Audia, G., Bakacsi, G., Bendova, H., & Brenk, K. 
(2000). Cultural variation of leadership prototypes across 22 European countries. 
Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 73(1), 1-29.  
 
Brown, J. R. (1996). The I in science: Training to utilize subjectivity in research: Scandinavian 
University Press. 
 
Burnett , J., & Whyte., D. (2005) Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism. Journal for 
Crime, Conflict and the Media, 1, 1-8.  
 
Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership. NY: Harper & Row. 
 
Butler Jr, J. K. (1991). Toward understanding and measuring conditions of trust: Evolution of 
a conditions of trust inventory. Journal of Management, 17(3), 643-663.  
 
Caelli, K., Ray, L., & Mill, J. (2003). ‘Clear as mud’: toward greater clarity in generic 
qualitative research. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 2(2), 1-13.  
 
Carleton, R. N., Norton, M. P. J., & Asmundson, G. J. (2007). Fearing the unknown: A short 
version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21(1), 
105-117. 
  
Carleton, R. N., Mulvuogue, M. K., McCabe, R. E., Antony, M. M.,  & Asmundson, G., 
 (2012). "Increasingly certain about uncertainty: Intolerance of uncertainty across 
 anxiety and depression." Journal of Anxiety Disorders 26(3): 468-479. 
Cherney, A., & Chui, W. H. (2010). Police auxiliaries in Australia: police liaison officers and 
the dilemmas of being part of the police extended family. Policing & Society, 20(3), 
280-297.  
 
Cherney, A., & Hartley, J. (2015). Community engagement to tackle terrorism and violent 
extremism: challenges, tensions and pitfalls. Policing and Society, 1-14.  
 
Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. (2015). Being a ‘suspect community’in a post 9/11 world–The 
impact of the war on terror on Muslim communities in Australia. Australian & New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology, 0004865815585392.  




Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. (2016). What does it mean to be a moderate Muslim in the war on 
terror? Muslim interpretations and reactions. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1-23.  
 
Choudhury, T. (2007). The role of Muslim identity politics in radicalisation. London, UK, 
Department for Communities and Local Government.  
 
Chowdhury, A., & Krebs, R. R. (2009). Making and mobilizing moderates: Rhetorical strategy, 
political networks, and counterterrorism. Security Studies, 18(3), 371-399.  
 
Chowdhury, N., (2002). Leadership strategies and global unity for the 21st century. An Islamic 
perspective. Leadership & Unity in Islam, 23.  
 
Clark, L. S. (2007). Religion, media, and the marketplace: Rutgers University Press New 
Brunswick, NJ. 
 
Cleary, M., Horsfall, J., & Hayter, M. (2014). Data collection and sampling in qualitative 
research: does size matter? Journal of Advanced Nursing, 70(3), 473-475.  
 
Cole, D. (1999). No equal justice: Race and class in the American criminal justice system (Vol. 
1): New Press New York. 
 
Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA. 
 
Conger, J. A. (1998). Qualitative research as the cornerstone methodology for understanding 
leadership. The Leadership Quarterly.  
 
Cook, K. S., & Cooper, R. M. (2003). Experimental studies of cooperation, trust, and social 
exchange. Trust and Reciprocity, 209-244.  
 
Cook, K. S., Yamagishi, T., Cheshire, C., Cooper, R., Matsuda, M., & Mashima, R. (2005). 
Trust building via risk taking: A cross-societal experiment. Social Psychology 
Quarterly, 68(2), 121-142.  
 
Council, New South Wales.), N. N. S. W. P. L. (2001). Report on Inquiry into Cabramatta 
Policing. General Purpose Standing Committee No. 3, New South Wales Parliament 
Legislative Council, New South Wales.  
Covello, V. T., & Mumpower, J. (1985). Risk analysis and risk management: an historical 
perspective. Risk Analysis, 5(2), 103-120.  
 
Covey, S. R. (1992). Principle centered leadership, New York: Free Press. 
 
Creed, W. D., Miles, R. E., Kramer, R., & Tyler, T. (1996). Trust in organizations. Trust in 
Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, 16-38.  
 
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approach, London: SAGE 
publisher. 
201 | P a g e  
 
 
Cross, S. E., & Madson, L. (1997). Models of the self: self-construals and gender. 
Psychological Bulletin, 122(1), 5.  
 
Currier, C. (2015). Spies among us: how community outreach programs to Muslims blur lines 
between outreach and intelligence. The Intercept, 21.  
 
Darley, J. M. (2004). Commitment, trust, and worker effort expenditure in organizations. Trust 
and Distrust in Organizations: Dilemmas and Approaches, 7, 127-151.  
 
De Guzman, M. C. (2002). The changing roles and strategies of the police in time of terror. 
ACJS Today, 22(3), 8-13.  
 
de Londras, F. (2014). Privatized counter-terrorist surveillance: constitutionalism  
  undermined. Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism,
  Routledge: 73-86. 
 
 
De Pree, M. (1992). Leadership Jazz. New York, Currency‐Doubleday.  
 
Deal, T. E. and Kennedy, A. A.,  (1983). Corporate cultures: The rites and rituals of 
 corporate life, Business Horizons 26(2): 82-85. 
Demerath, L. (1993). Knowledge-Based Affect: Cognitive Origins of" Good" and" Bad". 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 136-147.  
 
Demos. (2007). The Activist Police Force. London: Demos. 
 
den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C., Nolke, A., & Virta, S. (2008). Closing the web around 
radicalization and recruitment: Notes on the legitimacy of European counter-terrorism 
initiatives. Community Policing Meets New Challenges: Preventing Radicalisation and 
Recruitment, 64-81.  
 
Denzin, N. K. (1989). Interpretive biography (Vol. 17): Sage. 
 
Deutsch, M. (1960). The effect of motivational orientation upon trust and suspicion. Human 
Relations, 13(2), 123-139.  
 
Dietz, G., Gillespie, N., & Chao, G. T. (2010). Unravelling the complexities of trust and 
culture. Organizational trust: A Cultural Perspective, 3-41.  
 
Dixon, D., & Maher, L. (2002). Anh Hai: Policing, culture and social exclusion in a street 
heroin market. Policing & Society, 12(2), 93-110.  
 
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. (1997). Trust in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing, 
61, 35-51.  
 
Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence of national 
culture on the development of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 601-620.  
 
202 | P a g e  
 
 
Dorfman, P. W. (1996). International and cross-cultural leadership research. Handbook for 
International Management Research, 2.  
 
Downing, J. (2007). Terrorism, torture and television: 24 in its context. Democratic 
Communiqué, 21(2), 62.  
 
Driskill, L., & Goldstein, J. R. (1986). Uncertainty: Theory and practice in organizational 
communication. The Journal of Business Communication (1973), 23(3), 41-56.  
 
Dugas, M. J., Schwartz, A., & Francis, K. (2004). Brief report: Intolerance of uncertainty, 
worry, and depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28(6), 835-842.  
 
Dunn, K. M., Atie, R., Kennedy, M., Ali, J. A., O’Reilly, J., & Rogerson, L. (2016). Can you 
use community policing for counter terrorism? Evidence from NSW, Australia. Police 
Practice and Research, 17(3), 196-211.  
 
Duronto, P. M., Nishida, T., & Nakayama, S., (2005). Uncertainty, anxiety, and avoidance in 
communication with strangers. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29(5), 
549-560.  
 
Edwards, C., Jeffray, C., & Pantucci, R. (2015). Out of Reach?: The Role of Community 
Policing in Preventing Terrorism in Canada: RUSI. 
 
El Fadl, K. A. (2007). Can Individual Rights and Popular Sovereignty Take Root in 
Faith. Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. 
 
El Faramawy, A. T. (2009). Conflict management: an Islamic perspective. The British 
University in Dubai (BUiD).    
 
Elangovan, A., & Shapiro, D. L. (1998). Betrayal of trust in organizations. Academy of 
Management Review, 23(3), 547-566.  
 
Elgari, M. A. (2003). Credit risk in Islamic banking and finance. Islamic Economic Studies, Vol. 
10, No. 2, 2003.  
 
Elliott, E., Watson, A. J., & Harries, U. (2002). Harnessing expertise: Involving peer 
interviewers in qualitative research with hard‐to‐reach populations. Health 
Expectations, 5(2), 172-178.  
 
Elster, J. (1989a). The cement of society: A survey of social order: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Elster, J. (1989b). Solomonic judgements: Studies in the limitation of rationality: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Emmel, N., Hughes, K., Greenhalgh, J., & Sales, A. (2007). Accessing socially excluded 
people—Trust and the gatekeeper in the researcher-participant relationship. 
Sociological Research Online, 12(2).  
 
203 | P a g e  
 
 
Ende, W., & Steinbach, U. (2010). Islam in the world today: a handbook of politics, religion, 
culture, and society: Cornell University Press. 
 
English, R. (2010). Terrorism: How to respond, Oxford University Press. 
 
Ergun, A., & Erdemir, A. (2010). Negotiating insider and outsider identities in the 
field:“Insider” in a foreign land;“outsider” in one’s own land. Field Methods, 22(1), 
16-38.  
 
Esposito, J. L. (2010). The future of Islam, New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Esterberg, K. G. (2002). Qualitative methods in social research. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Etzold, B. (2013). The politics of street food: Contested governance and vulnerabilities in 
Dhaka's field of street vending. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 
 
Faris, N. and Abdalla, M. (2018), Leadership in Islam: Processes and Solutions in Australian 
Organizations. Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Faris, N., and Parry, K. (2011). Islamic organizational leadership within a Western society: The 
problematic role of external context. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(1), 132-151.  
 
Farling, M. L., Stone, A. G., & Winston, B. E. (1999). Servant leadership: Setting the stage for 
empirical research. Journal of Leadership Studies, 6(1-2), 49-72.  
 
Feather, N. T. (1995). Values, valences, and choice: The influences of values on the perceived 
attractiveness and choice of alternatives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
68(6), 1135.  
 
Fenny, A. (2012). Do I trust you more if I think you are culturally intelligent?: an investigation 
on trust-building between expatriate leaders and host country nationals and the role 
cultural intelligence plays in the trust-building process. University of South Australia.    
 
Ferrin, D. L. and N. Gillespie (2010). "Trust differences across national-societal cultures: 
 Much to do, or much ado about nothing." Trust across cultures: Theory and practice:
  42-86. 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2), 117-
140.  
 
Fink, A., & Kosecoff, J. (1985). How to conduct surveys. Beverly Hills: CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Fischhoff, B. (1985). Managing risk perceptions. Issues in Science and Technology, 2(1), 83-
96.  
 
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., & Combs, B. (1978). How safe is safe 
enough? A psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits. 
Policy Sciences, 9(2), 127-152.  




Fiske, A. P., Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). The cultural matrix of social 
psychology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social 
psychology (pp. 915-981). New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill 
Fiske, S., & Taylor, S. (1991). McGraw-Hill series in social psychology. Social cognition (2nd 
ed.). New York, NY, England: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company.  
 
Folger, R., & Cropanzano, R., (2001). Fairness theory: Justice as accountability. Advances in 
 organizational justice 1: 1-55. 
 
Fontana, A., & Frey, J. (1994). The art of science. The Handbook of Qualitative Research, 
361376.  
 
Ford, L. (1991). Transforming Leadership: Jesus Way of Creating Vision. Shaping Values and 
empowering change. Illinois: InterVarsity Press (IVP). 
 
Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why do 
people worry? Personality and Individual Differences, 17(6), 791-802.  
 
Frey, J. H., & Oishi, S. M. (1995). How To Conduct Interviews by Telephone and In Person. 
The Survey Kit, Volume 4: ERIC. 
 
Fromm, E. (1947). Man for himself: An inquiry into the psychology of ethics. New York: 
Rinehart and Co. 
 
Frost, D. (2008). Islamophobia: examining causal links between the state and “race hate” from 
“below”. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 28(11/12), 546-563.  
 
Fry, L. W. (2003). Toward a theory of spiritual leadership. The Leadership Quarterly, 14(6), 
693-727.  
 
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity: Free Press 
Paperbacks. 
 
Gallagher, C., Maguire, E. R., Mastrofski, S. D., & Reisig, M. D. The Public Image of the 
 Police Final Report. The administration of Justice Programme to the International 
 Association of Chiefs of Police. Virginia: George Mason University. 
Gambetta, D. (1988). Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations. Blackwell.  
 
Geaves, R. (2008). Drawing on the past to transform the present: contemporary challenges for 
training and preparing British imams. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 28(1), 99-
112.  
 
Georgsen, M. (2007). Democracy under attack?: British counter-terrorism measures and 
 liberal democratic values (Master’s Thesis) 2001-2006. 
 http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-16913 
205 | P a g e  
 
 
Ghazali, M. (1999). Fiqh-us-Seerah: Understanding the life of Prophet Muhammad. Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia.  
 
Gibson, C. B., & Manuel, J. A. (2003). Building trust. Virtual Teams that Work, 59-86.  
 
Gibson, C., Maznevski, M. L., Kirkman, B. L., (2009). "When does culture matter." 
 Cambridge handbook of culture, organizations, and work: 46-70. 
 
Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Giroux HA, 1991. Border Pedagogy and the Politics of Postmodernism, Social 
Text28(A), 51.  
 
Gill, T. (2001). Men of Uncertainty. The Social Organization of Day Laborers In.  
 
Gillespie, N. A., & Mann, L. (2004). Transformational leadership and shared values: The 
building blocks of trust. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 19(6), 588-607.  
 
Githens-Mazer, J., & Lambert, R. (2010). Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime: A London 
case study: University of Exeter, European Muslim Research Centre. 
 
Goldsmith, A. (2005). Police reform and the problem of trust. Theoretical Criminology, 9(4), 
443-470.  
 
Goldsmith, A., & Harris, V. (2012). Trust, trustworthiness and trust-building in international 
policing missions. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 45(2), 231-254.  
 
Goldsmith, A. J. (1991). Complaints against the police: The trend to external review: 
Clarendon Press Oxford. 
 
Gould, S. B., & Cross, K. P. (1972). Explorations in non-traditional study: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Govier, T. (1997). Social trust and human communities, McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP. 
Govier, T. (1998). Dilemmas of trust: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP. 
 
Green, L., & Aly, A. (2011). How Australian Muslims construct western fear of the Muslim 
other. Negotiating Identities: Constructed Selves and Others, 77, 65. 
  
Greenleaf, R. K. (1973). The servant as leader: Center for Applied Studies. 
 
Greenleaf, R.K. (1977), Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate 
Power and Greatness, Paulist Press, New York, NY. 
 
Grossman, M. &Tahiri, H., (2015). "Community perceptions of radicalisation and violent 
 extremism: an Australian perspective." Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter 
 Terrorism 10(1): 14-24. 
Grotelueschen, A. D., Kenny, W. R., & Harnisch, D. L. (1980). Research on reasons for 
participation in continuing professional education: A statement of position and 
206 | P a g e  
 
 
rationale: Office for the Study of Continuing Professional Education, College of 
Education, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
 
Gudykunst, W. (1995). Anxiety/uncertainty management theory. Intercultural Communication 
Theory, 8-58.  
 
Gudykunst, W. B. (2005). An anxiety/uncertainty management (AUM) theory of strangers’ 
intercultural adjustment. Theorizing About Intercultural Communication, 419-457.  
 
Gudykunst, W. B., & Kim, Y. Y. (1992). Communicating with strangers: An approach to 
intercultural communication (Vol. 19): New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Hall, E. (1976). Beyond Culture. New York: Anchor Press.  
 
Hall, M. J., Norwood, A.E., Ursano, R.J., Fullerton, C.S., & Levinson, C.J. , & (2002). 
Psychological and behavioural impacts of bioterrorism. PTSD Research Quarterly,  
13(4), 1-7.  
 
Hammersley, M. (1987). Some notes on the terms 'validity' and 'reliability. British Educational 
Research Journal, 13(1), 73-81. 
 
Hardin, R. (2006). Trust. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Harris, D. A. (2010). Law enforcement and intelligence gathering in Muslim and immigrant 
communities after 9/11. NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change, 34, 123.  
 
Harvey, R., Hogg, R., & Bull, M. (2010). Working with Muslim communities in Australia: a 
review of the Community Policing Partnership Project. Canberra: Australian Human 
Rights Commission and the Australian Multicultural Foundation.  
 
Hascall, S. C. (2011). Restorative justice in Islam: should Qisas be considered a form of 
restorative justice. Berkeley journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic law., 4, 35.  
 
Hassan, M. E. M., Muhamad, N., Abdullah, N. A., & Adham, K. A. (2011). Islamic values, 
leadership legitimacy and organizational sustainability. International Journal of 
Economics, Management and Accounting, 19(2), 169.  
 
Hays, P. A. (2004). Case study research. Foundations for research: Methods of inquiry in 
education and the social sciences, 217-234.  
 
Heath, R. L., Seshadri, S., & Lee, J. (1998). Risk communication: A two-community analysis 
of proximity, dread, trust, involvement, uncertainty, openness/accessibility, and 
knowledge on support/opposition toward chemical companies. Journal of Public 
Relations Research, 10(1), 35-56.  
 
Heimberg, R. G., Turk, C. L., & Mennin, D. S. (2004). Generalized anxiety disorder: Advances 
 in research and practice. New York: Guilford Press 
207 | P a g e  
 
 
Herzfeld, M. (1992). The Symbolic Production of Indifference: Exploring the Roots of Western 
Bureaucracy: New York: Berg. 
 
Hilal, M. (2014). Too Damn Muslim to be Trusted: The War on Terror and the Muslim 
American Response. American University Press. 
 
Hillyard, P. (1993). Suspect community: people's experience of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Acts in Britain: Pluto Pr. 
 
Hillyard, P. (2005). The “war on terror”: Lessons from Ireland. European Civil Liberties 
Network, 5-6.  
 
Hinton, L., & Kleinman, A. (1993). Cultural issues and international psychiatric diagnosis. 
International Review of Psychiatry, 1, 111-129. 
  
HM Government 2009 , N. (2009). The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering 
International Terrorism. The Stationery Office Limited, HMSO.  
 
Hofstede, G. (1983). The cultural relativity of organizational practices and theories. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 14(2), 75-89.  
 
Hofstede, G. (1984). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related 
 values, Sage. 
 
Hofstede, G. (1986). Cultural differences in teaching and learning. International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations, 10(3), 301-320.  
 
Hofstede, G., House, R.J., Hanges, P.J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.W., & Gupta, V., ( (1991). 
 Cultures and Organizations: software of the mind, London, McGraw Hill. 
 
Hofstede, G. (1999). Problems remain, but theories will change: The universal and the specific 
in 21st century global management. Organizational Dynamics, 27(1), 34-34.  
 
Hofstede, G. H. and G. Hofstede (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values, 
 behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations, Sage. 
 
Hogg, M. A. (2001). From prototypicality to power: A social identity analysis of leadership. 
Advances in Group Processes, 18, 1-30.  
 
Hogg, M. A., & Mullin, B.-A. (1999). Joining groups to reduce uncertainty: Subjective 
uncertainty reduction and group identification. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg 
(Eds.), Social identity and social cognition (pp. 249-279). Malden, : Blackwell 
Publishing. 
 
Hogg, M. A., Sherman, D. K., Dierselhuis, J., Maitner, A. T., & Moffitt, G. (2007). 
Uncertainty, entitativity, and group identification. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 43(1), 135-142.  




Holaway, R. M., Heimberg, R. G., & Coles, M. E. (2006). A comparison of intolerance of 
uncertainty in analogue obsessive-compulsive disorder and generalized anxiety 
disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 20(2), 158-174.  
 
Horsburgh, H. (1960). The ethics of trust. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 10(41), 343-
354.  
 
Hosmer, L. T. (1995). Trust: The connecting link between organizational theory and 
philosophical ethics. Academy of Management Review, 20(2), 379-403.  
 
House, E. R. (1977). The Logic of Evaluative Argument. CSE Monograph Series in Evaluation, 
7. Los Angeles: Center for the study of evaluation – University of California.  
 
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (2004). Culture, 
leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies: Sage publications. 
 
Hubbert, K. N., Gudykunst, W. B., & Guerrero, S. L. (1999). Intergroup communication over 
time. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 23(1), 13-46.  
 
Huff, L., & Kelley, L. (2003). Levels of organizational trust in individualist versus collectivist 
societies: A seven-nation study. Organization Science, 14(1), 81-90.  
 
Hughes, R. L. (1993). Leadership: Enhancing the lessons of experience: ERIC. 
 
Husband, C. and Y. Alam (2011). Social cohesion and counter-terrorism: A policy 
 contradiction?, Policy Press. 
 
Innes, M. (2006). Policing uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and 
democratic policing. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 605(1), 222-241.  
 
Jabnoun, N. (1994). Islam and management, Institut Kajian Dasar (IKD). 
 
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Kuha, J., Stares, S., Widdop, S., Galev, T., (2011). 
Developing European indicators of trust in justice. European Journal of Criminology, 
8(4), 267-285.  
 
Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, 
and commitment: Free Press. 
 
Jassin, K., Sheikh, H., Obeid, N., Argo, N., & Ginges, J. (2013). Negotiating cultural conflicts 
over sacred values Models for Intercultural Collaboration and Negotiation (pp. 133-
143): Springer. 
 
Jefferson, T., Walker, M., & Seneviratne, M. (1992). Ethnic minorities, crime and criminal 
justice: A study in a provincial city. Unravelling Criminal Justice. London: Macmillan, 
138-164.  




Jensen, D. L. (2006). Enhancing homeland security efforts by building strong relationships 
between the Muslim community and local law enforcement. Monterey, California. 
Naval Postgraduate School.    
 
Jocano, F. L. (1975). Slum as a way of life: A study of coping behavior in an urban environment. 
Quezon City: University of the Phillippines Press. 
 
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (1989). Cooperation and competition: Theory and research: 
Interaction Book Company. 
 
Jonathan-Zamir, T., & Weisburd, D. (2013). The effects of security threats on antecedents of 
police legitimacy: Findings from a quasi-experiment in Israel. Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency, 50(1), 3-32.  
 
Jones, C., & Supinski, S. B. (2010). Policing and community relations in the homeland security 
era. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 7(1).  
 
Jones, G. R., & George, J. M. (1998). The experience and evolution of trust: Implications for 
cooperation and teamwork. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 531-546.  
 
Jones, M. L. (2007). Hofstede-culturally questionable? The University of Wollongong. 
 
Jones, T., & Newburn, T. (2001). Widening access: Improving police relations with hard to 
reach groups: Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, 
Development and Statistics Directorate. 
 
Kahlke, R. M. (2014). Generic qualitative approaches: Pitfalls and benefits of methodological 
mixology. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 13(1), 37-52.  
 
Kahneman, D., & Slovic, P. (1982). Amos Tversky, editions.   
 
Kamali, M. H., & Society, I. T. (2002). Freedom, equality and justice in Islam: Islamic Texts 
Society Cambridge. 
 
Kasperson, R. E. (1986). Six propositions on public participation and their relevance for risk 
communication. Risk Analysis, 6(3), 275-281.  
 
Kelley, H. H. (2013). Personal relationships: Their structures and processes: Psychology 
Press. 
 
Khadduri, M. (2001). The Islamic conception of justice: JHU Press. 
 
Khodyakov, D. (2007). Trust as a process: A three-dimensional approach. Sociology, 41(1), 
115-132.  
 
Kim, D. J., Ferrin, D. L., & Rao, H. R. (2008). A trust-based consumer decision-making model 
in electronic commerce: The role of trust, perceived risk, and their antecedents. 
Decision Support Systems, 44(2), 544-564.  




Klausen, J. (2009). "British counter-terrorism after 7/7: Adapting community policing to the   
 fight against domestic terrorism." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35(3):  
 403- 420. 
Kollock, P. (1994). The emergence of exchange structures: An experimental study of 
uncertainty, commitment, and trust. American Journal of Sociology, 100(2), 313-345.  
 
Konovsky, M. A., & Folger, R. (1991). The effects of procedural and distributive justice on 
organizational citizenship behavior: Tulane University. 
 
Kothari, C. R. (2004). Research methodology: Methods and techniques, New Age 
International. 
 
Kouzes, J., & Posner, B. (1993). Credibility: How leaders gain and lose it, and why people 
demand it. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.  
 
Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring 
questions. Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1), 569-598.  
 
Kramer, R. M., Brewer, M. B., & Hanna, B. A. (1996). Collective trust and collective action. 
Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, 357-389.  
 
 
Kramer, R. M., et al. (2001). Collective identity, collective trust, and social capital: Linking 
 group identification and group cooperation. Groups at work: Theory and research 
 173: 196. 
 
Krieger, S. (1991). Social science and the self: Personal essays on an art form: Susan Krieger. 
 
Kriger, M., & Seng, Y. (2005). Leadership with inner meaning: A contingency theory of 
leadership based on the worldviews of five religions. The Leadership Quarterly, 16(5), 
771-806.  
 
Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & De Grada, E. (2006). Groups as epistemic 
providers: Need for closure and the unfolding of group-centrism. Psychological 
Review, 113(1), 84.  
 
Kühlmann, T. M. (2005). Formation of trust in German-Mexican business relations. Trust 
under Pressure: Empirical Investigations of Trust and Trust Building in Uncertain 
Circumstances. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 37-54.  
 
Kuhn, R. (2007). The rise of anti-Muslim racism in Australia: who benefits? Australian 
national university. 
 
Kull, S. (2011). Feeling betrayed: The roots of Muslim anger at America: Brookings Institution 
Press. 
 
211 | P a g e  
 
 
Kundnani, A. (2014). The Muslims are coming!: Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic 
war on terror: Verso Books. 
 
LaFree, G., & Dugan, L. (2009). Research on terrorism and countering terrorism. Crime and 
Justice, 38(1), 413-477.  
 
Laitinen, K. (2008). New Terrorism and a question of radicalization: Contemporary challenges 
for security organizations and policing. Virta, S (toim.) Policing Meets New 
Challenges: Preventing Radicalization and Recruitment. CEPOL reports, published by 
University of Tampere, CEPOL, and Police College of Finland.  
 
Lambert, R. (2008). "Empowering Salafis and Islamists against al-Qaeda: A London 
 counterterrorism case study." PS: Political Science & Politics 41(01): 31-35. 
Lambert, R. (2011). Countering al-Qaeda in London: police and Muslims in partnership: Hurst 
Publishers. 
 
Lane, E. W. (1863). An Arabic-English Lexicon. 8 vols. Beirut: Libraire du Liban. 
 
Lane, C., & Bachmann, R. (1998). Trust within and between organizations: Conceptual issues 
and empirical applications: Oxford University Press. 
 
Latif, M. I. and R. A. Khan (2011). Emerging New Threats in International System: 
 Limitations on State's Capacity. Journal of Political Studies 18(2): 37. 
 
Laub, J. A. (1999). Assessing the servant organization. Development of the Servant 
Organizational Leadership (SOLA) Instrument.  
 
Layder, D. (1998). Sociological practice: Linking theory and social research: Sage. 
 
Lea, J., & Young, J. (1984). What is to be done about law and order? : Penguin Books 
Harmondsworth,, England. 
 
Lee, R. M. (1993). Doing research on sensitive topics: Sage. 
 
Levi, M. (1998). A state of trust. Trust and Governance, 1, 77-101.  
 
Lewicki, R. J., & Bunker, B. B. (1995). Trust in relationships. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 5(1), 583-601.  
 
Lewicki, R. J., McAllister, D. J., & Bies, R. J. (1998). Trust and distrust: New relationships 
and realities. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 438-458.  
 
Lewicki, R. J., Tomlinson, E. C., & Gillespie, N. (2006). Models of interpersonal trust 
development: Theoretical approaches, empirical evidence, and future directions. 
Journal of Management, 32(6), 991-1022.  
 
212 | P a g e  
 
 
Liamputtong, P. (2006). Researching the vulnerable: A guide to sensitive research methods. 
London: Sage. 
 
Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Layman, M., & Combs, B. (1978). Judged frequency 
of lethal events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 
4(6), 551.  
 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry (Vol. 75): Sage. 
 
Lind, E. A., & Earley, P. C. (1992). Procedural justice and culture. International Journal of 
Psychology, 27(2), 227-242.  
 
Lind, E. A., Tyler, T. R., Huo, Y. J., (1997). Procedural context and culture: Variation in the 
antecedents of procedural justice judgments. Journal of personality and social psychology 
73(4): 767. 
Lindskold, S. (1978). Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory 
acts on conflict and cooperation. Psychological Bulletin, 85(4), 772.  
 
Lopes, L. L. (1987). Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology (Vol. 20, pp. 255-295): Elsevier. 
 
Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and Power., NewYork: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Luhmann, N. (2000). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. Trust: Making 
and Breaking Cooperative Relations, 6, 94-107.  
 
Macfarlane, J. (2012). Islamic divorce in North America: A Shari'a path in a secular society: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Maguire, S., & Phillips, N. (2008). ‘Citibankers’ at Citigroup: a study of the loss of institutional 
trust after a merger. Journal of Management Studies, 45(2), 372-401.  
 
Maher, S., & Frampton, M. (2009). Choosing our friends wisely. Policy Exchange.  
 
Maiter, S., Simich, L., Jacobson, N., & Wise, J. (2008). Reciprocity: An ethic for community-
based participatory action research. Action Research, 6(3), 305-325.  
 
Malik, I. H. (2003). Islam and modernity: Muslims in Europe and the United States: Pluto 
Press. 
 
Malik, M. E. and B. Naeem (2011). Impact of perceived organizational justice on 
 organizational commitment of faculty: Empirical evidence from Pakistan. 
 Interdisciplinary Journal of Research in Business 1(9): 92-98. 
Malphurs, A. (1996). Values-driven leadership. Grand Rapids: Baker 
 
Mann, A. (2016). Malek Fahd College: Video Shows Chaos at Meeting to Resolve Split in  
 Management of Islamic Schools. ABC. March 11, 2016, Retrieved from  




 in-chaos/7239508.  
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Cultural variation in the self-concept: The Self:  
 Interdisciplinary Approaches (pp. 18-48): Springer. 
 
Martin, M. M. (1999). Trust leadership. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 5(3), 
41-49.  
 
Martin, T. (2015). Challenging the separation of counter-terrorism and community cohesion in 
prevention: The potential threat of the radicalised subject. Counter-Radicalisation: 
Critical Perspectives.  
 
Mastrofski, S. D., Reisig, M. D., & McCluskey, J. D. (2002). Police disrespect toward the 
public: An encounter-based analysis. Criminology, 40(3), 519-552.  
 
Masuda, T., & Kitayama, S. (2004). Perceiver-induced constraint and attitude attribution in 
Japan and the US: A case for the cultural dependence of the correspondence bias. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(3), 409-416.  
 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational 
trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709-734.  
 
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal 
cooperation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 24-59.  
 
McCulloch, J. and S. Pickering (2010). "Future threat: pre-crime, state terror, and dystopia in  
 the 21st century: Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering question whether pre-crime  
 approaches work." Criminal Justice Matters 81(1): 32-33. 
 
McEvily, B., Perrone, V., & Zaheer, A. (2003). Trust as an organizing principle. Organization 
Science, 14(1), 91-103.  
 
McEvoy, P. M. & Mahoney, A. E., (2012). To be sure, to be sure: Intolerance of uncertainty 
 mediates symptoms of various anxiety disorders and depression. Behavior Therapy 
 43(3): 533-545. 
McFadden, M., Lyon, R., & Pinsker, R. (2008). Uncertainty, terrorism and law enforcement. 
Uncertainty and Risk: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 261.  
 
McKnight, D. H., Cummings, L. L., & Chervany, N. L. (1998). Initial trust formation in new 
organizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 473-490.  
 
Meer, N., Dwyer, C., & Modood, T. (2010). Embodying nationhood? Conceptions of British 
national identity, citizenship, and gender in the ‘Veil Affair’. The Sociological Review, 
58(1), 84-111.  
 
214 | P a g e  
 
 
Mellinger, G. D. (1956). Interpersonal trust as a factor in communication. The Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52(3), 304.  
 
Melrose, K. (1997). How servant leadership leads to business success. Hudson Valley Business 
Journal, 8. 
 
Merriam, S. B. (1998). Qualitative research and case study applications in education. Revised 
and expanded from" Case Study Research in Education.": ERIC. 
 
Merriam, S. B. (2002). Qualitative research in practice: Examples for discussion and analysis: 
Jossey-Bass Inc Pub. 
 
Merriam, S. B., & Tisdell, E. (2009). Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and 
Implementation. San Fransisco: John Willey & Sons: Inc. 
 
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). Drawing valid meaning from qualitative data: 
Toward a shared craft. Educational Researcher, 13(5), 20-30.  
 
Milliman, R. E., & Fugate, D. L. (1988). Using trust-transference as a persuasion technique: 
 An empirical field investigation. Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 
 Management, 8(2), 1-7.  
 
Mir, A. M. (2010). Leadership in Islam. Journal of Leadership Studies, 4(3), 69-72.  
 
Mishler, E. (1990). "Validation in inquiry-guided research: The role of exemplars in narrative 
 studies." Harvard educational review 60(4): 415-443. 
Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional
  and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 
 34(1), 30-62.  
Moghaddam, F. M., & Love, K. (2011). Collective uncertainty and extremism. Extremism and 
the Psychology of Uncertainty, 246-262.  
 
Mohamed, A. (2008). Journalistic ethics and responsibility in relation to freedom of expression: 
An Islamic perspective. Stephen, JA Ward and H. Wasserman (Eds.), Media ethics 
beyond borders: a global perspective, 142-156.  
 
Molinsky, A. (2007). Cross-cultural code-switching: The psychological challenges of adapting 
behavior in foreign cultural interactions. Academy of Management Review, 32(2), 622-
640. 
  
Moorman, C., Zaltman, G., & Deshpande, R. (1992). Relationships between providers and 
users of market research: The dynamics of trust. Journal of Marketing Research, 29(3), 
314-328.  
 
Morris, M. W., & Gelfand, M. J. (2004). Cultural differences and cognitive dynamics: 
Expanding the cognitive perspective on negotiation. The Handbook of Negotiation and 
Culture, 45-70.  
 
215 | P a g e  
 
 
Morton, R. (2015). Radicalism Risk from Local Islamic Power Fight. The Australian. May  
 20, 2015. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/ radicalism-risk-from-local- 
 islamic-power-fight/news-story/1656ffcfd3d273e 07917869b65c8c5c0.  
 
Murphy, K. (2004). Mission Statement for a proposal for the establishment of a center for 
behavioral and social science of counter-terrorism.Washington: In library of congress. 
 
Murphy, K., Cherney, A., Barkworth, J., (2015). Avoiding community backlash in the fight   
    against terrorism, University of Queensland and Griffith University. 
 
Mythen, G. (2012). ‘No one speaks for us’: security policy, suspected communities and the 
problem of voice. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3), 409-424.  
 
Mythen, G., Walklate, S., & Khan, F. (2013). ‘Why should we have to prove we’re alright?’: 
Counter-terrorism, risk and partial securities. Sociology, 47(2), 383-398.  
 
Nair, K. (2010). Higher standard of leadership: Tata McGraw-Hill Education. 
 
Narag, R., & Maxwell, S. R. (2014). Understanding cultural context when collecting field data: 
Lessons learned from field research in a slum area in the Philippines. Qualitative 
Research, 14(3), 311-326.  
 
Nelken, D. (1994). The futures of criminology: Sage London. 
 
New South Wales Parliament Legislative Council [NSWPLC], (2001), Report on Inquiry into 
 Cabramatta Policing, General Purpose Standing Committee No. 3.   
Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: 
Holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108(2), 291.  
 
Nixon, H. (2008). The changing face of local governance. Community Development Councils 
in Afghanistan, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  
 
Noorderhaven, N. G. (1999). National culture and the development of trust: the need for more 
data and less theory. Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review, 
24(1), 9.  
 
Nooteboom, B., & Six, F. (2003). The trust process in organizations: Empirical studies of the 
determinants and the process of trust development: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Nordin, N., Aziz, S. A., Ahmad, A. A., & Daud, N. (2014). Contracting with gharar 
(uncertainty) in forward contract: What does Islam say? Asian Social Science, 10(15), 
37.  
 
Nyabadza, G. (2003). Leadership at the peak—the 10th trait of effective leaders: Servant 
Leadership [Electronic version]. Zimbabwe Independent–AAGM.  
 
216 | P a g e  
 
 
O’Brien, N. (2008). Moderates Stage Coup at Australian Federation of Islamic Councils. The  
 Australian. May 21, 2008, Retrieved from     
 http://www.crescentsofbrisbane.org/newsletter/CCN0185.asp.  
O'Hara, K. (2004). Trust: from Socrates to spin: Icon Books. 
 
O'neill, O. (2002). Autonomy and trust in bioethics: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Messner, D. (2003). Trust and reciprocity: Russell Sage Foundation 
New York. 
 
O’Toole, T., Meer, N., De Hanas, D., Jones, S., Moodood, T., (2016). "Governing through 
 prevent? Regulation and contested practice in State–Muslim engagement." Sociology 
 50(1): 160-177. 
 
Palmer, M., & Palmer, P. (2004). At the heart of terror: Islam, jihadists, and America's war on 
terrorism: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Pantazis, C., & Pemberton, S. (2009). From the ‘old’to the ‘new’suspect community examining 
the impacts of recent UK counter-terrorist legislation. British Journal of Criminology, 
49(5), 646-666.  
 
Parmar, A. (2011). "Stop and search in London: counter-terrorist or counter-productive?" 
 Policing and Society 21(4): 369-382. 
 
Parry, G. (1976). Trust, distrust and consensus. British journal of political science, 6(2), 129-
142.  
 
Patton, M. Q. (1980). Qualitative research methods: Sage publications. 
 
Peek, L. (2011). Behind the backlash: Muslim Americans after 9/11. Temple University Press. 
 
Peel, M. (1998). Trusting disadvantaged citizens. Trust and Governance, 315-342.  
 
Pickering, S., McCulloch, J., & Wright-Neville, D. (2008). Counter-terrorism policing: 
towards social cohesion. Crime, Law and Social Change, 50(1-2), 91-109.  
 
Pillai, R., Schriesheim, C. A., & Williams, E. S. (1999). Fairness perceptions and trust as 
mediators for transformational and transactional leadership: A two-sample study. 
Journal of Management, 25(6), 897-933.  
 
Poynting, S., & Mason, V. (2007). The resistible rise of Islamophobia Anti-Muslim racism in 
the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001. Journal of Sociology, 43(1), 61-86.  
 
Punch, M. (1994). Politics and ethics in qualitative research. Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, 2, 83-98.  
 
217 | P a g e  
 
 
Purdue, D., Razzaque, K., Hambleton, R., Stewart, M., Huxham, C., & Vangen, S. (2000). 
Community Leadership in Area Regeneration: Policy Press Bristol. 
 
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work. NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Raban, J. (2003). The Greatest Gulf. The Guardian.  
 
Rahman, A. R. A. A. (1996). Administrative responsibility: an Islamic perspective. American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 13(4), 497.  
 
Rahman, F. (1970). Islam and social justice. Paper presented at the Pakistan Forum. 
 
Rahman, F. (1984). Islam and modernity: Transformation of an intellectual tradition (Vol. 15): 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Ramadan, T. (2009). In the footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the life of Muhammad: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Ramirez, D., Quinlan, T. L., Malloy, S. P., & Shutt, T. (2013). Community partnerships thwart 
terrorism Preventing Ideological Violence (pp. 151-169): Springer. 
 
Ransley, J., & Mazerolle, L. (2009). Policing in an era of uncertainty. Police Practice and 
Research: An International Journal, 10(4), 365-381.  
 
Rashid, S. F. (2007). Accessing married adolescent women: The realities of ethnographic 
research in an urban slum environment in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Field Methods, 19(4), 
369-383. doi:10.1177/1525822xo7302882 
 
Ray, C. (2015). Islamic Councils Peak Body Beset with Infighting, Claims of Financial   
 Impropriety. https://www.crikey.com.au/2015/11/25/islamiccouncils-peak-body-  
 beset-with-infighting-claims-of-financial-impropriety/.  
Reisig, M. D., & Parks, R. B. (2000). Experience, quality of life, and neighborhood context: A 
hierarchical analysis of satisfaction with police. Justice Quarterly, 17(3), 607-630.  
 
Renert, H., Russell-Mayhew, S., & Arthur, N. (2013). Recruiting ethnically diverse participants 
into qualitative health research: Lessons learned. The Qualitative Report, 18(12), 1.  
 
Richards, J. (2012). Intelligence dilemma? Contemporary counter-terrorism in a liberal 
democracy. Intelligence and National Security, 27(5), 761-780.  
 
Rigoni, I. (2005). Challenging notions and practices: The Muslim media in Britain and France. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(3), 563-580.  
 
Rinehart, S. (1998). Upside down: The paradox of servant leadership: NavPress. 
 
Rizvi, F. (2005). Representations of Islam and education for justice. Race, Identity, and 
Representation in Education, 167-178.  
 
218 | P a g e  
 
 
Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values: Free press. 
 
Rosa, E. A. (1998). Metatheoretical foundations for post-normal risk. Journal of Risk Research, 
1(1), 15-44.  
 
Rotter, J. B. (1967). A new scale for the measurement of interpersonal trust 1. Journal of 
Personality, 35(4), 651-665.  
 
Rotter, J. B. (1971). Generalized expectancies for interpersonal trust. American Psychologist, 
26(5), 443.  
 
Rotter, J. B. (1980). Interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and gullibility. American 
Psychologist, 35(1), 1.  
 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A 
cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 393-404.  
 
Rowsell, K., & Berry, T. (1993). Leadership, vision, values and systemic wisdom. Leadership 
& Organization Development Journal, 14(7), 18-22.  
 
Russell, C., Touchard, D., & Porter, M. (2002). What's rapport got to do with it? The practical 
accomplishment of fieldwork relations between young female researchers and socially 
marginalised older men. The Qualitative Report, 7(1), 1-21.  
 
Russell, R. F. (2001). The role of values in servant leadership. Leadership & Organization 
Development Journal, 22(2), 76-84.  
 
Ryan, L., Kofman, E., & Aaron, P. (2011). Insiders and outsiders: working with peer 
researchers in researching Muslim communities. International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology, 14(1), 49-60.  
 
Sabel, C. (1992). Building new forms of co-operation in a volatile economy. Industrial 
Districts and Local Economic Generation, Geneva, International Institute for Labour 
Studies.  
 
Saeed, M., Thaib, L., Rahman, M. Z. A., (2014) Islamization on Modern leadership 
 Perspective: A Conceptual study. International Journal of Multidisciplinary 
 Approach and Studies, ISSN NO:: 2348 – 537X 
Safi, L. (1995). Leadership and subordination: An Islamic perspective. The American Journal 
of Islamic Social Sciences, 12(2), 204-223.  
 
Saggar, S. (2009). Boomerangs and slingshots: radical Islamism and counter-terrorism 
strategy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35(3), 381-402.  
 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1997). Frontiers of cognitive therapy: Guilford Press. 
 
Samochowiec, J., & Florack, A. (2010). Intercultural contact under uncertainty: The impact of 
predictability and anxiety on the willingness to interact with a member from an 
219 | P a g e  
 
 
unknown cultural group. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 34(5), 507-
515.  
 
San Juan, K. S., & Residence, S. J. (2005). Re-imagining power in leadership: Reflection, 
integration, and servant-leadership. International Journal of Servant Leadership, 1(1), 
187-209.  
 
Sapsford, R., & Jupp, V. (2006). Data collection and analysis: Sage. 
 
Sarkus, D. J. (1996). Servant-leadership in safety: Advancing the cause and practice. 
Professional Safety, 41(6), 26.  
 
Schwartz, S. H. & Bilsky., (1987). Toward a universal psychological structure of human 
values. Journal of personality and social psychology 53(3): 550. 
 
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human 
 values? Journal of Social Issues 50(4): 19-45. 
Sendjaya, S., & Sarros, J. C. (2002). Servant leadership: Its origin, development, and 
application in organizations. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 9(2), 57-
64.  
 
Shakir, Z. (2003). Flight from the masjid. Seasons: Journal of Zaytuna Institute, 1(1), 65-69.  
 
Shariati, Ali. (1978) The Islamic View of Man. Bedford, Ohio: Free Islamic Literature. 
 
Sharp, D., & Atherton, S. (2007). To serve and protect? The experiences of policing in the 
community of young people from black and other ethnic minority groups. British 
Journal of Criminology, 47(5), 746-763.  
 
Shaw, J. B. (1990). A cognitive categorization model for the study of intercultural 
management. Academy of Management Review, 15(4), 626-645.  
 
Siddiqi, M. A. (1997). Islam, Muslims and media: Myths and realities: Naamps Publications. 
 
Silk, P. D. (2010). Planning outreach between Muslim communities and police in the USA and 
the UK. Doctoral diss., The University of Georgia.  
 
Silverman, D. (2000). Doing qualitative research. London: Sage. 
 
Simons, T. L. (1999). Behavioral integrity as a critical ingredient for transformational 
leadership. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 12(2), 89-104.  
 
Singleton Jr, R. A., Straits, B. C., & Straits, M. M. (1993). Approaches to social research. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sitkin, S. B., & Roth, N. L. (1993). Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic “remedies” 
for trust/distrust. Organization Science, 4(3), 367-392.  




Sivanandan, A. (1981). From resistance to rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean struggles in 
Britain. Race & Class, 23(2-3), 111-152.  
 
Sixsmith, J., Boneham, M., & Goldring, J. E. (2003). Accessing the community: Gaining 
insider perspectives from the outside. Qualitative Health Research, 13(4), 578-589.  
 
Skogan, W. G. (2006). Advocate: The promise of community policing Police Innovation: 
Contrasting Perspectives: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Slovak, J. (1988). Styles of urban policing: Organization, environment, and police styles in 
selected American cities: NYU Press. 
 
Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236(4799), 280-285.  
 
Smircich, L. (1983). Concepts of culture and organizational analysis. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 339-358.  
 
Smirnov, A. (1996). Understanding justice in an Islamic context: some points of contrast with 
Western theories. Philosophy East and West, 337-350.  
 
Smith, D. J. and J. Gray (1985). Police and people in London: The PSI report, Gower 
Publishing Company, Limited. 
 
Smith, B. N., Montagno, R. V., & Kuzmenko, T. N. (2004). Transformational and servant 
leadership: Content and contextual comparisons. Journal of Leadership & 
Organizational Studies, 10(4), 80-91.  
 
Sohrabi, H. (2016). Identity and Muslim leadership: the case of Australian Muslim leaders. 
Contemporary Islam, 10(1), 1-16.  
 
Sonn, T. (1991). Fazlur Rahman's Islamic Methodology. The Muslim World, 81(3‐4), 212-230.  
 
Sorrentino, R. M., & Roney, C. J. (1986). Uncertainty orientation, achievement-related 
motivation, and task diagnosticity as determinants of task performance. Social 
Cognition, 4(4), 420-436.  
 
Spalek, B. (2010). Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to “new 
terrorism”. Politics & Policy, 38(4), 789-815.  
 
Spalek, B. (2013). Islam, crime and criminal justice: Routledge. 
 
Spalek, B., & Lambert, R. (2008). Muslim communities, counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalisation: A critically reflective approach to engagement. International Journal of 
Law, Crime and Justice, 36(4), 257-270.  
 
Spalek, B., & McDonald, L. Z. (2011). Conflict with and between communities: Exploring the 
role of communities in helping to defeat and/or endorse terrorism and the interface with 
221 | P a g e  
 
 
policing efforts to counter terrorism. Birmingham: University of Birmingham/AHRC. 
Retrieved October, 20, 2015.  
 
Spalek, B., El Awa, S., McDonald, L. Z., & Lambert, R. (2008). Police-Muslim engagement 
and partnerships for the purposes of counter terrorism: An examination: University of 
Birmingham. 
 
Spalek, B., & O’Rawe, M. (2014). Researching counterterrorism: a critical perspective from 
the field in the light of allegations and findings of covert activities by undercover police 
officers. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(1), 150-164.  
 
Spears, L. (1996). Reflections on Robert K. Greenleaf and servant-leadership. Leadership & 
Organization Development Journal, 17(7), 33-35.  
 
Spradley, J. P. (1979). The ethnographic interview. Long Grove, IL, Waveland Press. 
 
Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of case study research: Sage. 
 
Staniforth, A. (2014). Preventing terrorism and violent extremism: Oxford University Press. 
 
Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1985). Intergroup anxiety. Journal of Social Issues, 41(3), 
157-175.  
 
Stickel, D. (1999). Building trust in the face of hostility (Doctoral dissertation, Duke 
 University, Durham, NC, US). 
Stone, G. A., Russell, R. F., and Patterson, K., (2004). Transformational versus servant 
 leadership: A difference in leader focus. Leadership & Organization Development 
  Journal 25(4): 349-361. 
Stoutland, S. E. (2001). The multiple dimensions of trust in resident/police relations in Boston. 
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 38(3), 226-256.  
 
Strickland, L. H. (1958). Surveillance and trust 1. Journal of Personality, 26(2), 200-215.  
 
Strub, P. J., & Priest, T. (1976). Two patterns of establishing trust: The marijuana user. 
Sociological Focus, 9(4), 399-411.  
 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy 
of Management Review, 20(3), 571-610.  
 
Sunshine, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping 
public support for policing. Law & Society Review, 37(3), 513-548.  
 
Sweedan, T. (2000). Ar-Rasoul Al-Qaa’d (The Leader Prophet). Cassette, Recording 
(142000323).  
 
Syed, I. B. (2002). Shoura. Islamic Research Foundation. Kentucky, (http://www.irfi.org/).  
 
222 | P a g e  
 
 
Sztompka, P. (1998). Trust, distrust and two paradoxes of democracy. European Journal of 
Social Theory, 1(1), 19-32.  
 
Sztompka, P. (1999). Trust: A sociological theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tangngareng, T., Zulkifli, T., Syukri, S., (2017). Justice Construction In Qur’an Perspective. 
 Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 4(14). 
Tatum, J. B. (1995). Meditations on servant-leadership. Reflections on Leadership: How 
Robert K. Greenleaf’s Theory of Servant Leadership Influenced Today’s Top 
Management Thinkers, 308-312.  
 
Tewksbury, R., Dabney, D. A., & Copes, H. (2010). The prominence of qualitative research in 
criminology and criminal justice scholarship. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 
21(4), 391-411.  
 
Tewksbury, R., & Gagné, P. (1997). Assumed and presumed identities: Problems of self‐
presentation in field research. Sociological Spectrum, 17(2), 127-155.  
 
Thacher, D. (2005). The local role in homeland security. Law & Society Review, 39(3), 635-
676.  
 
Thompson, L. L., & Thompson, L. L. (2001). The mind and heart of the negotiator (Vol. 3): 
Prentice Hall Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
 
Tibi, B. (1997). The cultural underpinning of civil society in Islamic civilization: Islam and 
democracy-bridges between the civilizations. Civil Society, Democracy, and the 
Muslim World, 23-31.  
 
Turner, J. H. (1988). A theory of social interaction: Stanford University Press. 
 
Tyler, T., Degoey, P., Smith, H., (1996). Understanding why the justice of group procedures 
 matters: A test of the psychological dynamics of the group-value model. Journal of 
 personality and social psychology 70(5): 913. 
Tyler, T. R. (2006). Why people obey the law: Princeton University Press. 
 
Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. (2002). Trust in the law: Encouraging public cooperation with the 
police and courts. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Umaña‐Taylor, A. J., & Bámaca, M. Y. (2004). Conducting focus groups with Latino 
populations: Lessons from the field. Family Relations, 53(3), 261-272.  
 
van de Linde, E. J. (2002). Quick scan of post 9/11 national counter-terrorism policymaking 
and implementation in selected European countries: Research project for the 
Netherlands Ministry of Justice: Rand. 
 
Vermeulen, F. (2014). Suspect communities—targeting violent extremism at the local level: 
policies of engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London. Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 26(2), 286-306.  




Vermeulen, F., & Bovenkerk, F. (2012). Engaging with violent Islamic extremism: Local 
policies in Western European cities: The HagueEleven International 
Publishers9789490947576. 
 
Waddington, P. A., Stenson, K., & Don, D. (2004). In proportion race, and police stop and 
search. British Journal of Criminology, 44(6), 889-914.  
 
Walklate, S., Mythen, G., & McGarry, R. (2011). Witnessing Wootton Bassett: An exploration 
in cultural victimology. Crime, Media, Culture, 7(2), 149-165.  
 
Wallace, J. R. (2007). Servant leadership: A worldview perspective. International Journal of 
Leadership Studies, 2(2), 114-132.  
 
Warren, M. E. (1999). Democracy and trust: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Weary, G., Jacobson, J. A., Edwards, J. A., & Tobin, S. J. (2001). Chronic and temporarily 
activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 81(2), 206. 
  
Weick, K. (1979). The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd edn, New York: McGraw-Hill.  
 
Weitz, R. (1989). Uncertainty and the lives of persons with AIDS. Journal of Health and Social 
Behavior, 270-281.  
 
Welzel, C., Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H.-D. (2003). Human development as a theory of 
social change: A cross-cultural perspective. European Journal of Political Science, 42, 
341-379.  
 
Weterings, R. A., & Van Eijndhoven, J. C. (1989). Informing the public about uncertain risks. 
Risk Analysis, 9(4), 473-482.  
 
Whitaker, B. (2002). Islam and the British press. Muslim Council of Britain, The Quest for 
Sanity, 53-57.  
 
Whyte, W. F. (1955). Street corner society: the social structure of an Italian slum. Chicago 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Willis, J. W., Jost, M., & Nilakanta, R. (2007). Foundations of qualitative research: 
Interpretive and critical approaches: Sage. 
 
Wilson, J. Q. (1968). 1978. Varieties of police behavior. New York: Atheneum.  
 
Wilson, M., & Sapsford, R. (2006). Data collection and analysis. London, England: Sage 
.  
Witte, K. (1992). Putting the fear back into fear appeals: The extended parallel process model. 
Communications Monographs, 59(4), 329-349.  
 
224 | P a g e  
 
 
Woodward, Ian and Shaffakat, Samah, Understanding Values for Insightfully Aware 
Leadership (2016). INSEAD Working Paper No. 2016/05/OBH.  
 
Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan. 
Motivation and Emotion, 18(2), 129-166.  
 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case Study Research, Design & Methods 4th ed. London: Sage Publishers 
 
Zaheer, S. and A. Zaheer (2006). "Trust across borders." Journal of International Business
  Studies 37(1): 21-29. 
 
Zak, P. J., & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. The Economic Journal, 111(470), 295-321.  
 
Zand, D. E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
229-239.  
 
Zucker, L. G. (1986). Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 1840–
1920. Research in Organizational Behavior.  
 




Appendix One:  Ethical Approval from the University of Queensland Human Research 




226 | P a g e  
 
 




227 | P a g e  
 
 
Appendix Three:  Letter of Support from the Islamic Council of Queensland 
 
 
228 | P a g e  
 
 
 
